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1

Dissertation Overview
In the past decades, two topics have attracted public attention both inside and outside
academia: Financial markets and environment. Environment is fundamental for the well
being of human life and the financial sector plays a key role for the functioning of a
modern economy, due to its principle interconnection with the real economy.
First, when governments and regulators discuss whether stricter regulations should be
imposed on banks in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2007-2008, two questions are
fundamental: How is the availability of credit to firms influenced by aggregate fluctuations
of the economy? And what do stricter regulations mean for the real sector?
Second, if we take a closer look at the financial sector, it is clear from data that
tremendous structural change has taken place in the past thirty years: This is not only
reflected by an increasing weight of the financial sector relative to the production sector,
but also by a shift within the financial sector from conventional banking towards modern
new finance (e.g., commodity contracts, securities, etc). A natural question is therefore:
What drives such twofold structural change?
The first two chapters of this dissertation study the interconnection between the finan-
cial sector and the real economy from the above-mentioned two perspectives, respectively.
The third chapter converts the focus to the other pressing issue: Environment.
China has experienced substantial economic growth, but also severe environmental de-
terioration in the last decades. It is both of academic interest and of the interest of fellow
households to understand potential reasons that induce such situation. A series of obser-
vations point to a role of the political institutions in China: First, China’s environmental
pollution surpasses other countries in their similar phase of economic development and
industrial structure. Second, local governments in China have low incentives to improve
environment, due to career concerns and availability of fiscal budgets. And lastly, there
are increasing cases of household protest due to environmental issues. These observations
lay the ground for my third project.
The first paper Bank lending and firm dynamics in general equilibrium (jointly with
Sabrina Studer) characterizes a long-term dynamic lending relationship between banks
and firms in a general equilibrium framework. First, firms need bank loans to produce,
and banks provide loans with deposits from workers. The productivity of firm production
is a random variable, and the realized productivity in each period is private information
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of firms. To avoid information asymmetry, profit-maximizing banks provide loans and
ask for repayments through long-term dynamic contracts. Like in standard literature, the
dynamic contract is recursively determined with promised value as state variable, where
the promised value in the context of this paper is firms’ discounted future income (output
net of repayments to banks). Since the availability of bank loans determines firms’ budget
for employing input factors, the lending relationship between banks and firms determines
the size of firms in the economy, as well as important characteristics of firm dynamics, such
as firms’ growth and the volatility of growth. In a second step, we embed the dynamic
loan contract into a general equilibrium framework by endogenously determining the
occupational choice of households (to become a worker or an entrepreneur). This allows
us to get the share of entrepreneurs in equilibrium and the factor prices. The theoretical
contribution of the paper is that we merge two strands of research: Lending relationships
between banks and firms in general equilibrium, and impact of firm financing on firm
dynamics (in a partial equilibrium). The quantitative results of the model are in line with
empirical observations: Young firms are more financially constrained, and the situation is
alleviated in repeated interactions with banks. In addition, young firms are characterized
by faster growth but more volatility in growth. Furthermore, comparative statics analysis
of the model allows us to assess the impact of an increase in productivity volatility,
and of an increasing stringency in bank regulation (in terms of higher reserve ratio) on
equilibrium factor prices, entrepreneurship and firm dynamics.
The second project Explaining structural change towards and within the financial sec-
tor (jointly with Josef Falkinger and Sabrina Studer) studies in a three-sector OLG frame-
work potential drivers of the twofold structural change. The three sectors are a good sector
that produces consumption and investment goods, and two financial sectors that provide
financial services for transforming household savings into future consumption possibilities.
High- and low-skilled labor are used in production of goods and services. And capital is ad-
ditionally used in the good sector. Sectors differ in skill intensity. Households make saving
and portfolio decisions to maximize lifetime expected utility. To transform savings in the
safe and in risky assets, financial services from the two financial sectors are demanded. In
general equilibrium, the skill premium, which is the relative wage of high- to low-skilled
labor, and the sectoral structure of an economy are determined. Furthermore, we do
comparative statics analysis with respect to fundamentals (i.e., households endowment,
supply of skill and directed technical change). Using the wage premium as an indicator of
inequality, we identify the following channels as common drivers that contribute simulta-
neously to two salient features of the recent development: The twofold structural change
as well as the increasing inequality. Specifically, the channels are uniform productivity
growth across sectors, biased technical change and increasing completeness of financial
5market. We further extend the baseline model to allow for frictions, which in fact charac-
terize financial market (e.g., fixed costs, rents or participation constraints in the financial
sector, as well as distorted portfolio choice due to erroneous belief and set-up capital for
firms), and discuss their impact on structural change and on inequality. In the end, we
calibrate the model using US data from 1980-2014, and show that the potential drivers
of change suggested by the theoretical analysis are consistent with the data.
The third project Environmental policy and social stability in China analyzes reasons
of China’s environmental deterioration from a political economy perspective. This pa-
per provides a framework for analyzing “high output / high pollution” issue in China.
It accounts for China’s political system and addresses its key elements: The hierarchy
system between the central government and local officials, the central government’s cadre
system, local officials’ fiscal investment and increasing cases of household protest. The
model includes a central government, local officials and households from N regions. The
benevolent central government chooses the environmental policy that maximizes house-
hold welfare; however, it needs local officials to implement the policy by regional invest-
ments. Households act to maintain their utility (from consumption and environment)
above an exogenous threshold: When their utility falls below, they protest against their
local official. Local officials have career concerns (in pursuit of promotion and avoiding
demotion due to local protests): They maximize their expected income by allocating local
fiscal budget on production-related and environment-related infrastructure. Higher local
production increases their probability of being promoted, whereas overly high production
deteriorates environment and increases probability of household protest in the region.
The tradeoff of the central government is between a moderate pollution abatement policy
on the one side and a decreasing probability of policy success under more thorough envi-
ronmental policy. We compare local officials’ investment allocation under two scenarios:
In an equilibrium where the local officials are incentivized by career concerns, and in a
social optimum with benevolent local officials. We find that promotion incentives induce
an overly high investment in production-related infrastructure; the extent of overinvest-
ment depends on local officials’ ability and the strength of environmental policy of the
central government. As a consequence, households have higher consumption but worse
environmental quality in the equilibrium with incentivized officials compared to the social
optimum with benevolent officials. Additionally, the central government chooses a weaker
environmental policy to avoid local officials’ incentive to overinvest, which further lowers
the equilibrium environmental quality below the social optimum one.
The structure of the dissertation is as follows: The three papers are presented in Part
II and the respective appendices are provided in Part III. The bibliography is in Part IV
and Part V includes my curriculum vitae.
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1 Bank lending and firm dynamics in general
equilibrium
Joint with Sabrina Studer
1.1 Introduction
Access to financing is one of the main issues firms are dealing with. In general,
financial constraints determine firms’ development and their size distribution
(Angelini and Generale, 2008). Especially for small and medium-sized firms with con-
strained access to bond or equity markets (The Economist, 2015), bank loans account for
the primary part of external financing (Berger and Udell, 2002). This project analyzes
how entrepreneurs and banks interact by modeling long-term credit relationships between
them. Long-term credit relationships help to overcome information asymmetries through
dynamic contracting. To the best of our knowledge we are the first who deal with such
a long-term lending relationship in a general equilibrium framework which allows us to
determine endogenously both the share of entrepreneurs as well as important aspects of
firm dynamics such as size, growth and variance of growth of firms.
A key point of our model is the assumption of information asymmetry. This is, en-
trepreneurs have private knowledge about realized output levels of firms’ production and
banks cannot observe these. To deal with such repeated informational friction we take the
paper of Smith and Wang (2006) on “dynamic credit relationships in general equilibrium”
as a starting point. Like them we have banks and ex-ante identical households with finite
life expectancy who either become entrepreneurs or workers. Workers supply labor, con-
sume and save, whereas entrepreneurs run firms by hiring labor and capital. The realized
output of firms is exposed to stochastic states of productivity. These are only observ-
able to the entrepreneurs who report them to the banks. We extend Smith and Wang
(2006) by adopting a production structure which allows for variable firm size like in
Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) (who work in a partial-equilibrium analysis). In partic-
ular, we use a technology with decreasing returns to scale. As in Clementi and Hopenhayn
(2006) and Smith and Wang (2006) entrepreneurs finance production costs through loans
from banks. Banks offer entrepreneurs long-term financial contracts, which determine
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the optimal level of bank loans and state-contingent repayments. In recursive formula-
tion these are determined together with future promised values as functions of today’s
promised values. A promised value is the continuation utility of an entrepreneur from con-
sumption of future cash flows (net revenue generated from production by using bank loans
minus repayments). The financial contracts are promise keeping and incentive compatible
and fulfill the limited liabilities and the credibility constraints.
Our model structure allows us to determine the share of entrepreneurs endogenously
and to see the effects of the dynamic lending-contracts on the size, growth, variance of
growth of firms at different ages, and on the size distribution of firms in the economy in
equilibrium. This extends Smith and Wang (2006) by the aspect of firm dynamics and
it completes Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) by the general equilibrium aspect. Fur-
ther, it adds to Dyrda (2016), Gross and Verani (2013) and Verani (2015) the endogenous
determination of the share of entrepreneurs. They embed dynamic contract in a gen-
eral equilibrium framework, but assume two types of households with different utility
functions being either workers or entrepreneurs. We calibrate our model; use it to get
numerical results and to solve for the general equilibrium. Workers’ saving and labor
decision, entrepreneurs’ choice of the optimal level of factor inputs and the optimal finan-
cial contract are derived numerically. We find that the optimal level of bank loans and
state-contingent future promised values are increasing functions of today’s promised val-
ues while the state-contingent repayments first increase and then decrease with the state
variable. State-contingencies of future promised values and repayments are as follows: If
entrepreneurs report a high productivity state they are promised a higher future contin-
uation utility, but they have to repay more today than if they report a low productivity
state. This trade-off induces truth-telling about productivity realizations. By combining
the three partial decision problems – of workers, entrepreneurs and banks, respectively –
we close our model and determine the stationary general equilibrium. Our model predicts
an equilibrium interest rate of around 4%. This is a common number in literature. The
share of entrepreneurs in our economy is found to be 8%, which corresponds approxi-
mately to the rate of self-employed in the U.S. (data from OECD). The firm dynamics
resulting in general equilibrium from the optimal path of the promised values are as fol-
lows: There is a positive correlation between firm size and firm age. Furthermore, the
growth of younger firms is on average larger and more volatile than that of older firms.
In addition to the numerical results and the economic explanation of them, we provide
a discussion of technical issues which can cause problems in dynamic programming. These
are, among others, starting value problems, extrapolation issues, sensitivity to parameter
values and to functional forms as well as issues related to simulations.
The paper adds to the literature by modeling the long-term credit relationships be-
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tween firms and banks in general equilibrium. Through dynamic contracting informa-
tion asymmetries between banks and firms can be overcome. The analysis of repeated
information asymmetries was initiated by Radner (1985) and Rogerson (1985). The dy-
namic programming approach to it with the recursive formulation of incentive compati-
ble, optimal contracts was developed by Green (1987) and Spear and Srivastava (1987).
Thomas and Worrall (1990), who extend the two-period, two-state problem of Townsend
(1982) for any number of periods and finite state spaces, add to Green (1987) and
Spear and Srivastava (1987) by focusing on the long-run asymptotic properties of the
contracts. Such incentive compatible long-term contracts deliver on the one hand an insur-
ance component if agents are exposed to idiosyncratic shocks which are unobservable (as in
Green (1987), Thomas and Worrall (1990), Atkeson and Lucas (1992) or Atkeson and Lucas
(1995)). On the other hand, they provide financing opportunities. In particular, contracts
between risk-neutral banks and firms can support optimal lending policies of banks which
maximize the value of the firms (as in Quadrini (2004), Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006)
or DeMarzo and Fishman (2007)).
The main contribution of this paper is the incorporation of dynamic financial con-
tracts into a general equilibrium framework with an endogenous share of entrepreneurs
and dynamic evolution of firms’ size over age. Smith and Wang (2006), Dyrda (2016),
Gross and Verani (2013) and Verani (2015) work in a similar model set-up. However,
Smith and Wang (2006) do only consider projects with fixed units of capital and labor as
input factors. They do not model an entrepreneur’s optimal labor and capital decision
under a more realistic production function. Hence, they cannot deal with firm dynamics.
Dyrda (2016) does not consider a saving decision of workers by excluding them from the
capital market. And in contrast to Dyrda (2016), Gross and Verani (2013) and Verani
(2015), who do not incorporate firm entry, we determine the share of entrepreneurs in the
economy endogenously. Technically, more complex equilibrium conditions are considered,
which raises computational challenges.
Our model exhibits financial frictions which are the result of the information asymme-
try. More precisely, we have borrowing constraints (i.e., firms do not get the efficient level
of banks loans) as an endogenous result of the incentive-compatible long-term lending re-
lationship between borrowers and the lender. This is like in the literature discussed above.
Yet, in contrast to other contributions to the analysis of long-term contracts between firms
and banks, our model does not connect financial frictions to the issue of collateral as it
is done in Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) or Verani (2015). Nor do we allow for the
possibility of auditing like in Verani (2015) or Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) in an
environment with limited enforcement.
Directly connected to the (endogenous) borrowing constraints are the dynamics of
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firm development in our model.1 As a result of the long-term relation between the banks
and firms, we predict that older firms are on average larger and that they grow less but
more stable. These results are in line with the predictions from the dynamic contract
models in Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), Dyrda (2016), Gross and Verani (2013) and
Verani (2015). Furthermore, they are consistent with the empirical regularities of firm
dynamics.2 In our model, the firm size distribution is more dispersed for older than for
younger firms because their history of productivity realizations is more heterogeneous.
That (endogenous) borrowing constraints have an impact on the size distribution of firms
is consistent with the results of Angelini and Generale (2008) and Cabral and Mata (2003)
who find that younger firms, which are financially constrained, have in fact different (more
skewed) firm size distributions.
The structure of the paper is as follow: Section 1.2 introduces the theoretical model.
Therein, the workers’ and entrepreneurs’ problems and the role of financial intermedi-
aries is described. Further, the recursive formulation of the dynamic lending contracts
is presented and some theoretical properties are discussed. Section 1.3 provides the ag-
gregation and equilibrium conditions and defines the stationary, general equilibrium. In
Section 1.4 the calibration of the model and numerical results are presented. In Section 1.5
we propose two model applications. Section 1.6 discusses issues connected with dynamic
programming. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Model
1.2.1 Model set-up
Consider an infinite time horizon model with finite life expectancy. A continuum of ex-
ante identical households are born at the beginning of each period. A household survives
at the end of the period with an exogenous probability. Right after birth a household
decides to become a worker or an entrepreneur. We assume that this choice of occupation
is irreversible over lifetime. A worker supplies labor, consumes and saves part of its
income. An entrepreneur runs a firm which uses labor and capital as inputs and consumes
entrepreneurial income (net revenue from production). In addition to the households,
there are banks which act as financial intermediaries between workers and entrepreneurs.
Namely, they take annuity deposits from workers and offer financing contracts in the
form of bank loans to the entrepreneurs for their production. We assume that banks are
1For an overview of the effects of financial frictions in a dynamic contract set-up on aggregate fluctu-
ations / business cycle fluctuations see the literature discussed in Dyrda (2016) and Verani (2015). For
the effects of access to credit on international trade see Gross and Verani (2013).
2See, for example, Evans (1987) or Hall (1987) for empirical literature on firm dynamics.
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competitive so that they make zero profit in expectation from any financial contract they
sign with entrepreneurs.
1.2.2 Households
Households are endowed with one unit of labor each period and no wealth at birth.
The instantaneous utility function of the households (both workers and entrepreneurs) is
U(c, l), where c is the consumption level and l is the labor supply. U(c, l) is decreasing
in l and increasing, strictly concave and bounded in c. Households discount future with
rate β.
The exogenous survival probability is ∆. We assume that the mass of newborns
in each period is 1 − ∆, so that the mass of population is constant at 1. The share
of the households in cohort τ who become entrepreneurs is λτ . λτ will be determined
endogenously in equilibrium by the labor market clearing condition (see 1.27). Figure 1.1
summarizes the compositions of different cohorts’ population size and their occupations
at time t. It shows that at each point in time we have a distribution of workers and of
entrepreneurs of different ages in the population.
Cohort 0
Cohort 1
Cohort τ
Mass 1−∆:
λ0 entrepreneurs
(1− λ0) workers
Mass (1−∆)∆:
λ1 entrepreneurs,
(1−λ1) workers
Mass (1−∆)∆τ :
λτ entrepreneurs,
(1−λτ ) workers
Time t
Age 0
Age 1
Age τ
Figure 1.1: Size and occupational composition of different cohorts
1.2.2.1 Workers
In each period, workers supply labor for production and get wage income in return. Wage
income as well as wealth can be used for consumption of final goods or as savings for wealth
(and thus consumption) in future periods in the form of one-period annuity deposits in
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the banks. In each period t, the workers of age τ buy at the end of the period Aτ,t+1 ≥ 0
units of the annuity at price pAt . This entitles the worker to receive wealth level Aτ,t+1
in period t + 1 conditional on survival. The annuity deposits are priced competitively
(actuarially fair) such that banks make zero profit from offering them to the workers.
This means, the aggregate amount of money received by the banks from workers plus
the interest it generates within a period must be equal to what they give out in the next
period. Formally, at time t,
∞∑
τ=0
(1 + rt+1)(1−∆)∆
τpAt Aτ,t+1 =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τ+1Aτ,t+1,
where (1−∆)∆τpAt Aτ,t+1 is the aggregate payments of the workers of age τ at time t to
buy the annuity. This generates an interest with rate 1 + rt+1 in the next period. The
aggregate amount is redistributed to all workers from last period who are still alive this
period, which is ∆-times the original size (1−∆)∆τ of each cohort. Therefore, zero-profit
for banks implies that
pAt =
∆
1 + rt+1
, (1.1)
whereby the market-clearing interest rate rt+1 is endogenously determined in equilibrium.
The workers’ problem of choosing labor supply l, consumption c and savings in annu-
ities A′ in an optimal way can be formulated in the following recursive way with today’
wealth A ≥ 0 as state variable:
V W (A; r, w) = max
c,l,A′
{
U(c, l) + ∆βV W (A′; r′, w′)
}
, (1.2)
subject to
c+ pAA′ = wl + A, (1.3)
c ≥ 0, l ∈ [0, 1], A′ ≥ 0.
V W (A; r, w) is the worker’s value function (i.e., continuation utility) given today’s wealth
level A, interest rate r and wage rate w. pA is given by (1.1). A prime indicates variables of
tomorrow. ∆β captures discounting and the fact that the worker survives with probability
∆. Denote the policy function of optimal saving A′ and labor choice l, respectively, by
Aτ,t+1 = g(Aτ,t; rt+1, wt), lτ,t = h(Aτ,t; rt+1, wt). (1.4)
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1.2.2.2 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs run firms. They supply entrepreneurial labor and derive utility from con-
sumption of net revenue from production. Entrepreneurs and firms are associated for the
whole lifetime. Namely, a newborn household who becomes entrepreneur opens a firm
and runs the firm for the entire lifetime until death; then the firm exits the market. Thus,
the firm’s exit rate is exogenously given by the household’s death rate 1−∆.
Firms produce in each period under uncertainty a single output (numéraire), which can
either be consumed or be used as capital. In each period a fixed amount of entrepreneurial
labor LE is needed for setting up / managing the production. The production requires
capital k and labor from workers l. The production function takes the form:
Y (kt, lt) = θtF (kt, lt),
where F (·) reflects the production technology that transforms capital and labor inputs
into the final product. It exhibits decreasing returns to scale. We assume the function to
be continuous and strictly concave.
The level of θt represents the productivity at time t. In each period t the productivity is
subject to an idiosyncratic shock with state space S = {1, 2, . . . , S} and the corresponding
realization of states θt ∈ Θ = {θ1, θ2, . . . , θS}. The shock is i.i.d. over entrepreneurs and
time. The probability distribution of the states is {πs}s∈S with
∑
s∈S
πs = 1. Without
loss of generality, let θi < θj if i < j. At any time t, each firm has an entire history of
productivity realizations θtτ = (θt−τ , . . . , θt−τ+i, . . . , θt), where τ is the age of the firm and
t − τ + i, i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , τ} is the calendar time when the firm was of age i. Note that
the heterogeneity among firms is characterized by the different histories of productivity
realizations.
We assume that the realization of productivity shock is private information to the
entrepreneur. This reflects the information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and banks.
Prior to production (i.e., before the idiosyncratic shock is realized), the entrepreneurs
need to purchase capital and pay the workers. By assumption, the entrepreneurs are
neither endowed with wealth nor do they accumulate wealth from their production rev-
enues over lifetime. This means, self-financing of production is excluded. Hence, they
need external financing. We restrict the source of financing to bank funding. Bank
loans and repayments arise from a lifetime financial contract between the bank and the
entrepreneur. More specifically, the financial contract entitles the entrepreneurs each pe-
riod to some amount of bank loans b, which is used to cover the production costs, and
some repayments m after production.3 For a given level of loans and factor prices, the en-
3A detailed characterization of the financial contract, which includes bank loans b as well as repayments
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trepreneurs determine the optimal capital and labor employment by maximizing expected
output. The decision problem is
max
kt,lt
E(θt)F (kt, lt) (1.5)
subject to
wtlt + (rt + δ)kt ≤ bt,
where (rt + δ) are the user cost of capital with δ being the depreciation rate of capital.
We define
R(bt; rt, wt) ≡ F (k
∗
t , l
∗
t ) (1.6)
with k∗t = k(bt; rt, wt), l
∗
t = l(bt; rt, wt) being the solution to (1.5) at which the marginal
rate of transformation correspond to the relative factor price of capital and labor. Notice
that firms’ labor costs include only wage payments to workers. The implicit assumption
is that the entrepreneurs do not supply the entrepreneurial labor LE in the labor market
of workers. In what follows we denote the labor supply from workers as labor.
The entrepreneur’s consumption ct in each period is given by net revenue from pro-
duction, which is gross production θtR(bt) minus repayments to banks mt:
cEt = θtR(bt; rt, wt)−mt. (1.7)
Therefore, the expected lifetime utility of an entrepreneur is given by
V E0 =
∞∑
t=0
(β∆)tEU(cEt , L
E), (1.8)
where expectation is with respect to current period realization of productivity, θt, as well
as the history of realizations captured in bt andmt (as derived in Section 1.2.4). According
to the properties of the utility function, natural bounds for V E0 are given by V
E
min and
V Emax, where
V Emin ≡ limc→0
1
1− β∆
U(c, LE) and V Emax ≡ limc→∞
1
1− β∆
U(c, LE). (1.9)
Remember that entrepreneurs do not make intertemporal savings decisions by assumption.
Therefore, for given terms of the financial contract, maximization of expected lifetime
utility in (1.8) is equivalent to maximizing the expected production output as given by
(1.5).
In recursive formulation the continuation utility of an entrepreneur at time t can be
m, can be found in Section 1.2.4.
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written as:
V Et = E
[
U(cEt , L
E) + β∆V Et+1
]
(1.10)
Notice that V Emin and V
E
max are also the upper and the lower bound of continuation
utilities of the entrepreneurs, respectively.
1.2.3 Financial intermediaries
The banks in the economy serve the role as financial intermediaries between saving house-
holds and producing firms. Namely, they take annuity deposits from workers and offer
financial contracts to entrepreneurs. Banks act also as holder of capital. Banks’ equity,
E, is the accumulated retained earnings from net cash flows of bank loans and repay-
ments (see Section 1.3.1.3 for more details on equity). Overall, banks invest the annuity
deposits from workers and own banks’ equity as capital input into the production run by
entrepreneurs.
Banks are risk neutral profit maximizers and discount future at the current interest
rate. There is free entry into the banking sector. This means in equilibrium banks expect
zero profits from each single lending contract and thus size and ownership of the banks do
not matter. Without loss of generality, we assume the existence of a representative bank
holding a portfolio of all financial contracts with the entrepreneurs of all ages τ and with
all heterogeneous histories of productivity realizations θtτ .
1.2.4 Dynamic lending contract
The credit relation between banks and entrepreneurs is characterized by a lifetime binding
financial contract. More specifically, following the standard dynamic contracting model
(e.g., Thomas and Worrall (1990), Atkeson and Lucas (1992)), each firm signs a lifetime
contract with a bank. Banks offer each newborn entrepreneur a take-it-or-leave-it lifetime
binding financial contract.
We assume that both banks and entrepreneurs are fully committed to the contract in
all possible future contingencies.
In the dynamic financial contract problem in recursive form, the continuation utility
of an entrepreneur from future consumption, V Et as defined in (1.10), can be used as
state variable (given interest and wage rate). Following the terminology of the literature,
we call V Et the promised value. This means that the banks promise a continuation util-
ity to the entrepreneurs by committing themselves to the terms of contract that imply
a sequence of future consumption flows which generate the promised value. Therefore,
given a promised value V Et = V
E(θt−1; rt, wt) as state variable – which includes the entire
history of productivity realizations of an entrepreneur until time t − 1, θt−1 – the con-
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tract consists of
{
b(V Et ; rt, wt),m(V
E
t , θt; rt, wt), V
E(V Et , θt; rt, wt)
}
.4 The first two terms
are the bank loans to the entrepreneur, b(V Et ; rt, wt), and the repayments from the en-
trepreneur to the bank, m(V Et , θt; rt, wt). Loans are advanced before production, whereas
repayments are made after the realization and after entrepreneurs’ report of the current
period productivity. Hence, loans are only contingent on today’s promised value, whereas
repayments are a function of today’s promised value and the reported productivity level
including time θt. (Note that according to the revelation principle, any equilibrium out-
come can be achieved by a truth-telling mechanism. In particular, by imposing incentive
constraints we can guarantee that entrepreneurs always report the actual realization of
productivity θt. Therefore, we focus only on truth-telling contracts.) The third term,
V E(V Et , θt; rt, wt), is the next period’s promised value given today’s promised value and
the productivity realization θt. In other words, V
E
t+1 = V
E(V Et , θt; rt, wt) is the transi-
tion function of the state variable which incorporates the whole history of productivity
realizations of an entrepreneur.
Since firms with the same promised value of today are assigned the same terms of
contract (independent of time t or age τ), V E is the state variable. V E can be used as
an indicator of firms in the equilibrium analysis (see Section 1.3.1.2 for aggregation of
entrepreneurs).
1.2.4.1 Optimal financial contract
For given interest rate and wage rate, (r, w), the optimal contract can be determined by the
following program written in recursive form with the promised value, V E ∈ [V Emin, V
E
max],
as state variable:
P (V E; r, w) = max
b,{ms,V Es }s∈S
−b+
∑
s∈S
πs
[
ms +
∆
1 + r
P (V Es ; r
′, w′)
]
(1.11)
subject to
V E =
∑
s∈S
πs[U
(
θsR(b; r, w)−ms, L
E
)
+ β∆V Es ], (PK)
U
(
θiR(b; r, w)−mi, L
E
)
+β∆V Ei ≥ U
(
θiR(b; r, w)−mj, L
E
)
+β∆V Ej , ∀i, j ∈ S, (IC)
ms ≤ θsR(b; r, w),∀s ∈ S, (LL)
V Es ∈ [V
E
min, V
E
max]. (CC)
P (V E; r, w) is the bank’s expected profit (value function) from a financial contract with
state variable V E given r and w. b denotes the level of bank loans,
{
ms, V
E
s
}
s∈S
are state-
4See Appendix A.1 for a detailed structure of the timing in the dynamic financial contract.
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contingent repayments and future promised values, respectively. ∆
1+r
captures discounting
and the fact that the entrepreneur survives with probability ∆. V Emin and V
E
max are given
in (1.9).
(PK) is the promise keeping constraint. It indicates that the terms of the contract
must be such that the expected utility from today’s cash flows plus future promised values
fulfill the promised value V E.
(IC) ensures that a contract is incentive compatible. Specifically, it guarantees that
the truth-telling reporting strategy (weakly) dominates all other possible reporting strate-
gies of entrepreneurs in terms of their expected utility, and thus eliminates incentives to
misreport.
The constraints (LL) stand for limited liability. Since by assumption entrepreneurs
do not own wealth, their liability for repayments to the bank are limited by the extent
of the production revenue (i.e., realized productivity shock times the production level
corresponding to the bank loan level). Hence, a contract is feasible if the terms of the
contract are such that the entrepreneurs consume a non-negative amount of the final
products after any productivity realization.
The credibility constraint (CC) imposes that banks could only promise utility values
that are achievable with non-negative finite cash flows; otherwise, the promised value
would only be granted by violating (LL) sometime in the future or is never satisfiable,
respectively. More precisely, (CC) captures that banks can never promise (i) less utility
than achievable by non-negative consumption for all future periods or (ii) more utility
than by infinite consumption for all future periods.
Formally, we define an optimal financial contract as follows:
Definition 1.1. For a given path {rt, wt}
∞
t=0, the optimal dynamic contract is a se-
quence of functions
{
b(V Et ; rt, wt),m(V
E
t , θt; rt, wt), V
E(V Et , θt; rt, wt)
}∞
t=0
that solves pro-
gram (1.11).
For notational simplicity we suppress from now rt and wt in the sequence of functions of
the contract
{
b(V Et ),m(V
E
t , θt), V
E(V Et , θt)
}∞
t=0
and in the value function P (V E) whenever
it is not misleading.
1.2.4.2 Theoretical properties
In this part, we show theoretical properties of financial contracts under program (1.11).5
We first discuss general results about incentive compatible contracts and the simplification
5In the optimal dynamic contract, the path of factor prices rt, wt is taken as given. For notational
simplicity we suppress from now on {rt, wt} in the R(b) function whenever it is not misleading.
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of incentive constraints. Then, we come to the properties of the optimal contract. Propo-
sition 1.1 and 1.2 and Lemma 1.1 and 1.2 follow the properties of optimal social insurance
in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000) which are based on Thomas and Worrall (1990).
The following proposition defines the necessary condition of an incentive compatible
contract:
Proposition 1.1. Let θs > θs−1,∀s ∈ S. An incentive compatible contract satisfies
ms ≥ ms−1 and V
E
s ≥ V
E
s−1.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.1.1.
This implies that banks induce truth-telling behavior of entrepreneurs by postponing
rewards for reporting high productivity realization. If productivity is high repayments
are high, but the future promised value is high, too.
Define the incentive constraints for all i, j ∈ S as:
Ci,j ≡ U(θiR(b)−mi, L
E) + β∆V Ei − U(θiR(b)−mj, L
E)− β∆V Ej ≥ 0, (1.12)
where i is the actual state and j is the reported state. Then, the set of incentive constraints
can be simplified with the following lemma.
Lemma 1.1. If the local downward constraints, Cs,s−1 ≥ 0, and the local upward con-
straints, Cs,s+1 ≥ 0, hold for each s ∈ S, then the constraints Ci,j ≥ 0 hold ∀i, j ∈ S.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.1.2.
Suppose for the following lemma and Proposition 1.2 and 1.3 that P (V E) is strictly
concave – a fact which is observed in the numerics.
Using this and Lemma 1.1, we get the following property of the optimal contract.
Lemma 1.2. For strictly concave P (V E), for all states s ∈ S, the optimal contract
implies that the local downward constraints Cs,s−1 ≥ 0 always bind, whereas the local
upward constraints Cs−1,s ≥ 0 never bind for ms > ms−1.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.1.3.
In addition, the optimal contract has the property of risk sharing:
Proposition 1.2. For strictly concave P (V E), both the entrepreneurs’ utility and the
banks’ profits are non-decreasing with a higher productivity realization, that is: Under an
optimal contract, for θi > θj
U(θiR(b)−mi, L
E) + β∆V Ei ≥ U(θjR(b)−mj, L
E) + β∆V Ej , (1.13)
−b+mi +
∆
1 + r
P (V Ei ) ≥ −b+mj +
∆
1 + r
P (V Ej ). (1.14)
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Proof. See Appendix A.2.1.4.
Next, we introduce the efficient level of bank loan, b∗, which is implicitly determined
by
E(θ)R′(b∗;w, r) = 1, (1.15)
that is, marginal productivity equals marginal costs of one more unit of bank loans. Notice
that the efficient level of bank loans corresponds to the optimal firm size if banks were
the firm owners.
Suppose for Proposition 1.3 that there are only two states in the state space, S = {l, h}
with θh > θl.
Proposition 1.3. For strictly concave P (V E) and for ms > ms−1, the optimal level of
bank loans from the contract is not larger than the efficient level.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.1.5.
Note that this implies endogenous borrowing constraints, which are also existent in
the models of Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), Dyrda (2016), Gross and Verani (2013)
and Verani (2015).
1.3 Aggregation and general equilibrium
So far we have characterized the optimization problems of the agents in the economy. More
specifically, for a given sequence of factor prices {rt, wt}
∞
t=0 and the share of entrepreneurs
of each cohort {λτ}
∞
τ=0, we get: (i) the workers’ optimal path of consumption, wealth
accumulation and labor supply from (1.2); (ii) the entrepreneurs’ optimal path of capital
and labor employment from (1.5); and (iii) the banks’ optimal path of terms of contract
with loans, repayments and future promised values from (1.11). Given the technical
complexities, for combining the three partial parts to get the general equilibrium we
focus on the stationary case with constant factor prices {r, w} and a constant share of
entrepreneurs λ. Specifically, we consider the age-dependent, time-independent supplies
and demands of labor and capital, consumption of workers and entrepreneurs, bank loans
and repayments. We sum the individual decisions over the cohorts of all ages in the
economy to get the aggregate demand and supply of labor, capital and goods. This
allows us in the end to write down the equilibrium conditions and define the general
equilibrium. More precisely, the equilibrium is then the prices {r, w} and the share of
entrepreneurs λ such that goods, labor and capital markets clear and banks make zero
profit (see Sections 1.3.2 and 1.3.3).
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1.3.1 Aggregation
1.3.1.1 Aggregation of workers
By aggregating the optimal consumption, saving and labor decision over individual work-
ers of all ages τ , we get total consumption CW , total deposits D and total labor supply
LS:6
CW (r, w) =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τc(Aτ , r, w) (1.16)
D(r, w) =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τpAAτ+1 =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τpAg(Aτ , r, w) (1.17)
LS(r, w) =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τ lτ =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τh(Aτ , r, w) (1.18)
where c(·) is given by the workers’ budget constraint (1.3) and g(·) and h(·) are the
worker’s policy functions defined in (1.4). (1−∆)∆τ is the mass of households of age τ .
Note that heterogeneity among workers comes only from age differences; within a cohort
all workers are identical in their lifetime decisions.
1.3.1.2 Aggregation of entrepreneurs
Aggregating over all entrepreneurs is more complicated because they are heterogeneous
in two dimensions: Age and history of productivity realizations. In other words, there
are firms of different ages τ and firms of the same age τ differ in productivity history θτ
due to the idiosyncratic shocks.
History of productivity realizations of an entrepreneur aged τ , θτ ∈ Θτ maps into a
promised value V E by applying the transition function V Es = V
E(V E, θs; r, w) recursively
with starting value V E0 .
7 The distribution of θτ among entrepreneurs of age τ corresponds
to a stationary distribution of promised values, denoted by Ψτ (V
E).
Promised values V E are translated by the optimal financial contract into bank loans
and repayments,
{
b
(
V E; r, w
)
,m
(
V E, θs; r, w
)}
. For given bank loans, the optimal cap-
ital and labor employment,
{
k∗(V E; r, w), l∗(V E; r, w)
}
are given by the solution to (1.5)
where it is used that b(V E; ·) is a function of V E.
We can aggregate bank loans B, capital KD and labor demand LD over all cohorts as
6For now the measure of workers is supposed to be 1. The equilibrium share of workers (1− λ) will
be determined through the equilibrium conditions as given in Section 1.3.2.
7The indifferent occupational choice condition, which must hold in equilibrium, requires that V E0 =
VW (0; r, w) (see (1.26)).
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follows:8
B(r, w) =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τ
∫
b(V E; r, w)dΨτ (V
E), (1.19)
KD(r, w) =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τ
∫
k∗(V E; r, w)dΨτ (V
E) (1.20)
LD(r, w) =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τ
∫
l∗(V E; r, w)dΨτ (V
E) (1.21)
Furthermore, the aggregate expected repayments from the entrepreneurs of all ages τ to
banks are given by:
M(r, w) =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τ
∑
s∈S
πs
∫
m(V E, θs; r, w)dΨτ (V
E) (1.22)
In a similar way, the expected aggregate output Y and the consumption of the en-
trepreneurs CE are given by:
Y (r, w) =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τ
∑
s∈S
πs
∫
θsR(b(V
E; r, w); r, w)dΨτ (V
E), (1.23)
CE(r, w) =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τ
∑
s∈S
πs
∫
c(V E, θs; r, w)dΨτ (V
E), (1.24)
where R(·) is defined in (1.6) and c(·) in (1.7).
1.3.1.3 Aggregation of banks’ equity
Finally, banks’ equity is the accumulated retained earnings from the flows of bank loans
and repayments. In a stationary equilibrium, it is determined by
E(r, w) = (1 + r)E(r, w) +M(r, w)−B(r, w),
where E(r, w) denotes the bank equity, (1 + r)E(r, w) are the gross returns on previ-
ous equity and M(r, w) − B(r, w) are the net aggregate payments from a measure 1 of
8For now the measure of entrepreneurs is supposed to be 1. The equilibrium share of entrepreneurs λ
will be determined through the equilibrium conditions as given in Section 1.3.2.
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entrepreneurs.9 Rewriting the above equation, we have
E(r, w) =
B(r, w)−M(r, w)
r
. (1.25)
1.3.2 Equilibrium conditions
In a stationary equilibrium (see Section 1.3.3 for the formal definition), there are simulta-
neously workers and entrepreneurs from all cohorts in the economy. Newborn households
are indifferent with respect to their occupational choice. That is, the expected lifetime
utility of becoming a worker is the same as that of becoming an entrepreneur. Formally,
this means:
V E0 = V
W (0; r, w), (1.26)
where V W (0; r, w) is determined by program (1.2). Note that this equation defines the
starting value of the state variable for the entrepreneurs, which is used in generating the
life path of promised values in the numerical analysis by applying the optimal contracts
(see Section 1.4.2).
In addition – as in standard general equilibrium theory – labor, capital and goods
markets clear.
Labor market clearing requires that aggregate labor supply from workers equals ag-
gregate demand for labor by the entrepreneurs. This is
λLD(r, w) = (1− λ)LS(r, w), (1.27)
with LS(r, w) and LD(r, w) defined in (1.18) and (1.21), respectively, and λ being the
endogenously determined share of the entrepreneurs in the economy.
Capital market clearing requires in equilibrium that capital supply in the economy,
which consists of aggregate deposits from the workers plus banks’ equity, is equal to capital
demand:
KS(r, w) ≡ (1− λ)D(r, w) + λE(r, w) = λKD(r, w), (1.28)
where D(r, w), E(r, w) and KD(r, w) are given in (1.17), (1.25) and (1.20), respectively.
The goods market is cleared if aggregate output equals the sum of households’ con-
sumption plus aggregate investments, where the latter is equal to depreciated capital in
9Notice that this condition indicates that in the stationary equilibrium banks give on aggregate more
loans than repayments they ask for; with the gap between B andM being exactly coverable by the interest
from banks’ equity. Thus, the level of equity is endogenously kept constant in the stationary case. Since
we do not characterize the path of how the economy converges to the stationary equilibrium, we cannot
show numerically how the accumulation of banks’ equity converges to the stationary equilibrium level.
However, we give in Appendix A.5 a non-rigorous intuition of how an economy may evolve from the very
beginning of time to the stationary equilibrium.
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a stationary equilibrium. Formally, the condition is
λY (r, w) = (1− λ)CW (r, w) + λCE(r, w) + δλKD(r, w). (1.29)
It is directly implied by the labor and the capital market clearing conditions, (1.27) and
(1.28) as shown Appendix A.2.2.
Finally, banks’ are assumed to make zero profit in expectation from each newly-signed
contract in equilibrium. Under the indifferent occupational choice condition in (1.26), the
zero-profit condition for banks is given by
P (V W (0; r, w)) = 0. (1.30)
1.3.3 Definition of general equilibrium
With the agents’ optimal behavior derived from the respective optimization problems and
the general equilibrium conditions, we can now define the stationary general equilibrium
in the economy.
Definition 1.2. A stationary general equilibrium is characterized by a stationary dis-
tribution of workers of different ages, and the corresponding capital and labor supply
{Aτ , lτ}
∞
τ=0, a stationary distribution of entrepreneurs of different ages, for each cohort
a stationary distribution of promised values,
{
Ψτ (V
E)
}∞
τ=0
, and the corresponding cap-
ital and labor demand of the entrepreneurs,
{
k∗(V E), l∗(V E)
}
, bank loans and repay-
ments of the banks,
{
b(V E),m(V E, θs)
}
s∈S
, and interest rate, wage rates and share of
entrepreneurs, {r, w, λ} such that for given (r, w),
(1) workers maximize lifetime utility according to (1.2),
(2) entrepreneurs maximize expected output according to (1.5),
(3) banks offer profit-maximizing contracts subject to (PK), (IC), (LL), (CC) according
to (1.11).
The factor prices (r, w) and share of entrepreneurs λ are such that,
(1) labor, capital and goods market clear according to (1.27), (1.28) and (1.29).
(2) banks make zero profit in expectation according to (1.30).
We determine the stationary equilibrium numerically, but we do not deliver an ana-
lytical general proof for the existence of a stationary equilibrium.10
10See Appendix A.3.3for a detailed description of the algorithm to find the stationary equilibrium
numerically.
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1.4 Calibration and numerical results
Given the complexity of the problem, the stationary equilibrium is determined numerically
in the following. To calibrate the model, we assume specific functional forms of the utility
and the production function and give exogenous parameter values.
The households’ utility function (workers and entrepreneurs) is given by
U(c, l) = −exp(−γc)− ηl2, γ, η > 0. (1.31)
It includes a CARA-part for consumption with γ being the absolute risk aversion and a
parabola part for the disutility of labor supply. The form of the utility function gives us
computational simplicity.
The production technology of the entrepreneurs exhibits decreasing return to scale:
Y (k, l) = θsa¯k
αk lαl , (1.32)
where θs denotes the state-dependent productivity realization, a¯ scales total factor pro-
ductivity and αk and αl are the share of capital and labor, respectively. We simplify the
state space S to two states: “high” and “low” with productivity θh = θ+σ and θl = θ−σ,
σ > 0, and corresponding probability πh and πl, respectively.
For the exogenous parameters we take the values given in Table 1.1. The survival rate
Table 1.1: Exogenous parameters
Parameters Value
Survival rate ∆ 0.92
Discount rate β 0.963
Household preferences
γ 2
η 0.5
Probability of bad state πl 0.5
High productivity θh 1.25
Low productivity θl 0.75
Fixed entrepreneur labor LE 1/3
Share of capital αk 0.35
Share of labor αl 0.6
Productivity scale a¯ 1/3
Depreciation rate δ 0.1
is chosen such that the death rate 1−∆ corresponds approximately to the empirical yearly
exit rate of firms. The discount rate β is similar to standard values found in literature.
Household preference parameter γ and η are internally calibrated such that workers’
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labor supply is about 30% of their labor endowment. Further, we assume both states are
equally likely. Then, the values of θh and θl imply an expected productivity realization
of θ = 1, with standard deviation of 0.25. LE corresponds to a third of an entrepreneur’s
labor endowment. αk and αl correspond to the capital and labor shares of output. The
depreciation rate δ = 0.1 corresponds to a common number in literature reflecting a
quarterly depreciation rate of approximately 2.5%. The assumed utility function and the
parameter values determine the boundaries of the promised value, V Emin = −9.26 and
V Emax = −0.49 given by (1.9).
1.4.1 Three optimization problems
We characterize first the numerical solutions to the three optimization problems. Specif-
ically, for a given wage w and interest rate r, we solve for the workers’ optimal consump-
tion, saving and labor supply decision based on (1.2), the entrepreneurs’ capital and labor
demand as in (1.5) and especially the banks’ optimal financial contract from (1.11).11
1.4.1.1 Workers’ optimal decisions
Figure 1.2 depicts, as a function of the current period deposit wealth A, the workers’ opti-
mal consumption c(A), the labor supply l(A) and the saving decision A′(A) corresponding
to the policy functions given in (1.4) and the lifetime expected utility V W (A) for given w
and r.12
They are in line with the results from standard lifetime utility maximization: House-
holds consume more today and save more for tomorrow if their current wealth A is higher.
One has A′(A) > 0 for all A, which means that households always decide to hold positive
annuity deposits. Further, with more A they supply less labor because they are less de-
pendent on labor income. Their lifetime expected utility, captured by the value function
V W (A), is an increasing function in A, indicating that workers are better off if endowed
with more wealth A.
11In the figures, we use w = 0.1599 and r = 0.0417, which are the equilibrium values later deter-
mined numerically in the general equilibrium in Section 1.4.2 by using the search algorithm described in
Appendix A.3.4. For simplicity we suppress w and r in the notation.
12See Appendix A.3.1 for the procedure to solve the recursive workers’ problem numerically.
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Figure 1.2: Solution to worker’s problem
1.4.1.2 Entrepreneurs’ optimal capital and labor employment
For a given level of bank loans b and factor prices w and r, the entrepreneur chooses
optimally capital input and labor employment based on the decision problem in (1.5) as
follows:
k∗ =
1
r + δ
αk
αk + αl
b and l∗ =
1
w
αl
αk + αl
b. (1.33)
Hence,
R(b) =
(
αk
r + δ
)αk (αl
w
)αl ( b
αk + αl
)αk+αl
a¯. (1.34)
Following from equation (1.15), the efficient level of bank loans is thus given by
b∗ = (αk + αl)
[
a¯
(
αk
r + δ
)αk (αl
w
)αl] 11−αk−αl
. (1.35)
Figure 1.3 shows this capital and labor demand of entrepreneurs as function of the
bank loans b for given r and w. Capital and labor demand are linearly increasing functions
in b. For the given form of the production function, the capital intensity is independent
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of the level of the bank loan b.
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Figure 1.3: Solution to entrepreneur’s problem
The outcomes indicate that the more bank loans firms get, the more input they are
demanding. This implies that the size of production increases in the amount of available
funds in the form of bank loans. Hence, bank loans determine the size of firms. Following
this we will later use the amount of bank loans as the indicator of firm size and discuss
based on this the dynamics of average firm size, growth and variance of growth at different
ages of the firms (see Section 1.4.4).
1.4.1.3 Banks’ optimal financial contract
Figure 1.4 shows (for given r and w) as a function of today’s promised value V E (state
variable), the banks’ profit P (V E), state-contingent future promised value V Es (V
E), state-
contingent repaymentsms(V
E) and the bank loans b(V E).13 State-contingency is captured
by the subindex, s ∈ {l, h}, with l and h standing for low and high productivity realiza-
tions, respectively.
The banks’ profit is P (V E) is strictly concave. For V E not close to V Emin, P (V
E) is
clearly decreasing in V E.
The state-contingent future promised values, V El (V
E) and V Eh (V
E) are strictly increas-
ing in V E. Further, one can see from the subplot of V Es (V
E) that V El < V
E and V E < V Eh .
For values of V E very close to V Emin the lower credibility constraint (CC) is binding. In
other words, without imposing the credibility constraint (CC), V El (V
E) < V Emin would
result for values of V E very close to V Emin, which contradicts c ≥ 0 sometime in future.
14
13See Appendix A.3.2 for the numerical procedure to solve the recursive formulated lending contract.
14This shows that accounting the credibility constraints is essential.
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Figure 1.4: Optimal contract
State-contingent repaymentsms(V
E), s ∈ {h, l} are non-monotonic; repaymentsms(V
E)
first increase in V E and then decreases at higher promised values.15 The latter means,
firms with a high promised value V E have to repay less (even ms(V
E) < 0) with the intu-
ition that otherwise high V E could not be realized without exploding V E-path. Further,
ml < mh says that firms with a low productivity shock are spared from high repayments.
Note that the two subplots V Es (V
E) and ms(V
E) for s ∈ {h, l} reflect the theoreti-
cal results (see Proposition 1.1): Importantly, a postponed reward for reporting a high
productivity state (high mh, high V
E
h ) and a postponed punishment for reporting a low
productivity state (low ml, low V
E
l ) provide the entrepreneurs incentive to report the
actual productivity realization.
Figure 1.4 shows further that the level of bank loan b(V E) is strictly increasing in V E.16
By comparing the level of bank loans b(V E) with the expected repayment πlml(V
E)+(1−
15Non-monotonicity can arise as a result of the functional forms of the utility, the production and the
profit function, and their relative curvature compared to each other; the banks fulfill higher promised
values V E by both higher future promised utility and higher current consumption (through b to ms).
16The specific shape of b(V E) is the result of the functional forms of the utility and the production
function and their relative curvature compared to each other (see (A.9) in Appendix A.2.1). There are
unstable b(V E) for V E-values approaching V Emax due to computational difficulties for values close to V
E
max.
However, for determining the equilibrium this problem is negligible because firms hardly reach promised
V E-values in the region close to V Emax when starting at V
E
0 = −8.36 as derived in the general equilibrium
(e.g., 65 years of always high productivity shock, which would leads to V E > −1 has probability (∆(1−
πl))
65 = 1.2 · 10−22 ≈ 0). Further, the highest V E reached by an entrepreneur in the simulation of our
economy is only −1.51.
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πl)mh(V
E) (see Appendix A.5), one sees that for low V E the expected repayments exceed
the level of bank loans. Thus, banks retain earnings from the contracts at such state
variable levels. For higher V E the reverse holds which means that entrepreneurs retain
deposited resources. For all V E, b(V E) is smaller than the efficient level b∗ = 1.1814
defined in (1.15); in line with Proposition 1.3. The increasing function b(V E) means
that firms with a higher promised value V E get more bank loans and are thus larger.
Hence, the transition function of the promised value, V Es (V
E), is crucial in generating
firm dynamics: For given current period productivity realization, the future promised
value to entrepreneurs, V Es (V
E), determines the level of tomorrow’s bank loans and thus
the evolution of the firm size. The relative level of bank loans available to a firm in two
successive periods given by b(V
E
s )
b(V E)
, s ∈ {h, l} depends on the productivity realization: A
high productivity shock entitles the firm to more bank loans in the next period while
a low productivity shock lowers b (see Figure 1.5, which gives a similar pattern as in
Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006)).17
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Figure 1.5: Relative change of bank loans, b(V
E
s )
b(V E)
, s ∈ {h, l}
17The pattern of the two curves is determined by two factors: The gap between today’s and tomorrow’s
promised value, V E and V s(V E), s ∈ {h, l}, and the level of bank loans, b(V E). At low level of promised
value today (i.e., small V E), the gap between V E and V s(V E) is relatively large. In addition, the level
of bank loans is very sensitive to change in promised values. The combination of the two leads to a large
relative change of bank loans between today and tomorrow,
b(V Es )
b(V E)
. At high level of V E , however, level
of bank loans is almost flat; change in promised values has nearly no impact on the level of bank loans
a firm gets. In addition, tomorrow’s promised values (in both states) are very close to that of today.
Therefore, the relative change of bank loans in both states approaches 1.
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1.4.2 General equilibrium
With the solutions of the three optimization problems, we can now determine the general
equilibrium in our economy. The stationary equilibrium values of the endogenous factor
prices (r, w) and the share of entrepreneurs λ are simultaneously found by labor and capital
market clearing and banks’ zero-profit condition. Thus, for determining the equilibrium,
aggregate demands and aggregate supplies of labor and capital and the starting promised
value V W (0; r, w) must be calculated.
The labor supply and part of the capital supply come from workers. In the stationary
equilibrium, aggregating total deposits D and total labor supply LS of all generations
in the economy is computationally equivalent to the aggregation of deposits and labor
supply of one cohort over its lifetime as is implied by (1.17) and (1.18). The weights
(1−∆)∆τ correspond then to the size of the cohort at the different ages τ . Since workers
are homogeneous within cohorts with identical saving and working decision, it is numeri-
cally straightforward to compute the aggregate savings and labor supply using (1.17) and
(1.18).18
To derive the demand for labor and capital we simulate life paths of entrepreneurs
with stochastic shocks in their productivity and exogenous death.19 Thus, we have simu-
lated the length of life for each entrepreneur and its history of productivity realizations,
θt = {θ1, θ2, . . . θt}. Starting at promised value V
E
0 = V
W (0, r, w), the simulated his-
tory of productivity realizations generates then for each entrepreneur a lifetime sequence
of promised values
{
V E1 , V
E
2 , . . . , V
E
t
}
by applying the transition function V Es (V
E) recur-
sively.20 To the sequence of
{
V Ei
}t
i=1
correspond directly a sequence of repayments {mi}
t
i=1
and a sequence of bank loans {bi}
t
i=1. Aggregating these at t over all entrepreneurs we
get in the end total repayments M and total bank loans B. The latter determines total
labor and capital demands LD and KD: Because of the linear relation between b and k∗,
b and l∗ according to (1.33), the total labor and capital demands defined in (1.20) and
(1.21), are given respectively by
KD = B
1
r + δ
αk
αk + αl
, and LD = B
1
w
αl
αk + αl
. (1.36)
18See step 4 in Appendix A.3.3 for the aggregation of the supply side.
19See step 1 in Appendix A.3.3 for the description of the simulation procedure with NE = 10, 000, 000
life paths.
20See Figure A.4-A.6 in Appendix A.6 for three different examples of life paths of a 50 year old
entrepreneur: Life path I illustrates a lucky life with many high productivity shocks. Life path II
represents a life with a relatively balanced history of productivity realizations and life path III was driven
by bad luck with many low productivity shocks. One can see that high productivity shocks tend to
increase V E overtime, while low productivity shocks lower it. The transition of V E translates directly
into the evolution of b and m.
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To determine the general equilibrium, we now use these aggregate demands and sup-
plies. The share of entrepreneurs λ is determined by the labor market clearing condition
(1.27). Namely, λ = L
S
LD+LS
. The factor prices w and r are simultaneously determined
by the capital market clearing condition (1.28) and the expected zero profit condition
(1.30).21 The resulting equilibrium values of r, w and λ are shown in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2: Equilibrium parameter
Parameters Value
Interest rate r∗ 4.17%
Wage w∗ 0.1599
Share of entrepreneurs λ∗ 7.62%
Our equilibrium interest rate is around 4%, which is a common number in literature.
The equilibrium share of entrepreneurs λ is 7.6% and corresponds approximately to the
rate of self-employed labor of around 7% in the U.S. over the last years (data from OECD).
The equilibrium lifetime expected utility and other equilibrium values are given in
Table 1.3.
Table 1.3: Equilibrium values
Parameters Value
Lifetime utility V E0 = V
W (0, r∗, w∗) -8.3549
Total labor supply LS 0.2879
Total capital supply D 0.1618
Total bank loans B 0.8836
Total labor demand LD 3.4906
Total capital demand K 2.2972
Total repayments M 0.8695
The lifetime utility of entrepreneurs and workers is V E0 = V
W (0, r∗, w∗) = −8.36. The
total labor supply LS corresponds to about a third of a worker’s labor endowment, which
is in line with standard values from the empirics. Further, from the amount of bank
loans B and repayments M given in Table 1.3 we can calculate the amount of banks’
equity E using (1.25). This indicates is an equity ratio E/K = 14.68%. This number is
above current levels of large international banks, but below the proposed level of 20% by
Admati and Hellwig (2013).
21See step 5 in Appendix A.3.3 for the procedure to determine the equilibrium in which the two
conditions are jointly fulfilled, and Appendix A.3.4 and A.4 for the detailed description of the algorithm
to find the stationary equilibrium numerically. We approximate the labor market clearing up to a residual
of magnitude 0, the residual in the capital market is -0.00015 and the deviation from the zero-profit
condition is -0.00016.
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1.4.3 Firm distributions
In this equilibrium, we can derive distributions for firm characteristics from the simulation
of the paths of the entrepreneurs’ lives. Figure 1.6 shows the distribution of entrepreneurs
in the economy with respect to different characteristics: Age, promised values, repayments
and bank loans.
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Figure 1.6: Distribution of age, promised values, repayments and bank loans
Subplot (a) shows the distribution of entrepreneurs’ ages. With a share of 1−∆ = 8%
most entrepreneurs are newborns. Then, one-year old represent a share of (1 − ∆)∆ =
7.36% and so on. Finally, the share of entrepreneurs older than 50 years account for only
0.16% in our economy.
Subplot (b) shows the distribution of promised values V E. We get the histogram
of the distribution of firm promised values Ψ(V E) as shown in Subplot (b) by counting
the number of entrepreneurs in the economy in different bins of V E ∈ [Vmin, Vmax]. The
plot indicates clearly that the mass of the promised values lies around the starting value
V E0 = −8.36. Firm heterogeneity then arises from the different length and composition
of productivity realizations over firms’ lifetime. The further away from the starting value
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V E0 , the lower is the density of V
E because longer and more heterogeneous life paths
underlie such values.
Subplot (c) shows the distribution of repayments. It follows directly from the distri-
bution Ψ(V E) (because V E is the underlying state variable). Depending heavily on the
current period productivity realization, the levels of repayments are separated into two
groups. This means, the repayments exhibit two distinct sub-distributions because the
difference in repayments of high and low state are relatively large (compare mh(V
E) and
ml(V
E) in Figure 1.4).
Subplot (d) shows the distribution of bank loans. It also follows directly from the
distribution Ψ(V E) (because V E is the underlying state variable). It captures the firm
size distribution measured by the levels of bank loans. From Figure 1.4 follow that for
many V E the optimal level of banks loans lies around the value b(V E) ≈ 1.12 (see relatively
flat part in Figure 1.4). This means, many firms get such levels of banks loans so that the
mode of the distribution of bank loans lies around this value. Thus, the negative skewness
in the distribution of b is the result of the less strongly increasing part of b(V E) seen in
Figure 1.4.
1.4.4 Firm dynamics
By considering now firm distribution of different cohorts separately (i.e., all entrepreneurs
of the same age τ), the model allows us to get firm dynamics: Average firms’ size, growth
and variance of growth at different ages.
First, using the simulation of life path of entrepreneurs in Section 1.4.2 we generate
the distribution of promised values Ψτ (V
E) of entrepreneurs at different ages.22 The
development of Ψτ (V
E) for selected cohorts with age τ = {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 209} is
shown in Figure 1.7.
The newborns τ = 1 are all identical with the same starting promised value V E0 =
−8.36. Surviving firms then experience either high or low productivity realizations and
are updated with higher or lower future promised value levels, respectively. Over time
as τ gets larger, histories of productivity realizations get more heterogeneous due to the
i.i.d. shocks. The distribution of promised values, Ψτ (V
E), gets more dispersed. In
addition, as age advances cohort size becomes smaller because firms have been exiting
with the exogenous death rate 1−∆. Eventually, (almost) all firms of a given cohort exit
the market so that the distribution Ψτ (V
E) of old cohorts consist of very few individual
observations.
22This maps directly into the distributions of bank loans and repayments. The corresponding distri-
butions of b and m are shown in Figure A.7 and A.8 in Appendix A.6, respectively.
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Figure 1.7: Development of entrepreneurs’ promised value distributions
Following the cohort distribution,
{
Ψτ (V
E)
}∞
τ=0
, we can get firm dynamics such as
average size, growth and variance of growth at different ages τ of entrepreneurs. Such
firm dynamics are shown in Figure 1.8.23
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Figure 1.8: Firm dynamics
Figure 1.8 shows in Subplot 1 an increasing average size of firms at different ages.24
23To see the trend of the firm dynamics more clearly, we plot the 5-year moving average (e.g., the value
of the average size at age 10 is the weighted average size of firms with age 10-14.)
24There is a decrease in firm size between the one-year-olds and the two-year-olds. To see why, first,
notice that the starting promised value, V E0 = −8.36, is at the right end of the steep part of the b(V
E)-
function; a low productivity shock lowers b more than a high productivity shock increases b. In addition,
since the history of productivity shocks is not very heterogeneous after one period (i.e., 50% are high and
50% are low), the decrease from the low productivity shock is directly reflected in the average size. For
more periods the history of productivity shocks of entrepreneurs becomes more heterogeneous and the
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Firm size is measured in terms of the level of banks loans.25 Hence, our model pre-
dicts a positive relation between firm size and their age, which is in line with empirical
observations.
In Subplot 2 we plot firms’ average growth rates at different ages. We define the
growth rate of a firm at age τ by the percentage change in bank loans relative to last
period’s loan, gτ ≡
bτ−bτ−1
bτ−1
, where bτ and bτ−1 are bank loans of today and of yesterday,
respectively. The average growth rate of all firms at age τ is measured by the mean of
gτ among all entrepreneurs in this cohort. The graph shows that firms’ average growth is
positive, but the rate decreases with firm age.26 The same holds for the variance of the
growth rate (i.e., the variance of gτ ) which is shown in Subplot 3. This means that on
average older firms grow less, but in a more stable way.
These patterns are also found by Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), Gross and Verani
(2013) and Verani (2015), and are observed in industry data (e.g., Evans (1987)). This
suggests that empirical firm dynamics can be explained by the design of the optimal
financial contracts with endogenous borrowing constraints.
1.5 Model applications
In this section, we propose two applications of the benchmark model. First, we study the
impact of an increasing production volatility on the equilibrium variables, the aggregate
variables and firm dynamics.27 More specifically, we analyze how a mean-preserving-
spread of the firms’ productivity influences the equilibrium outcome. Second, we extend
the model in a parsimonious form to analyze the macroeconomic consequences of bank
regulation. In particular, we show the impact of imposing higher reserve ratios on the
equilibrium variables, credit availability at firm level, and the resulting firm dynamics.
average is thus less dependent on the level of bank loans corresponding to a specific history of productivity
realizations.
25Firm size can be equivalently measured by the level of capital employment or labor employment.
This can be seen from the linear relation between b and k∗, b and l∗, defined in (1.33).
26The observation discussed in footnote 24 is the reason for the outlier of the average growth (and
also of the variance) in the first year. Note that the less smooth pattern for young firms comes from the
fact that at the beginning firms have less different productivity paths, so that we have in this sense not
enough cases of observations. The less smooth pattern for older firm arises since firms are dying and not
many observations are left.
27The equilibrium variables of concern are always factor prices and the equilibrium share of en-
trepreneurs.
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1.5.1 Production volatility
We set the productivity in high, h, and in low, l, state, respectively, as follows:
θh = E(θ) + σ (1.37)
θl = E(θ)− σ, (1.38)
where E(θ) is the expectation of productivity and is normalized to 1. Apparently, a
mean-preserving-spread of the firms’ productivity implies an increase in σ.
Keeping all other parameters as given in Table 1.1, we calculate the model equilibrium
numerically for different values of σ. The resulting equilibrium parameters are summarized
in Table 1.4.28
Table 1.4: Comparative statics of σ on equilibrium variables
σ = 0.15 σ = 0.25 σ = 0.3375 σ = 0.5 Sign
Interest rate, r 0.04187 0.04170 0.04159 0.04156 -
Wage rate, w 0.161 0.160 0.159 0.157 -
Share of entrepreneurs, λ 0.072 0.076 0.077 0.073 +/-
In an economy with higher production volatility, interest rate and wage rate are
monotonically lower. However, the share of entrepreneurs displays an inverse U-shape
relationship with production volatility: For volatility below a threshold (approximately
σ¯ = 0.3375), the share of entrepreneurs increases as the volatility increases. Whereas for
volatility above the threshold, the share of entrepreneurs decreases.
The change in interest rate and the change in the share of entrepreneurs for production
volatility above the threshold, σ¯, are in contrast to Smith and Wang (2006), where firms’
capital and labor demand are exogenously given.
1.5.1.1 Impact on firm dynamics
Given the equilibrium factor prices, we can analyze the impact of a rising productivity
volatility on firm dynamics as discussed in Section 1.4.4 (i.e., size, average growth, and
variance of growth). The underlying mechanism that determines the credit availability at
firm level can be attributed to two aspects: Changes in the optimal contract and changes
in the distribution of the population in the economy (in terms of promised values).
Volatility effect and equilibrium price effect
28+/− means first increase and then decrease, and −/+ indicates the opposite.
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An increase in the production volatility has two counteracting effects on the optimal
contract: A direct “volatility effect” (i.e., ceteris paribus, the impact of an increase in
volatility on the optimal contract) and an “equilibrium price effect”.
For isolating the volatility effect, we first fix the factor prices constant.29 A mean-
preserving spread of production volatility decreases firms’ realized output, θsR(b), in low
state (s = l), and increases it in high state (s = h). On the one hand, lower firms’ output
in low state suppresses the amount of repayment banks could potentially ask for. On
the other hand, however, higher output in high state does not necessarily lead to higher
repayment. Notice that higher repayment in good state will drive up the gap between the
repayments in the two contingencies. To guarantee truth-telling behavior of the firms,
the banks need to spread the gap in future promised values, Vh−Vl (see constraint (IC)).
Given the concavity of the profit function, P (V E), this is costly for the banks. Therefore,
banks only ask for more repayment in high productivity state if the cost of spreading
future promised values can be compensated. Our quantitative results show that a higher
production volatility lowers banks’ profits. In other words, the net gain from higher
repayment in high state (if at all) is not enough to compensate the loss in repayment
in low state. In addition, it lowers banks’ expected marginal return from granting bank
loans, and thus push down the level of bank loans they grant. This is especially the case
for firms with low promised values. The residual from production (i.e., consumption) of
these firms is low, which indicates a stricter limited liability constraint. A decrease in
the level of output may lead to a binding constraint, which drives down the repayment.30
Overall, the volatility effect lowers credit availability of firms, especially firms with low
promised values, and drives down banks’ profits. The higher the volatility the stronger
the effect.
Now we consider the equilibrium price effect. As listed in Table 1.4, the equilibrium
prices decrease as production volatility rises. Lower equilibrium factor prices drive down
the cost of running a firm. This increases firms’ profits and marginal return of bank
loans in the context of a decreasing return to scale technology. Since higher profits imply
higher repayments potentially, banks have more incentive to provide bank loans. This
effect is stronger for firms at higher level of promised values. To see this, first notice
that the optimal bank loans starts from b = 0 at V E = Vmin regardless of the production
volatility, and approaches the efficient size of firms defined in (1.35) as V E is larger. Since
the efficient level is larger in an economy with lower factor prices, given the curvature of
the optimal bank loans, b(V E), the gap between the level of bank loans under different
29For example, take the benchmark equilibrium factor prices, r = 0.0417 and w = 0.1599.
30For firms with high promised values, the limited liability constraint is far from binding (e.g., at the
promised values when the repayments are negative). Then this volatility effect is very small, even zero.
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production volatility, σ, is larger as V E is away from Vmin.
In addition, the increase in bank loans boosts firms’ production, R(b). As a result,
in high state of a more volatile economy, firms’ profits, θhR(b), increase significantly
due to an increase in both θh and R(b). At the same time, the negative impact of a low
productivity realization, θl, is mitigated by the high production. Therefore, banks can ask
for higher repayment in both states, and thus their profits rise. Overall, the equilibrium
price effect leads to an expansion of credit for all firms, especially for those with high
promised values, and increases banks’ profit. Since the factor prices are lower when the
production volatility is higher, the equilibrium price effect is stronger in a more volatile
economy.
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Figure 1.9: Comparative statics of σ on the optimal contract in equilibrium
In Figure 1.9 we illustrate the optimal equilibrium contract under σ1 = 0.15 and
σ2 = 0.5.
31 Both the volatility effect and the equilibrium price effect are accounted for in
31We illustrate only the two boundary cases of our numerical analysis, so that the small changes can
be recognized more easily. The plots of the optimal contract under other intermediate values of σ lie in
between the two cases we showed.
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the figure. For firms with low level of promised values (V E close to Vmin), the volatility
effect dominates. As a result, firms are more financially constrained (i.e., b is lower), banks
ask for lower repayments, ms, s ∈ {h, l}, and the banks’ profit, P (V
E), is thus lower. In
contrast, for firms with higher promised values, the equilibrium price effect dominates.
Consequently, firms get more bank loans (i.e., b is larger), firms’ profits are higher, which
increases repayments in high state, mh, and mitigate the negative impact of productivity
shock in low state on repayments (the mitigation can be seen from the fact that ml(σ2) is
not much lower than ml(σ1), where σ2 > σ1). In the end, to induce truthful behaviors of
firms, the gap between future promised values is larger in a more volatile economy (i.e.,
|Vh(σ2)− Vl(σ2)| > |Vh(σ1)− Vl(σ1)|).
Distribution effect
So far we have discussed the impact of an increasing production volatility on the opti-
mal contract. To understand the underlying mechanism that determines credit availability
at firm level, we still need to see the changes in the distribution of promised values for
entrepreneurs at different ages, τ , in the economy, Ψτ (V
E;σ) defined in 1.3.1.2.
Entrepreneurs’ promised values start from V W (0;σ) under indifferent occupational
choice (1.26), and grow on average as they get older.32 In an economy with higher pro-
duction volatility, equilibrium factor prices are lower. Thus, the lifetime expected utility
of new-born workers, V W (0;σ), is lower, and so is that of new entrepreneurs. Given the
monotonically increasing relation between promised values and the level of bank loans,
new firms are more financially constrained in a volatile economy. Moreover, the lower
initial promised value is propagated over firms’ lifetime (see section 1.3.1.2), and tends
to lower the level of bank loans to all firms. Furthermore, the spread in future promised
values in the two contingencies is larger as the production volatility increases, the dis-
tribution of promised values is more dispersed. This increases the growth rate of firms’
bank loans, and the variance of growth.
We summarize the impact of an increasing production volatility on credit availability
at firm level in Table 1.5. Specifically, we calculate at four σ values, the average firm
size (in terms of level of bank loans granted to firms), average growth rate and variance
of growth. Furthermore, to see more clearly how production volatility influences firms of
different ages differently, we decompose the firms into three age groups, 1-20, 21-40, and
41-60.33
32Notice that the lifetime expected utility of a worker is actually VW (0; r∗(σ), w∗(σ)), where
{r∗(σ), w∗(σ)} are the equilibrium factor prices under production volatility, σ. We write VW (0;σ) for
simplicity.
33We calculated the values for smaller age groups (e.g., groups of every 10 years, 1-10,11-21, etc.) and
for larger age range (e.g., age groups until the cohort of 100 years old, which accounts for 99.98% of the
population), the results are robust.
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Table 1.5: Comparative statics of σ on firm dynamics
σ = 0.15 σ = 0.25 σ = 0.3375 σ = 0.5 Sign
Average firm size, b 0.958 0.884 0.863 0.901 -/+
Age group 1-20 0.953 0.869 0.843 0.882 -/+
Age group 21-40 0.977 0.938 0.939 0.973 -/+
Age group 41-60 0.993 0.970 0.979 1.020 -/+
Average firm growth 0.004 0.020 0.040 0.086 +
Variance of growth 0.01 0.06 0.12 0.31 +
The average firm size first decreases and then increases as production volatility in-
creases. This indicates a dominating volatility effect and distribution effect at low pro-
duction volatility, both of which tend to reduce the level of bank loans. And then a strong
equilibrium price effect at high production volatility which drives up the average bank
loans. Moreover, both the average firm growth and variance of growth increase mono-
tonically with production volatility, as a result of a strong equilibrium price effect and a
distribution effect that disperse the promised values.
Furthermore, higher volatility leads to a severe credit rationing among young firms
(age 1-20). This comes from a strong volatility effect. Even though the equilibrium price
effect compensates the volatility effect at σ = 0.5, the level of bank loans is still 7.5% lower
than firms of the same group under σ = 0.15. And at σ = 0.3375 where the price effect is
less strong, the decrease in bank loans is 11.5%. As firms grow older the equilibrium price
effect becomes stronger, and thus firms are less financially constraint under high volatility.
This is reflected from a flatter change of firm size as volatility increases, indicating the
volatility effect is offset or even dominated (firms of age 41-60 get 2.7% more loans under
σ = 0.5 than under σ = 0.15, and the level of bank loans under σ = 0.3375 is only 1.4%
lower than under σ = 0.15).
In sum, for a relatively large range of production volatility (σ < 0.3375), higher
volatility lowers the average firm size in the economy. Young firms are the most vulnerable
ones financially to productivity shocks. When production volatility is very strong, the
young firms are still the most financially constrained, but the average firm size is larger.
Yet, one should notice that the share of entrepreneurs decreases with higher volatility.
Furthermore, there is a tradeoff between average growth and variance of growth: Firms
grow faster in an economy with higher productivity volatility. However, the higher growth
comes at the expense of a higher variance of growth.
In Figure A.9 in appendix A.6, we illustrate the development of average firm size,
average growth rate and variance of growth at all ages (1-60). The quantitative results
confirm our conclusions above.
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1.5.1.2 Impact on aggregate variables
An increase in production volatility induces the following changes on aggregate variables.
Both total labor supply and capital supply decrease as a result of lower equilibrium factor
prices. Aggregate bank loans, B, first decrease and then increase as the volatility increases.
Notice that the value of aggregate variables are equal to the corresponding average value,
because the size of the agents is normalized to 1 (see (1.19)-(1.22)). Thus, the underlying
mechanisms that drive the change in aggregate bank loans are the same as the ones we
discussed for average bank loans. Aggregate repayments, M , show the same pattern as
the aggregate bank loans, indicating an effective limited liability constraint. Furthermore,
according to the linear relationship defined in (1.36), total capital demand, KD and total
labor demand, LD, both display a similar U-shape pattern.34 Finally, the ratio of bank
equity to bank loans (the bank’s equity ratio) increases as production volatility increases,
indicating a change in the composition of the banks’ balance sheet on the liability side
(i.e., a shift towards more equity).35 The quantitative results are summarized in Table
1.6.
Table 1.6: Comparative statics of σ on aggregate variables
σ = 0.15 σ = 0.25 σ = 0.3375 σ = 0.5 Sign
Total labor supply, LS 0.289 0.288 0.287 0.284 -
Total capital supply, KS 0.170 0.162 0.156 0.155 -
Total bank loans, B 0.96 0.88 0.86 0.90 -/+
Total labor demand, LD 3.76 3.49 3.43 3.62 -/+
Total capital demand, KD 2.49 2.30 2.25 2.35 -/+
Total repayments, M 0.95 0.87 0.85 0.89 -/+
Equity ratio, E/KD 0.108 0.147 0.164 0.165 +
1.5.2 Bank regulation: Reserve ratio
Suppose that banks must hold a share µ of the deposits as reserves. This implies that
apart from banks’ equity, E, only a share 1−µ of the deposits, (1−λ)D, can be supplied
34According to (1.36), both level of bank loans, B, and the equilibrium factor prices, {r, w}, have an
impact on the total capital and labor demand, KD and LD. The intuition is straightforward: As more
credit becomes available, firms employ more capital and labor to increase profits. At the same time, if
factor prices decrease, firms increase their demand for the corresponding input factor. However, from the
values of KD and LD at different σ-levels listed in Table 1.6, the former channel dominates.
35Intuitively, this is mainly due to the change in the distribution of firms’ promised values. As is
discussed in Appendix A.5, banks accumulate equity from firms with low promised values (i.e., expected
repayment is higher than bank loan) and the opposite occurs for firms with high promised values. Since
the initial promised value, VW (0;σ) decreases as productivity volatility increases, the distribution of
firms’ promised values tends to shift towards lower promised values, which leads to an increase in banks
equity.
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as capital to finance firm production. Therefore, the asset market clearing condition is
now given by
λK ≤ (1− λ)(1− µ)D + λE. (1.39)
Using the parameter values given in Table 1.1 we calculate the equilibrium numerically
for µ = {0, 0.2, 0.4}. The outcomes for µ = 0 coincide with the benchmark case in
Section 1.4. The quantitative results are summarized in Table 1.7. In an economy with
higher reserve ratio, the equilibrium interest rate is higher, wage rate and the share of
entrepreneurs are lower.
Table 1.7: Comparative statics of µ on equilibrium variables
µ = 0 µ = 0.2 µ = 0.4 Sign
Interest rate, r 0.0417 0.0424 0.0436 +
Wage rate, w 0.1599 0.1594 0.1587 -
Share of entrepreneurs, λ 0.0762 0.0757 0.0748 -
1.5.2.1 Impact on firm dynamics
What is the impact of a rising reserve ratio on firm dynamics and the credit availability at
firm level? Notice that a change in reserve ratio, µ, has no direct impact on the optimal
decisions at individual level (saving and labor supply decision by workers, labor and
capital employment by entrepreneurs and the optimal financial contract). Only through
an equilibrium price effect on the optimal contract and the resulting distribution changes.
Equilibrium price effect
The changes in interest rate and wage rate have counteracting effects on the optimal
contract. Our quantitative results show that as the reserve ratio rises, the efficient size
of firms (measured by the level of bank loans), defined in (1.35), decreases. The tighter
reserve ratio raises the interest rate, and thus depresses availability of credit in the market.
Distribution effect
In addition, the initial promised values of firms decreases as the reserve ratio in-
creases.36 As a result, in particular new firms are more financially constrained. Further-
more, firms at older ages have higher average promised values in an economy with high
reserve ratios. This tends to increase the credit availability of the old firms.
In Table 1.8 we summarize the impact of an increasing reserve ratio on average firm
size, average growth and variance of growth. Again, to see more clearly how firms of
36The values of V E0 at µ = {0, 0.2, 0.4} are -8.3549, -8.3553 and -8.3554, respectively.
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Table 1.8: Comparative statics of µ on firm dynamics
µ = 0 µ = 0.2 µ = 0.4 Sign
Average firm size, b 0.8836 0.8830 0.8832 -/+
Age group 1-20 0.8693 0.8681 0.8674 -
Age group 21-40 0.9381 0.9400 0.9439 +
Age group 41-60 0.9698 0.9727 0.9780 +
Average firm growth 0.01992 0.01988 0.01983 -
Variance of growth 0.058 0.057 0.055 -
different ages are influenced differently, we decompose the population of firms into three
age groups, 1-20, 21-40, 41-60.
Average firm size first decreases and then increases. The increase comes from a strong
positive impact of an increasing average promised values on credit availability as the
reserve ratio becomes very large (µ = 0.4). This effect is strong enough to overcome
not only the propagation effect of a lower initial promised value, but also the negative
equilibrium price effect on the optimal bank loan, b(V E).37 As we said, this positive effect
mainly influences the credit availability of older firms. This is confirmed by looking at the
firm size of different age groups: Only for firms older than 20 years, banks’ credit expands,
whereas for young firms credit shrinks as a result of the negative equilibrium price effect
and the lower initial promised value. Furthermore, as the reserve ratio increases, firm
growth decreases, and its variance decreases as well. This is because of a dominating
equilibrium price effect: Since the efficient firm size is smaller as the reserve ratio rises,
the range of bank loans decreases, and thus also the average growth and variance of
growth.
In sum, except for unrealistic high levels of reserve ratios, firms operate in smaller size
in an economy with higher a reserve ratio. In addition, there is a redistribution of credit
from young firms towards older firms, implying a worse-off financial situation of the young
firms. In the end, firms grow more slowly but more steadily as the reserve ratios increase.
The lower growth rate of firms is accompanied by less volatile growth.
In Figure A.10 in appendix A.6, we illustrate the development of average firm size,
average growth rate and variance of growth at all ages (1-60). The quantitative results
confirm our conclusions above.
37We verify numerically that it is indeed due to an increasing average promised values that drives up
the average firm size. Specifically, we want to isolate the effect on average firm size due to the transition
in promised values with the other two negative effects. To do this, we use the distribution of promised
values calculated with transition function V E(θs, V
E) under µ = 0, in combination with the optimal
bank loan b(V E) and the initial promised value VW (0) under µ = 0.4, to get average bank loans. The
value is smaller than the average bank loans under µ = 0. This implies that the gap between this value
and the actual average bank loan under µ = 0.4 is due to a strong impact of increasing average promised
values on the level of bank loans.
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1.5.2.2 Impact on aggregate variables
In Table 1.9, we summarize the impact of an increase in the reserve ratio on aggregate
variables. Again, because the size of the agents is normalized to 1, the aggregate value is
the corresponding average value (see (1.19)-(1.22)).
Table 1.9: Comparative statics of µ on equilibrium variables
Total labor supply, LS 0.288 0.287 0.284 -
Total capital supply, KS 0.162 0.197 0.253 +
Total bank loans, B 0.8836 0.8830 0.8832 -/+
Total labor demand, LD 3.491 3.497 3.514 +
Total capital demand, KD 2.297 2.284 2.265 -
Total repayments, M 0.870 0.868 0.867 -
Equity ratio, E/KD 0.147 0.153 0.164 +
Total labor supply decreases and total capital supply increases, due to the decline
of the wage rate and the rise in the interest rate. Total bank loans first decrease and
then increase for the same reason as the average bank loans. However, despite the linear
relationship defined in (1.36), total labor demand increases, whereas total capital demand
decreases. This results from substitution effects between input factors at firm level. Total
repayments decrease monotonically, because the increase in total bank loans mainly comes
from an increase in the level of bank loans to older firms, for which the limited liability
constraint is no longer tight. In the end, the banks’ equity ratio increases in an economy
with higher reserve ratio. To see this, notice that as the reserve ratio increases, for each
unit of deposit a bank acquires, the share that can be given as loan decreases. Therefore,
profit maximizing banks shift towards other sources to finance bank loans. Since banks’
equity is the only other source on the liability side, banks shift to more equity.38
1.6 Discussion of dynamic programming
In this section, we discuss problems one encounters in solving the dynamic contract. They
are, among others, starting value problems, extrapolation issues, sensitivities to functional
forms and to parameter values, and issues related to the simulation.
38Since the initial promised value VW (0;µ) decreases as reserve ratio µ increases, the building-up of
bank equity follows the same intuition as discussed in footnote 35.
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1.6.1 Starting value problems
Dynamic programming problems are sensitive to initial guesses of value function and
policy functions. In general, the convergence of dynamic programming algorithms is
limited to a region close enough to the solution. This issue is especially obvious in the
dynamic contract problem with relatively unconventional constraints. Therefore, our
problem requires proper guesses of the starting values. We tried two ways: First, educated
guess derived from the functional form of the utility function and, second, a “ground
search”. For the educated guess, we consider a contract under perfect information with
constant consumption for all periods and states. Then the value function, P (V E; r, w),
which can serve as the starting value, is an affine linear transformation of the inverse of
the utility function. In the ground search, we programmed a loop over a broad grid set of
{b(V E), mh(V
E),ml(V
E), V Eh (V
E), V El (V
E)}. We calculated for all combinations of the
grid points the corresponding bank’s profits and then checked which of the combinations
of the grid points maximize banks’ profits given that it fulfills all the constraints. These
grid points are supposed to be somewhere in the region close to the solution of the optimal
contract and can thus serve as the starting values. Overall, the initial guesses from the
two ways are both good enough for solving the dynamic contract in our model. In the
end, we used the first way to get the initial guesses as the second way requires relatively
long computation time and a large amount of storing memory.39
1.6.2 Extrapolation errors
In the numerical algorithm we generate a finite number of Chebychev grid points on the
interval of the state variable.40 Chebychev grid points have superior performances in
function iterations in dynamic programming, yet, an extrapolation problem arises: The
interval on which value function and policy functions are defined is larger than the range of
the grid points, and thus extrapolation may be needed. With cubic splines interpolation,
extrapolation close to the surroundings of the two grid boundaries is embedded in the code
and thus performed automatically. However, the default extrapolation cannot guarantee
that the image of the policy function remains in the domain of the state variable. To
prevent this, we manually replaced the lowest Chebyshev point with the lower bound of
the interval of the state variable before using it.
39Note that even with only four grid points for each of the five choice variables there are already
45 = 1024 combinations to be calculated and checked.
40For Chebychev grid points we follow Judd (1998): The m grid points {xk}k={1,...,m} are set according
to the coefficients of the Chebychev polynomial. We compute m Chebychev interpolation points zk =
− cos
(
2k−1
2m π
)
on [−1, 1]. Then we adjust it to our interval [a, b], such that xk = (zk + 1)(
b−a
2 ) + a.
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1.6.3 Sensitivity to parameter values and functional forms
Given the complexity of the dynamic contract problem, the numerical outcomes and
the convergence of the iterations are sensitive to functional forms and parameter values.
In our case, for example, with log-utility we would see a U -shaped b(V E), which may
not necessarily lead to the same firm dynamics as we observe in Figure 1.8. Further,
convergence of the problem is sensitive to the combinations of parameters. For example,
not all combinations of (r, w) may guarantee convergence of the value function iteration
when calculating the optimal dynamic contract. However, for combinations of (r, w) close
to the equilibrium solution, the dynamic contract problem is in general stable; it always
results in proper optimal contracts.
1.6.4 Simulation issues
To get the equilibrium, we grid-search (r, w)-combinations manually and check for the
equilibrium conditions to hold. To have monotonicity in the aggregation variables of the
simulation and comparability of different outcomes from the grid search, it is important
that the simulation reflects a stationary distribution of life paths for all compared (r, w)-
combinations. Otherwise, one cannot identify whether changes in the zero-profit condition
and the capital market clearing condition come from the effect of updated (r′, w′) or from a
changed combination of life paths. Furthermore, as is described in more detail in Appendix
A.3.4 and A.4, we use the observable fact that banks’ profit and the excess demand in the
capital market are both decreasing in r and w. In addition, the gap between the banks’
profit and the excess demand in the capital market is decreasing in r and increasing in w.
We use these signs and the (at least locally) observable monotonicity of the two conditions
to restrict the region where the optimal equilibrium lies and get the direction for further
searching.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper adds to the literature by modeling a dynamic credit relationship between banks
and entrepreneurs in a general equilibrium model – which determines simultaneously the
wage and interest rate and the share of entrepreneurs, and delivers firm dynamics. We
have households who decide, at the beginning of their life, to become either a worker
or an entrepreneur. Workers supply labor and save in the form of annuity deposits.
Entrepreneurs run firms and employ labor and capital for production. Productivity is
stochastic and private knowledge to the entrepreneur. The production costs are financed
with bank loans. To overcome the information asymmetry, loans and repayments are
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determined in long-term financial contracts with banks. More specifically, the financial
contract between banks and entrepreneurs derived from a recursive formulation deter-
mines the optimal level of bank loan, state-contingent repayments and future promised
values given today’s promised values. The contracts are promise keeping and incentive
compatible and fulfill limited liability and credibility constraints. In equilibrium banks
make zero profit from the contract and the labor, the capital and the goods markets are
cleared. The general equilibrium structure allows determining the wage, the interest rate
and the share of entrepreneurs in equilibrium, as well as the size distribution of firms.
Further, we get firm dynamics arising through the optimal financial contracts: The size
of firms, measured by their level of bank loans, increases with the age of firms while their
average growth and the variance of growth decreases with age.
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2 Explaining structural change towards and
within the financial sector1
Joint with Josef Falkinger and Sabrina Studer
2.1 Introduction
Financialization and inequality are topics that stir up the public debate – among experts
as well as outside the scientific community. Discussions about financialization have gained
momentum by the financial crisis (Greenwood and Scharfstein, 2013; Philippon and Reshef,
2012, 2013); the inequality debate was brought “in from the cold” (Atkinson, 1997) to-
wards the end of the last century and has reached the center court recently with the
Piketty book (Piketty, 2014). This paper argues that the two phenomena are genuinely
related to each other. Structural change towards and within the financial sector, as ob-
served over the last three decades, enhances inequality. And rising inequality fosters
financialization.
We present our argument in a model that comprises the most basic tools provided
by economics for analyzing sectoral structure and distribution. Financialization means
two things: The weight of financial business relative to non-financial business increases
and the type of financial business changes. From a macroeconomic perspective the first
aspect can be summarized as structural change towards the financial sector: The financial
sector expands relative to the production sector. We do not approach this question from a
monetary or financial aspect like the nominal transaction volume of the financial relative
to the real sector. Our perspective is a real economics one: The financial sector employs
resources and generates income for the resources employed. The relevant measures are
therefore employment and income or output shares; the essential component to be modeled
are the production function of the financial sector and the demand function for financial
services. For capturing the second aspect of financialization – the shift from conventional
banking type activities to sophisticated modern finance – an appropriate model structure
requires to have two separate subsectors within the financial sector which differ in their
1This chapter is a revised version of the Working Paper No. 206 from the Working paper series /
Department of Economics at the University of Zurich.
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demand and production characteristics. In sum, we have therefore a three sector model
– one production sector and two financial subsectors.
Inequality requires to have heterogeneous agents which differ in their endowments. In
our model we have low-skilled and high-skilled workers. They are mobile between sectors
and cost-minimal skill-intensities differ across sectors. As a consequence, the interaction
between sectoral structure and inequality comes through the skill premium. The focus
on inequality between low-skilled and high-skilled workers is on the one side motivated
by the empirical fact that the rise in inequality over the last decades has been driven
to a large extent by skill premia and skill composition, as the ample evidence from the
skill-bias literature shows (for instance, Machin and Van Reenen (1998); Piketty and Saez
(2003)). On the other side, we see it as a first important step, which later might be
complemented by elements which focus on the functional distribution of income between
workers and capitalists or on rents. There is capital in our model; it must be. After all,
financial markets have the purpose to transform, under risk, current resources into future
production possibilities. This requires, on the one side, saving decisions and, on the other
side, capital investment into revenue bearing inputs to future production. In our model,
returns on capital are generated by two different types of technologies (robust and risky)
which transform savings into future consumption possibilities.
Structural change can be caused by the supply side: Changing endowments or technical
change. The huge literature on directed technical change, for instance, has emphasized
this channel (Acemoglu, 2002). There is, however, also an important role for the demand
side. Although often neglected, income effects are essential for aggregate developments
(Boppart, 2014, 2015; Föllmi and Zweimüller, 2008). We account for demand side effects
by assuming that agents have quasi-homothetic preferences of the Stone-Geary form. The
specific finance aspect enters the demand side of our model through the following channel:
Demand for financial services comes from the need to manage portfolios and to finance
investments into profitable projects in a way that reflects the preferences of the agents
who own the endowments of the economy. Stone-Geary preferences account for the fact
that part of the savings is motivated by future subsistence expenditures.
In our model the finance industry correctly assesses risks and productivity of invest-
ment projects and earns no rents. This is against popular views; neither does it reflect
a common view of the authors of this paper. Actually, there are many sources for im-
perfections in the financial sector. For instance, prices and payoffs of financial products
may be distorted by neglected correlation (Studer, 2015), or insider knowledge and bar-
riers to entry generate rents for financial intermediation. A salient example is the so
called finance premium. There is convincing evidence that a finance premium exists
(Célérier and Vallée, 2016; Philippon and Reshef, 2007, 2012), that is, the same type of
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labor earns more in a finance job than in other occupations. Nonetheless, from a method-
ological point of view, we consider it as important to start with a benchmark model in
which distortions are kept at a minimum. Given the firm basis of such a benchmark, one
can then be bold in looking at the role of imperfections which certainly exists in reality
in general and in the financial business in particular. Arguably, rents can be more easily
extracted when they go along with the tide rather than against it. So it is important to
know if outcome changes are supported by changes in economic fundamentals. In a sup-
plementary section we analyze a series of extensions which show how distortions affect the
comparative-static results of the benchmark model. Moreover, in the quantitative imple-
mentation of our model, we separate the rent component of the expansion of the financial
sector, in particular new finance, from the part that is driven by economic fundamentals.
There is a long literature on the impact of financial development on economic growth
(Levine, 2005).2 The causes of financial sector growth and the changing structure of
financial activities, which are the topic of this paper, have been less scrutinized. The
literature related to our paper in a more narrow sense is rich as far as the empirical
side is concerned. In particular, Philippon and his co-authors did pioneering empirical
work on financialization. On the theoretical side the situation is quite different. To our
knowledge there are only two attempts to explain structural change towards finance in a
general equilibrium framework. Philippon (2012) sketches in his notes a 2x2 model with
a real and a financial sector both producing with capital and labor. The financial sector
produces intermediation services for households and firms. The focus is on the equilibrium
effects of changes in intermediation costs. Improvements in financial intermediation tend
to raise real wages but have in general an ambiguous effect on the GDP-share of the
financial sector. The GDP-share of finance rises if more firms need intermediation services.
Structural change between services for safe assets and services for risky investments or
wage inequality are not addressed nor do income effects play a role for the relative size
of the financial compared to the real sector. There is only one type of labor, one interest
bearing asset and preferences are homothetic. Moreover, there are two types of households
- infinitely living saver households and households which live two periods and borrow when
young. By contrast, in our paper all households live for two periods and save when young;
savings can be invested in a portfolio of safe and risky assets. The second theoretical
2While the dominant view in this literature was that financial development is positive for growth,
a more skeptical view has emerged in the recent past. Gründler and Weitzel (2012) or Law and Singh
(2014) provide evidence that more finance is good for growth at low levels of financial development
but harmful beyond a certain threshold. Financial sector growth seems to harm in particular skill-
intensive (Kneer, 2013) and R&D intensive (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015) industries. Moreover, neg-
ative growth effects are robust if different measures of financialization are used, for instance market
capitalization rather than credits (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011) or the employment share of the financial
sector (Capelle-Blancard and Labonne, 2011). Beck et al. (2012) find that in particular the shift from
enterprise credits to household credits is detrimental for growth and inequality enhancing.
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explanation of structural change towards finance is provided by Gennaioli et al. (2014).
Like in Philippon (2012) a 2x2 framework is considered and structural change within the
financial is not in the focus of the paper. The real sector produces with capital and labor,
the financial sector consists of financial intermediation experts in whom investors trust.
Therefore they are willing to pay them fees. Like in our set-up households live two periods
and save when young. Moreover, they also account for risky assets. Inequality among
households, however, plays no role. The saving decision is exogenous - young households
save the entire wage - and the portfolio choice is determined by mean-variance preferences.
The main driver for structural change towards finance in their model is the idea that
financial intermediation services are not only required for the financing of new capital but
also for the preservation of the entire stock of capital accumulated over time. Since in a
Solow type growth model the capital coefficient increases, the share of financial services
in GDP increases, too. In our model, which focuses on comparative-static equilibrium
effects of skills and endowments, technologies and preferences, no long-run accumulation
effect is considered.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section shows the three facts that the
paper wants to explain. Section 2.3 outlines the formal structure of our 3x3 model and its
building blocks. Section 2.4 analyzes the production equilibrium, Section 2.5 derives the
demand for goods and financial services. Section 2.6 summarizes the effects of inequality
on the sectoral structure of the economy. In Section 2.7 the general equilibrium is charac-
terized and comparative-static effects are derived analytically. Section 2.8 confronts the
theoretical results with empirical evidence from the U.S.. Moreover, a numerical exercise
is provided. In the appendix we provide supplementary material on extensions and model
variants to address the effects of distortions and to examine the robustness of our results.
Main conclusions are summarized in the last section.
2.2 Facts to be explained
Three facts motivate our analysis: The rising weight of the financial sector in total eco-
nomic activity, the rising weight of new finance activities within the financial sector and
the rise of inequality measured by the wage premium of skilled labor. The following figures
show the development for the U.S. economy over the period from 1980 to 2013 (based on
the Current Population Survey data).3
In Figure 2.1 the weight of the financial sector is measured by the wage ratio Ψ, that
is the sum of wages earned in the financial sector divided by the wage sum earned in
3Data from IPUMS-CPS by King et al. (2010). Survey years 1980-2013 represent years 1979-2012
because households are surveyed about last year’s job. This means whenever we talk about a year the
data considered represent the situation a year before.
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the other sectors of the economy.4 We show two measures: The actual finance ratio,
Ψactual, and the normalized one, Ψnormalized. As emphasized in the introduction, actual
wage earnings in the financial sector comprise a substantial finance premium. Moreover,
working hours in the finance industry are higher than in the other sectors of the economy.
In our normalized measure, we adjust for these factors and calculate the finance ratio by
assuming that employees in the financial sector work equal hours and earn the same wage
as the workers (with comparable skills) employed outside the financial sector.5
4%
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ΨnormalizedΨactual Averages
Figure 2.1: Wage sum ratios of the financial sector
Notes: Ψ measures the ratio of the total wage sum in finance vs. the rest of the U.S. economy. “Actual”
uses the observed sector-specific hours worked and hourly wages (for low-and high-skilled), whereas
“normalized” uses the X-sector hours worked and hourly wages (for low-and high-skilled). Survey years
from 1980-2013. Averages of normalized ratio for periods 1980-1994 and 1995-2009, respectively. Source:
Own calculations based on CPS.
Figure 2.2 shows the wage ratio of new finance, Φ, measured by the sum of wages
earned by workers employed in the new finance activities divided by the wages sum earned
in the traditional financial sector. The traditional financial sector comprises banking,
credit agencies and insurance; new finance activities consist of security and commodity
brokerage and investment companies. Again, a normalized new finance ratio Φnormalized
is shown beside the actual ratio Φactual, where working hours and wage rates from outside
the financial sector are used to calculate the normalized measure.
4Employment or value added ratios too would show the increased weight of the financial sector and
in particular of new finance activities.
5Section 2.8 describes data and measures in more detail.
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Figure 2.2: Wage sum ratios within the financial sector
Notes: Φ measures the ratio of the total wage sum in “new finance” vs. “traditional finance”. “Actual”
uses the sector-specific hours worked and hourly wages (for low-and high-skilled), whereas “normalized”
uses theX-sector hours worked and hourly wages (for low-and high-skilled). Survey years from 1980-2013.
Averages of normalized ratio for periods 1980-1994 and 1995-2009, respectively. Source: Own calculations
based on CPS.
Since our baseline analysis focuses on the economic mechanisms in a perfect equilib-
rium framework, it is only appropriate for explaining the development revealed by the
normalized measures of financialization. Possible additional drivers of financialization
which could explain the gap between normalized and actual weights of finance and new
finance are addressed in the extensions analyzed in Appendix B.2. Yet, as Figure 2.1 and
Figure 2.2 show, even the normalized measures clearly reveal a twofold structural change
towards and within the financial sector. The normalized wage ratio of the financial sector,
Ψnormalized, increased from 4.36% in 1980 to 5.94% in 2013 and the normalized wage ratio
of new finance, Φnormalized, rose from 9.17% in 1980 to 22.83% in 2013. For the quan-
titative implementation of our model and the comparative-static equilibrium results we
exclude the post-crisis years and compare average values for the period 1980-1994 with
the respective average values for 1995-2009. The average normalized wage ratio of finance
in the total economy was 5.08% in the period 1980-1994 and increased by 9% to 5.54%
in the period 1995-2009. The average normalized wage ratio of new finance increased by
67% from 13.99% in the period 1980-1994 to 23.41% in the period 1995-2009.
The twofold structural change shown in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 has been accom-
panied by a strong rise in inequality, including wage inequality in particular. Figure 2.3
shows the third fact that we want to explain by our analysis – the rise of the wage pre-
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mium ω earned by skilled workers compared to the wage of the unskilled. As shown in
Figure 2.3 this skill premium (measured by the normalized ratio of the hourly wage of a
skilled worker outside the financial sector divided by the hourly wage earned by unskilled
labor) increased from 1.55 in 1980 to 1.91 in 2013. Comparing averages for the two peri-
ods 1980-1994 and 1995-2009 the increase of the skill premium we have to explain by our
analysis is 14% from 1.62 to 1.85.
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Figure 2.3: Skill premium
Notes: ω measures the “normalized” skill premium (i.e., hourly wage of high-skilled labor in X-sector
divided by hourly-wage of low-skilled labor in X-sector). Survey years from 1980-2013. Source: Own
calculations based on CPS.
2.3 Model
2.3.1 Model set-up
We model a 3 sector, 3 factor economy. There is a production sector X and a finance
sector Z with two subsectors Z1 and Z2. All sectors employ low-skilled and high-skilled
workers. Produced goods are used for consumption and investment. For transforming
savings into future consumption possibilities, more or less risky technologies are available
which use capital as input and deliver consumption goods as output in the next period.
(As an extension we present a variant of the model, in which capital is used in the X
sector to set up firms.) Financial services have the function to support the transformation
of savings into future consumption possibilities. Services Z1 are used for safe savings.
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Services Z2 provide state-dependent instruments and are used for savings in securities
with risky returns.
We consider a (static) two-period OLG economy. The future t = 1 is uncertain. It
consists of a set Θ of distinguishable events and a set Θ¯ of events which are indistin-
guishable in t = 0. The future state space is
{
{θ|θ ∈ Θ} , Θ¯
}
. We have prob(Θ)=µ and
prob(θ|Θ)=πθ with
∑
θ∈Θ πθ = 1.
6 For θ ∈ Θ, state-contingent investment possibilities are
available which pay off if and only if state θ is realized. No state-contingent investment
possibilities exist for Θ¯ which reflects “true uncertainty”.
2.3.2 Saving decision and portfolio choice
There are N agents who live for two periods. They are endowed with a skill level and work
as either high-skilled or low-skilled worker when young. The number of low-skilled workers
is L¯ and the number of high-skilled workers is H¯. The efficiency units of labor provided
by a high-skilled and a low-skilled agent are given by bH and bL, respectively. They are
paid a wage per efficiency unit at rate, wl, l ∈ {L,H}. Income y
l = wlbl can be consumed
in t = 0 or be saved and transformed to tomorrow’s consumption possibilities. Agents
are assumed to have quasi-homothetic preferences of the Stone-Geary form: Beyond a
subsistence level to be expended they spend income on the good produced in the X-
sector.7 They have an instantaneous indirect utility function of the form log(et− e¯t) where
et is the expenditure for good X consumption and e¯t ≥ 0 is the subsistence expenditure
level in time t. Intertemporal preferences are assumed to be additive logarithmic with a
discount factor δ.
The intertemporal problem consists of two parts: A saving decision and a portfolio
choice. On the one hand, agents have to decide how much to expend on consumption, e0,
and how much to save, s. On the other hand, they have to put the saving in an appropriate
portfolio of financial products. For this purpose they demand financial services. With
the support of these services they decide how much of the saving is put into deposits, d,
with a safe payoff r, and how much into risky state-contingent financial products (Arrow
securities), fθ, which pay off Rθ if state θ is realized and zero otherwise. We assume that
all Arrow securities have the same expected payoff. Specifically, there exists R > 0 so
that
Rθ =
R
πθ
, θ ∈ Θ. (2.1)
6This structure is taken from Falkinger (2014).
7Achury et al. (2012) show that a Stone-Geary type utility function is appropriate for explaining
stylized facts of household finance like higher saving rates of households with higher lifetime income or a
larger fraction of risky assets in the portfolios of wealthy agents.
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For transforming one unit of deposit, one unit of financial services from subsector
1 is needed; and for transforming one unit of Arrow securities, one unit of financial
services from subsector 2 is required. Therefore, given the portfolio choice, {d, f} , with
f =
∑
θ∈Θ fθ, agents have to pay a fee T = pz1d + pz2f to the financial sector, where pz1
and pz2 are the prices for financial services Z1 and Z2, respectively.
8 Suppose the fee is
charged in the first period and agents internalize the fee in their portfolio choice. The
expected utility maximization problem of an agent l with income yl is then given by:
max
sl,{f l
θ
}θ∈Θ,dl
EU = log(el0 − e¯0) + δ

µ∑
θ∈Θ
πθ log(e
l
θ − e¯1) + (1− µ) log(e
l
Θ¯ − e¯1)


s.t.
el0 + (1 + pz1)d
l + (1 + pz2)
∑
θ∈Θ
f lθ = y
l (2.2)
elθ =


Rθf
l
θ + rd
l, if θ ∈ Θ
rdl, otherwise
(2.3)
sl =
∑
θ∈Θ
f lθ + d
l. (2.4)
In Section 2.5 aggregate demand functions for goods and financial services are derived
from this program.
2.3.3 Production of goods (X-sector)
Firms in the X-sector employ low-skilled and high-skilled labor as input factors in a linear
homogeneous production function
X = Gx(HX , LX),
where HX , LX denote respective labor employment in the X-sector. There is perfect
competition with zero-profit prices. This means:
px = cx(wH , wL), (2.5)
where cx(wH , wL) are the unit costs and wH , wL are the wage rates per efficiency units.
8Without loss of generality, it was assumed that financial services are measured in units of savings.
Without this normalization the cost of financial services per unit of saving would be p˜zi = pzini rather
than pzi , where ni denotes the units of financial services needed for one unit of saving in deposits (i = 1)
and securities (i = 2), respectively.
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The goods price is taken as numéraire, px = 1. Revenue X is distributed to labor as
follows:
Wx = wLLx + wHHx = G
x(Lx, Hx),
where Wx is total wage earned in the X-sector.
Capital is used in technologies which transform savings into future consumption pos-
sibilities. Two types of technologies are available: A robust technology, which transforms
under any condition (i.e., in Θ and Θ¯) one unit of capital invested today into r units
of output tomorrow; furthermore, for θ ∈ Θ, a set of risky technologies specialized to
θ-contingent environments. One unit of capital invested in technology θ delivers Rθ units
of output if state θ ∈ Θ occurs tomorrow and zero otherwise. Deposits are invested in
the robust technology; savings in securities are invested in the respective risky technolo-
gies. The smaller the measure πθ of the state to which a risky technology is targeted,
the more productive the capital invested in the technology. Equation (2.1) expresses this
relationship between specialization advantage and risk.
The separation of the production of old age consumption goods by capital from the
labor based production of the goods consumed and invested in the active period of life is
convenient from an analytical point of view. Under a more realistic perspective, however,
capital is typically a prerequisite for producing with labor. In the extension in Section
B.2.5, we show that essentially the same payoff structure arises if X is produced under
monopolistic competition and capital is needed to set up firms – by robust and risky set-
up technologies, respectively. Asset returns are then generated by the operating profits
of the firms the set up of which has been financed by the asset.
In almost all of the further analysis only the relative payoff between robust and spe-
cialized risky technologies matters. It is given by:
ρ ≡
r
R
.
The only exception is the discounting of future subsistence expenditure, e¯1
r
, for which the
level of the return on the robust technology matters.
2.3.4 Production of financial services (Z-sectors)
The financial sector Z consists of two subsectors, Z1 and Z2. They provide financial
services for transforming savings through safe and risky assets into future consumption
possibilities. (The assets are invested in the robust and risky technologies, and households
get the generated revenue as return on their investment.) Zi, i ∈ {1, 2}, is produced with
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a linear homogeneous production function Gzi(.):
Zi = G
zi(Hzi , Lzi), i ∈ {1, 2} (2.6)
where Hzi , Lzi denote employment levels in the Zi-sector.
In reality, fixed costs may play an important role in the provision of financial services.
We consider such costs as an extension in Section B.2.1 and show how changes in fixed
costs affect the equilibrium outcomes of our model.
We assume perfect competition in the Z-sectors and have therefore zero-profit prices
pzi = czi(wH , wL), i ∈ {1, 2} (2.7)
where czi(wH , wL) are the unit costs.
Revenue pziZi, i ∈ {1, 2}, is distributed to labor
Wzi = wLLzi + wHHzi = pziG
zi(Hzi , Lzi), i ∈ {1, 2}
where Wzi is total labor income earned in the Zi-sector.
As emphasized in the introduction, perfect competition in the Z-sector is an ideal
benchmark rather than a description of reality. The role of rents is considered in the
extension presented in Section B.2.2.
2.4 Production equilibrium and supply of goods and
financial services
At the production side, the essential feature we want to address is variation in skill
intensities. For an explicit comparative-static analysis we take production functions of
the Cobb-Douglas form.
Let, for j ∈ {x, z1, z2}, G
j have Cobb-Douglas form
Gj (Lj, Hj) = AjL
1−αj
j H
αj
j ,
where Aj is total factor productivity and αj is the factor share of high-skilled workers in
sector j.9 Then
aLj =
1
Ajκ
αj
j
, aHj =
κ
1−αj
j
Aj
(2.8)
9The magnitudes of the total factor productivities depend on the unit in which financial services are
measured. Since financial services are measured in units of savings, Ax < Az1 ≤ Az2 is a plausible
restriction on total factor productivities. Analytically no such restriction is required for the results.
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are the input coefficients, and cost-minimizing skill-intensities κj ≡ a
H
j /a
L
j are given by
κj(ω) =
γj
ω
, γj ≡
αj
1− αj
, (2.9)
where ω ≡ wH/wL is the relative wage per efficiency unit of skilled labor compared to
unskilled labor, which reflects the skill premium (per efficiency unit).10
2.4.1 Wages and prices
We have for variable unit costs in sector j:
cj (wH , wL) =
w
1−αj
L w
αj
H
AjΓj
, Γj ≡ α
αj
j (1− αj)
1−αj . (2.10)
Using (2.10) and px = 1 in the zero-profit price equation (2.5), we obtain
wL = AxΓxω
−αx , (2.11)
and from (2.7), for i ∈ {1, 2},
pzi =
Ax
Azi
Γx
Γzi
ωαzi−αx . (2.12)
In sum, prices for financial services are related to the skill premium in the following way:
Fact 2.1. The price of financial services Zi, pzi, is an increasing function of ω if αzi > αx.
If αzi = αx, then pzi is invariant with respect to ω. Moreover, αzi > αx (αzi = αx) is
equivalent to κzi > κx ( κzi = κx).
As known from the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, this fact holds quite generally and is
not an artifact of the Cobb-Douglas specification.
In the further analysis we make the following assumption about the factor intensity
ranking of the three sectors.
Assumption 2.1. αz2 ≥ αz1 and αz1 ≥ αx with at least one inequality holding strictly.
In Section 2.8 we provide evidence on the sectoral skill intensities. Assumption 2.1 is
consistent with the evidence.
10Note that κj =
bHH¯j
bLL¯j
. According to (2.9), the inverse labor demand function is ω =
(
γj
bL
bH
)
L¯j
H¯j
.
Thus, we have skill-biased technical change (in the sense of an outward shift of skilled-labor demand
relative to unskilled-labor demand) if the output elasticity αj of high-skilled labor rises or if there is
low-skilled labor augmenting progress (that is bL/bH rises). It is worth noting that αj is a sector-specific
component whereas bL/bH is uniform across sectors.
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2.4.2 Resource constraints
Total labor endowment in efficiency units is given by
L = bLL¯, H = bHH¯,
so that the “skill richness” of the total labor force is
k ≡
bHH¯
bLL¯
.
The aggregate resource constraints are:
aLxX + a
L
z1
Z1 + a
L
z2
Z2 = bLL¯
aHx X + a
H
z1
Z1 + a
H
z2
Z2 = bHH¯
(2.13)
with alj, j ∈ {x, z1, z2}, l ∈ {H,L} being functions of the skill premium ω defined in (2.9).
For illuminating the drivers of structural change on the production side it is worth
looking, as an intermediary step, separately at the allocation of resources within the finan-
cial sector and the resource allocation between financial services and goods production.
Let total employment (in efficiency units) in the financial sector be given by Lz and Hz,
respectively, and denote by kz ≡
Hz
Lz
the “skill richness” of the labor force in the financial
sector. If αz2 = αz1 , the allocation of Lz and Hz on Z1 and Z2 is determined by the
demand side only. If αz2 > αz1 , then we know from the Rybczynski analysis that both a
rise in the skill premium ω and increased skill richness kz shift resource allocation within
the financial sector from Z1 to Z2. For the same reason, resources are shifted from goods
production to the more skill-intensive provision of financial services if the skill premium
or the skill richness rise in the economy.
In a general equilibrium, however, skill premium and employment in the financial
sector are determined simultaneously with aggregate demand for financial services and
goods.
2.5 Income distribution and aggregate demand
The demand for financial services comes from the need of agents to transform current
savings into future income. For this purpose the asset-holding agents require financial
products and expert services from the financial sector which support them by choosing
and managing a portfolio of deposits and securities appropriate for their preferences.
The program max EU subject to (2.2)-(2.4) is only well-defined if e0 > e¯0 and e1 > e¯1.
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This requires that
yl = blwl > y¯ ≡ e¯0 + (1 + pz1)
e¯1
r
, l ∈ {L,H} . (2.14)
y¯ denotes the present value of future subsistence expenditure in units of today’s final
output.
Assuming yH ≥ yL, which is equivalent to ω ≥ bL/bH , y
L > y¯ is sufficient for (2.14).
The following fact gives a necessary and sufficient condition for yL > y¯. The signs below
the parameters show the sign of the respective partial derivatives.
Fact 2.2. There exists a threshold ω+L so that y
L > y¯ if and only if ω < ω+L (Ax
+
, Az1
+
, bL
+
, e¯0
−
, e¯1
r
−
).
Proof. Appendix B.1.3.
Savings in securities is positive if and only if the following condition holds: µR (1 + pz1) >
(1 + pz2) r. The condition can be rewritten in the form
µ > pρ, p ≡
1 + pz2
1 + pz1
, ρ ≡
r
R
. (2.15)
pρ is the relative net payoff (i.e., after correction for costs of financial services) of savings
in safe assets compared to savings in risky assets. If the condition is violated, the expected
net payoff of risky investment is lower than the net payoff of risk-free investments and all
saving is in deposits.
In the next subsection we analyze individual saving and expenditure behavior. Sub-
section 2.5.2 deals with aggregate demand.
2.5.1 Individual saving and expenditure behavior
As is derived in Appendix B.1.1, under the assumption that inequalities (2.14) and (2.15)
are satisfied, individual savings in deposits and securities are given by
dl = sd
δ
1 + δ
yl − y¯
1 + pz1
+
e¯1
r
, l = {L,H} , (2.16)
and
f l = sf
δ
1 + δ
yl − y¯
1 + pz2
, f lθ = πθf
l, θ ∈ Θ, l = {L,H} , (2.17)
respectively, with
sd =
1− µ
1− pρ
, sf =
µ− pρ
1− pρ
. (2.18)
Apart from the savings for future subsistence expenditure, e¯1
r
, in form of deposits, the
saving level is proportional to the supernumerary budget yl − y¯. In real terms, the value
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of the supernumerary budget, which is relevant as a basis for saving, depends on the price
of the financial service charged on the particular form of savings – pz1 for deposits and
pz2 for securities. The split of the saving on safe and risky assets is given by the marginal
propensities to save in deposits, sd, and in securities, sf , respectively.
11 The propensity
of safe investment increases in the relative net payoff of the safe asset, pρ, and declines
with the measure µ of states covered by securities. The propensity of risky investment
reacts in the opposite direction.12
In contrast to net savings, gross savings include the fee to be paid for the financial
services consumed in support for the transformation of savings into future income. Adding
up (1 + pz1)d
l + (1 + pz2)f
l, we have
sl + tl =
δ
1 + δ
(yl − y¯) +
(1 + pz1)e¯1
r
, (2.19)
where tl = pz1d
l + pz2f
l denotes the total fee paid by agent l.
Current expenditures el0 = y
l − (sl + tl) are thus:
el0 =
1
1 + δ
(yl − y¯) + e¯0. (2.20)
For the discussion of structural change on the demand side, the effect of income on the
portfolio structure is of particular importance.13 According to (2.16) and (2.17), richer
agents invest a larger share of their saving in risky assets than the relatively poorer ones.
The reason is that the provision for future subsistence expenditure by safe investments has
diminishing weight if people become richer. This means that saving in deposits has the
character of a “necessity” and saving in risky securities is a “luxury”. Moreover, if present
subsistence expenditure is more pressing than future subsistence expenditure, people save
a smaller part of their income when they are poor and the saving rate s/y rises when they
get richer.14 The following fact summarizes this important implication of our model.
11If inequality (2.15) is violated, then saving in securities is unattractive in the first place and we have
a corner solution with sf = 0 and sd = s =
δ
1+δ
y−y¯
1+pz1
+ e¯1r .
12For e¯0 = e¯1 = 0 and pz1 = pz2 = 0, we have sd =
1−µ
1−ρ and sf =
µ−ρ
1−ρ . Defining R¯ =
R
µ and
ρ¯ = r
R¯
, we can rewrite the two terms in the form sd =
R¯(1−µ)
R¯−r/µ
and sf =
µR¯−r/µ
R¯−r/µ
. Thus, with Cobb-
Douglas preferences and zero financial intermediation cost, the portfolio choice coincides with the one
in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), where the conditional expectation R¯ of the productivity of risky tech-
nologies is used rather than the unconditional expectation R.
13Boppart (2015) analyzes the skill-content of the consumption basket of different income groups. With
rising income, a household’s demand shifts towards skill-intensive sectors (including financial services; also
shown by Suellow (2015) in detail).
14The role of subsistence requirements for the saving behavior may call into mind the effects of fixed
costs in the model of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), where saving rate and portfolio structure depend
on an agent’s wealth due to constrained participation in the use of financial intermediation service. While
we consider the effect of a participation constraint as an extension in supplementary Section B.2, no such
66 Structural change
Fact 2.3. Let e¯0 > 0 or e¯1 > 0.
a) If e¯1 > 0 , then
∂(f/d)
∂y
> 0.
b) For e¯0 > 0,
∂(s/y)
∂y
> 0 if and only if δe¯0
1+pz1
> e¯1
r
[
1+δ
sd+sf/p
− δ
]
. (Note that for p = 1 the
square-bracketed term reduces to one.)
Proof. Part a) follows immediately from (2.16) and (2.17). For b) the definition of y¯ in
(2.14) is used.
2.5.2 Aggregate demand for goods and financial services
Saving and expenditure behavior follow affine-linear functions. Therefore, aggregate be-
havior depends on two things: The level of aggregate income and the number of people
over which the income is distributed. The latter comes in through the fact that sub-
sistence requirements are bound to the existence of an agent, independent of her or his
income.
Aggregating the two pools of agents, we have
N = L¯+ H¯
for the size of the population and
W = wLbLL¯+ wHbHH¯
for the level of aggregate income. In view of (2.11), the latter amounts to
W = AxΓxbLL¯ω
−αx(1 + ωk). (2.21)
The following fact shows that aggregate income, measured in units of X, is an increas-
ing function of the skill premium (ω = wH/wL).
Fact 2.4. Under Assumption 2.1, W is increasing in ω. We have
∂W
∂ω
= Awω
−αx(1− αx) (k − κx) > 0 (2.22)
constraint exists in the baseline considered here. But everybody has to expend a certain sum to survive.
This biases saving rate and portfolio structure. If people get richer the pressure of the subsistence
requirements diminishes. There are of course other important differences to Greenwood and Jovanovic.
In particular, all forms of saving require costly financial intermediation in our framework. Moreover, our
focus is on inequality in labor income rather than wealth inequality and on structural change rather than
growth.
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with Aw ≡ AxΓxbLL¯.
Proof. According to (2.21),
∂W
∂ω
= Awω
−αx
[
−
αx
ω
(1 + ωk) + k
]
= Awω
−αx
[
−
αx
ω
+ (1− αx)k
]
= Awω
−αx(1− αx)
[
k −
αx
1− αx
wL
wH
]
.
According to (2.9),
αx
1− αx
=
wHa
H
x
wLaLx
.
Thus, the square-bracketed term reduces to k − κx, which is positive if Assumption 2.1
holds.
Financial services provision is more skill intensive than goods production, at least on
average. Therefore, in terms of goods, aggregate wage income rises with the skill premium.
A different matter is the impact of the skill premium on the purchasing power for financial
services, the price of which rises too with the skill premium.
Aggregating individual investments in deposits, given by (2.16), we obtain
D =
(
sd
δ
1 + δ
w¯ − y¯
1 + pz1
+
e¯1
r
)
N, (2.23)
where w¯ ≡ W
N
denotes average income. In an analogous way, we have from (2.17):
F = sf
δ
1 + δ
w¯ − y¯
1 + pz2
N, Fθ = πθF (2.24)
for aggregate investments in securities and aggregate current expenditures are
E0 =
[
1
1 + δ
(w¯ − y¯) + e¯0
]
N. (2.25)
2.6 The effect of the skill premium on the sectoral
structure
In a general equilibrium, sectoral structure and skill premium are determined simulta-
neously. As an intermediate step we characterize the sectoral structure as a function of
the skill premium and exogenous parameters, keeping in mind that in the end the skill
premium depends on exogenous parameters too. Not all possible values of skill premia
and parameters are of interest, but only those which are reasonable candidates for a gen-
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eral equilibrium, in which both financial sectors are viable, the subsistence of all agents is
feasible and a positive skill premium results. The following paragraphs characterize the
set of parameter configurations which guarantee these equilibrium properties.
Assumption 2.1 that financial service provision is more skill intensive than goods
production (κx < k < κz) is equivalent to
γx
k
< ω < γz
k
as we know from (2.9). At
ωmin ≡
γx
k
the Z-sector vanishes and beyond ωmax ≡
γz
k
there would be no longer an
X-sector. Hence, we consider the range ω ∈ (ωmin, ωmax) in our search for the equilibrium
skill premium.
Moreover, according to Fact 2.2, ω < ω+L (Ax
+
, Az
+
, bL
+
, e¯0
−
, e¯1
r
−
) is required for guaranteeing
subsistence for low-skilled agents. ω+L ≥ ωmax holds if Ax, Az and bL are large enough (for
given e¯0,
e¯1
r
), or e¯0 and
e¯1
r
are not too high (for given Ax, Az, bL). If ω
+
L < ωmax, only range
ω ∈ (ωmin, ω
+
L ) is feasible.
Finally, ω ≥ bL/bH is required for y
H ≥ yL. This is guaranteed if ωmin ≥ bL/bH , which
is equivalent to
γx ≥
H¯
L¯
.
In terms of exogenous fundamentals, the requirements mean that we restrict the pos-
sible combinations of exogenous model parameters
ξ =
{
Ax, Az1 , Az2 , αx, αz1 , αz2 , bL, bH , H¯, L¯, e¯0,
e¯1
r
, ρ, µ, δ
}
to the following set:
Ξ0 ≡
{
ξ
∣∣∣∣∣H¯L¯ ≤ γx,
γx
k
< ω˜max
}
, (2.26)
where k = bHH¯
bLL¯
and ω˜max ≡ min
{
ωmax, ω
+
L (Ax, Az1 , bL, e¯0,
e¯1
r
)
}
.
In general, the interaction of the allocation of resources between the X-sector and
the Z-sector, on the one hand, and the allocation within the Z-sector on Z1 and Z2,
on the other hand, are hard to disentangle in an economically transparent way. For
qualitatively robust insights into important channels we have to reduce complexity on
either the demand or the supply side. In the benchmark analysis presented in Section
2.6.1, 2.6.2 and 2.7, we shut down relative price effects within the financial sector by
assuming identical technologies for Z1 and Z2.
Assumption 2.2. αz1 = αz2 = αz > αx and Az1 = Az2 = Az.
15
15Without normalization n1 = n2 = 1, the assumption would read
Az1
n1
=
Az2
n2
. That is the provision
of financial services per unit of saving must be equal in the two subsectors. For instance, new financial
services may be provided more productively than traditional services, but, at the same time, more units
of services are needed to transform a unit of saving into future payoff by complex rather than simple
financial products.
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Assumption 2.2 allows us to put focus on the income effects. In Appendix B.3 we
consider the case αz2 > αz1 = αx as a robustness check. Moreover, in the quantitative
implementation of the model we solve the model numerically for αj values that match
U.S. data where αz2 > αz1 > αx .
We analyze first the impact of an increase in the skill premium on structural change
within the financial sector.
2.6.1 Within change
The value added in subsector Zi, i = {1, 2} , is equal to aggregate expenditure on the
produced services. According to (2.23) and (2.24), aggregate expenditures for financial
services have the following structure:
pz2F
pz1D
=
sf η¯(ω)
sdη¯(ω) +
1+δ
δ
e¯1
r
≡ Φ(sd
−
, sf
+
,
e¯1
r
−
, η¯
+
(ω)) (2.27)
with η¯(ω) ≡ w¯(ω)−y¯
1+pz(ω)
. (Note that pz1 = pz2 = pz under Assumption 2.2.)
While the impacts of saving propensities sd and sf (defined in (2.18)) and the future
subsistence requirements on the within structure are straightforward, the role of the skill
premium is in general ambiguous. Apart from relative price effects, shut down by As-
sumption 2.2, the skill premium affects η¯(ω) which is the average supernumerary income
weighted by the cost of future subsistence.16 It captures the income effect on within
structural change. If e¯1 = 0, there is no income effect on the demand structure for finan-
cial services. For e¯1 > 0, however, the value-added ratio Φ of sector Z2 compared to Z1
depends on the skill premium in an U-shaped way. The following lemma characterizes
the properties of η¯(ω).
Lemma 2.1. Let exogenous model parameters belong to Ξ0 defined in (2.26).
a) If ξ ∈ Ξ1 ≡ Ξ0 ∩ {ξ|αx + αz > 1}, then there exists a threshold ω(Ax
?
, Az
?
, k
−
, bLL¯
N
?
, e¯0
−
)
with ∂η¯
∂ω
∣∣∣ω=ω = 0 so that:
∂η¯
∂ω
< 0 for ω < ω,
∂η¯
∂ω
> 0 for ω > ω.
Especially, define Ξ1D ≡ {ξ|ω > ωmin} and Ξ
2
D ≡ {ξ|ω < ω˜max}. If ξ ∈ Ξ1 − Ξ
1
D, then
∂η¯
∂ω
> 0 for all ω ∈ (ωmin, ω˜max). If ξ ∈ Ξ1 − Ξ
2
D, then
∂η¯
∂ω
< 0 for all ω ∈ (ωmin, ω˜max).
16See discussion in Section B.3 for the case of changing relative prices within the Z-sector.
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b) For the comparative static analysis we have:
η¯

ω
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ax+ , Az+ , k+,
bLL¯
N
+
, e¯0
−
,
e¯1
r
−


Proof. Appendix B.1.3.
On the one hand, a higher ω raises the average wage. On the other hand, the prices
of financial services are increasing, which has a negative effect on the purchasing power.
According to Lemma 2.1, the first effect dominates if the skill premium is sufficiently high.
In sum, we have the following partial results about within structural change in the
finance sector.
Proposition 2.1. Let e¯1 > 0.
a) A rise in the skill premium leads to structural change from subsector Z1 to subsector Z2
(in terms of value-added) at high levels of the skill premium (ω > ω) and to structural
change from Z2 to Z1 at low levels of skill premium.
b) For a given skill premium, a rise of Ax, Az, k,
bLL¯
N
or a decline of e¯0,
e¯1
r
lead to structural
change from Z1 to Z2. A rise of µ or a decline of ρ also lead to change from Z1 to Z2,
even if e¯1 = 0.
Proof. (2.27), Lemma 2.1 and the fact that a rise in µ or a decline in ρ raise sf (at cost
of sd).
The proposition describes only a partial effect. For a full comparative-static equilib-
rium analysis, we have to combine the direct effects of exogenous fundamentals with their
indirect effects through the equilibrium skill premium. We come back on the total effects
in Section 2.7.4.
2.6.2 Between change
For αz1 = αz2 = αz and Az1 = Az2 = Az, aggregate supply of financial services reduces
to:
Z(= Z1 + Z2) = AzLzκ
α
z .
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The allocation between the X-and the Z-sector is then determined by the resource
constraints:
aLxX + a
L
zZ = bLL¯,
aHx X + a
H
z Z = bHH¯.
Solving the system for X and Z, we obtain
X =
bLL¯
aLx
κz − k
κz − κx
, Z =
bLL¯
aLz
k − κx
κz − κx
. (2.28)
As a result, we have for values of the services supplied by the financial sector compared
to the output of the goods sector:
pzZ
X
=
pz(ω)a
L
x (ω)
aLz (ω)
k − κx(ω)
κz(ω)− k
≡ Ψ(ω
+
, k
+
). (2.29)
This gives us the following result for the comparative-static effects on the supply structure.
17
Proposition 2.2. An increase in the skill premium shifts the supply structure from goods
production to financial services provision. An increase in the high skilled labor share (k)
has the same effect.
Proof. The signs of the respective partial derivatives in (2.29) follow from κz > κx, the
Rybczynski analysis and the fact that pz rises in ω.
The proposition characterizes the supply structure as a function of exogenous fun-
damentals and the skill premium. The supply structure interacts with demand, which
depends on aggregate income and prices and thus also reacts to the skill premium. To
close the analysis, we have to determine the equilibrium skill premium. Section 2.7.3
will then summarize the general equilibrium effect of the skill premium on the between
sectoral structure.
17 Note that (2.29) characterizes the supply structure of labor produced output. If capital is used as
set-up capital as in the extended model in Section B.2.5, then X is indeed the total size of final output
in the goods sector. In the baseline model considered here there is in addition the output generated for
old age consumption by past capital investments. Thus, the total size of goods transactions becomes
X¯ ≡ X + rD + µRF with X = E0 + S, S = D + F and the between structural change ratio is
Ψ¯ ≡ pzD+pzF
X¯
= pzD+pzFX+rD+µRF with D, F and E0 from (2.23)-(2.25). It is, ceteris paribus, increasing in ω
if S′E0 − SE
′
0 − (µR − r)(DF
′ − FD′) > 0 where D′, F ′, S′ and E′0 are the respective derivatives with
respect to ω. This means, if the between change (S′E0−SE
′
0) is larger than within change (DF
′−FD′)
multiplied with the return difference (µR− r).
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2.7 General equilibrium
Aggregate demand in the X-sector is composed of consumer goods demand, E0, and
investment goods demand, S = D + F . On top of it, old agents consume the output
generated by the capital they invested in the period before.
Aggregating the individual budget constraints (2.2), we obtain:
E0 +D + F + pz1D + pz2F =W, (2.30)
where W = Wx +Wz, Wx = X and Wz = pz1G
z1(Hz1 , Lz1) + pz2G
z2(Hz2 , Lz2). If the Z1
and Z2-markets are cleared, we have G
z1(Hz1 , Lz1) = D and G
z2(Hz2 , Lz2) = F so that
(2.30) reduces to
E0 +D + F = X.
Thus, the goods market is automatically cleared if the markets for financial services are
cleared.
Aggregate demand for financial services comes from savings in deposits D and savings
in securities F . Adding up (2.23) and (2.24), we have for aggregate demand in the Z-sector
ZD =
(
δ
1 + δ
w¯ − y¯
1 + pz
+
e¯1
r
)
N. (2.31)
From (2.28) we know that aggregate Z-supply in a production equilibrium is
ZS = AzbLL¯κ
αz
z
k − κx
κz − κx
(2.32)
where aLz =
1
Azκ
αz
z
was used.
2.7.1 Existence, uniqueness and stability of equilibrium
Both market sides are functions of ω (which works through w¯ and pz on the demand
side and through skill intensities κx, κz on the supply side). For a stable equilibrium, the
condition
dZD
dω
<
dZS
dω
(2.33)
is required at the market clearing ω-value. (Since pz is increasing in ω, inequality (2.33)
guarantees that a rise in price pz goes hand in hand with a reduction of excess demand
and a fall in the price reduces excess supply.)
The supply function is characterized by the following fact.
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Fact 2.5. ZS is an increasing strictly concave function of ω starting at lim
ω→ωmin
ZS = 0
and approaching AzbLL¯k
αz at ωmax. More specifically,
ZS = AzbLL¯
γαzz
γz − γx
g(ω
+
, k
+
), g(ω, k) ≡ ω−αz(kω − γx). (2.34)
Proof. Appendix B.1.3.
For the demand side the following fact applies.
Fact 2.6. Aggregate demand for financial services is given by:
ZD =

 δ
1 + δ
η¯

ω
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ax+ , Az+ , k+,
bLL¯
N
+
, e¯0
−
,
e¯1
r
−

+ e¯1
r

N,
where η¯ was discussed in Lemma 2.1. For all ξ ∈ Ξ1, Z
D is defined and positive on the
ω-domain (ωmin, ω˜max). Moreover, it is either U-shaped in ω (for ξ ∈ ΞD ≡ Ξ1∩Ξ
1
D∩Ξ
2
D),
increasing over the entire domain (for ξ ∈ Ξ1−Ξ
1
D) or declining for all ω (if ξ ∈ Ξ1−Ξ
2
D).
Proof. Equation (2.31) and Lemma 2.1.
Figure 2.4 shows in the (ω,Z)-space the supply and demand curves under the assump-
tion that
ZD(ω˜max) < Z
S(ω˜max), (2.35)
where ω˜max was defined in (2.26).
18
If inequality (2.35) holds, then the market clearing condition ZD(ω) = ZS(ω) has a
unique solution ω∗ within (ωmin, ω˜max). Moreover, stability condition (2.33) is fulfilled at
ω∗. This establishes the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3. Define ΞE = Ξ1 ∩
{
ξ|ZD(ω˜max) < Z
S(ω˜max)
}
. For all ξ ∈ ΞE, there
exists a unique and stable equilibrium.
Proof. Continuity of ZD on ω ∈ (ωmin, ω˜max) and properties of the shape of Z
D established
in Fact 2.6.
2.7.2 Equilibrium skill premium
For the comparative-static equilibrium analysis, we have to look at the excess demand
function ZD − ZS. Because of stability condition ∂(Z
D−ZS)
∂ω
< 0, we know that for any
18If ω˜max = ω
+
L , then Z
D(ω˜) is to be read as ZD(ω) < ZS(ω) for all ω < ω+L − ǫ, with ǫ arbitrarily
small. Figure 2.4 assumes ξ ∈ ΞD; yet, from Fact 2.6 it is obvious that for ξ ∈ Ξ1 − Ξ
1
D the Z
D-curve
would cross the ZS-curve at ω∗ as in Case I, whereas for ξ ∈ Ξ1 −Ξ
2
D we would have at ω
∗ the situation
illustrated in Case II.
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Figure 2.4: Equilibrium in the financial service sector.
exogenous change of a component i of ξ ∈ ΞE
sign
∂ω∗
∂i
= sign
∂(ZD − ZS)
∂i
|ZD=ZS .
For signing the impact of exogenous fundamentals on the equilibrium, we express
excessive demand explicitly as a function of model parameters. Using (2.21) and (2.12),
we have
w¯N
1 + pz
= AxbLL¯D1(ω|
Az
Ax
+
, k
+
), (2.36)
where D1 ≡
Γx(1+ωk)
ωαx+AxΓx
AzΓz
ωαz
and the signs below parameters in (2.36) express the signs of
their impact on D1. Term D1 captures the purchasing power effect.
Moreover, substituting (2.12) for pz1 in (2.14) we can write the term
δ
1+δ
y¯
1+pz
− e¯1
r
in
the form:
D0(ω|
Az
Ax
+
, e¯0
+
,
e¯1
r
−
) =
1
1 + δ

 δe¯0
1 + AxΓx
AzΓz
ωαz−αx
−
e¯1
r

 . (2.37)
Term D0 captures the effect of the subsistence requirements on the aggregate demand
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for financial services. The sign of the square-bracketed term is positive if the present
subsistence expenditure e¯0 dominates the future subsistence expenditure e¯1. It is negative
if e¯1 dominates e¯0. For the economic interpretation of the relevant notion of dominance
it is useful to recall AxΓx
AzΓz
ωαz−αx = pz. Thus D0(ω|
Az
Ax
, e¯0,
e¯1
r
) > 0 (=, < 0) if and only if
δe¯0
1 + pz
>
e¯1
r
(=, <
e¯1
r
, resp.). (2.38)
This is exactly the condition for a rising (constant, declining, resp.) saving rate derived in
Fact 2.3.b). (Note that p = 1 in the benchmark case.) If present subsistence expenditures
are more pressing than future ones, people save more and demand more financial services
if they become richer and get farther away from subsistence problems.
Using D0 and (2.36) in (2.31) and combining the result with (2.34), we conclude that
ZD − ZS is equal to the term
AxbLL¯

 δ
1 + δ
D1(ω|
Az
Ax
+
, k
+
)−
N
AxbLL¯
D0(ω|
Az
Ax
+
, e¯0
+
,
e¯1
r
−
)−
Az
Ax
γαzz
γz − γx
g(ω, k
+
)

 . (2.39)
Hence, e¯1 has a positive impact on Z
D−ZS and thus on ω∗; e¯0 has a negative impact.
Az
Ax
and k have opposing effects so that their impacts cannot be signed unambiguously by
inspection of (2.39).
The most interesting question is how technical change affects the equilibrium skill
premium. For this we have to look at the impact of AxbLL¯
N
on ZD −ZS. (Since Az
Ax
has an
ambiguous effect, we only consider uniform progress across sectors, that is, total factor
productivity Az rises pari passu with Ax.) The answer depends on condition (2.38). If
δe¯0
1+pz
> e¯1
r
, D0 is positive and ω
∗ increases if AxbLL¯
N
rises. If δe¯0
1+pz
< e¯1
r
, then D0 is negative
and ω∗ declines if AxbLL¯
N
increases. For e¯0 = e¯1 = 0,
AxbLL¯
N
has no effect.
In sum, we have the following partial effects of the parameters on the equilibrium skill
premium:19
ω∗(
Az
Ax
?
, k
?
,
AxbLL¯
N
+/−
, e¯0
−
,
e¯1
r
+
), (2.40)
where the impact of AxbLL¯
N
depends on the cases discussed above.
All addressed effects refer to the partial derivatives, that is, they hold under the
condition that other parameters do not change simultaneously. Economically this means,
the effects come from a single source. In particular, for the effect of bLL¯
N
on ω∗, skill richness
19The signs below the parameters represent the partial derivatives. The combination +/− is used for
pointing to case-dependent impacts. A question mark means that the impact of the respective parameter
cannot be signed without further investigation.
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k = bHH¯
bLL¯
is held constant in the comparison. This requires a careful interpretation of the
described effect of bLL¯
N
. The following fact provides an economically meaningful description
of the variations which are consistent with a constant k and a rise in bLL¯
N
.
Fact 2.7. A rise in bLL¯
N
is consistent with a constant k if there is:
a) Uniform factor-augmenting technical progress, raising bL pari passu with bH .
b) A shift in labor supply from unskilled to skilled labor accompanied by factor augment-
ing progress that is biased towards the low-skilled. (Note that such low-skilled labor
augmentation depresses the relative wage of the unskilled – like skill-biased technical
change.)
Proof. Use N = L¯+H¯ for N
bLL¯
=
1+ H¯
L¯
bL
. Hence, k = bHH¯
bLL¯
remains constant under a decrease
in N
bLL¯
if either bL and bH rise proportionally and H¯/L¯ does not change or
H¯
L¯
rises and bL
rises such that bL
bH
grows proportionally to H¯
L¯
.
With these clarification the following proposition summarizes the comparative static
equilibrium results.
Proposition 2.4. Let e¯0 > or e¯1 > 0.
a) Uniform productivity growth across sectors (raising Ax and Az proportionally) or uni-
form factor-augmenting technical progress (raising bL and bH proportionally) have a
positive effect on the equilibrium skill premium if the present subsistence expenditure
dominates the future subsistence expenditure; if the future subsistence expenditure dom-
inates, then the skill premium declines.
b) A shift of labor supply from unskilled to skilled work accompanied by factor augmen-
tation which is biased towards low-skilled labor has the same effect on the equilibrium
skill premium as factor augmenting progress that is uniform.
c) The equilibrium skill premium rises, if future subsistence expenditure (e¯1) increases or
present subsistence expenditure (e¯0) declines.
Proof. Fact 2.7 and main text.
For the economic intuition behind a) and b) it is useful to remember Fact 2.3.b). If
present subsistence expenditure weighs more than future subsistence requirements then
the saving rate and therefore demand for financial services are rising with income. Since
the financial services are more skill intensive than goods, this rise of demand induces a
rise in the skill premium. The rising income in turn comes from technical progress or a
better educated workforce. The intuition for c) is: If future subsistence expenditure is
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high, agents have to save more and need more financial services; and if present subsistence
expenditure is low, they can afford to save more and to spend more for financial services.
It is worth noting that positive subsistence expenditure (e¯0 > 0 or e¯1 > 0) is essential
for the comparative-static results stated in Proposition 2.4. For e¯0 = e¯1 = 0, expression
(2.39) boils down to
AxbLL¯

 δ
1 + δ
D1

ω
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Az
Ax
+
, k
+

− Az
Ax
γαzz
γz − γx
g
(
ω, k
+
) .
Thus, uniform productivity growth has no effect in this case nor has bLL¯
N
.
2.7.3 Structural change between production and financial ser-
vice sectors
Combining the results of subsections 2.7.2 and 2.6.2, we obtain the following results for
the structural change between production and financial services in equilibrium:
Proposition 2.5. For all ξ ∈ ΞE, at given
Az
Ax
, k, any change in other exogenous fun-
damental which raises (lowers) the skill premium leads to structural change from X to Z
(Z to X, respectively).
Proof. Equation (2.29). Since pz rises with ω, the rise of ψ immediately implies that
pzZ
X
rises too.
2.7.4 Structural change within the financial sector
Finally, for structural change within the financial sector, we have the following results in
equilibrium:
Proposition 2.6. Let ω be the threshold defined in Lemma 2.1 and parameters fulfill
ξ ∈ ΞE. Then, under the assumption that prices do not differ across financial services,
the following comparative static results hold for structural change within the financial
sector as long as e¯1 > 0:
a) At high levels of the skill premium (ω∗ > ω), a fall of e¯0 leads to a shift from Z1
to Z2. In addition, if present subsistence expenditure dominates future subsistence
expenditure, uniform productivity growth across sectors (i.e. a proportional rise of Ax
and Az) as well as an increase in
bLL¯
N
change the structure within the financial sector
from Z1 towards Z2. According to Proposition 2.4 and 2.5, these changes induce an
increase in the inequality level ω∗, accompanied by a simultaneous structural change
from the goods to the financial service sector.
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b) At low levels of the skill premium (ω∗ < ω), a fall of e¯1 leads to a shift from Z1 to Z2. In
addition, if future subsistence expenditure dominates present subsistence expenditure,
uniform productivity growth across sectors as well as and an increase in bLL¯
N
change
the structure within the financial sector from Z1 towards Z2. However, according to
Proposition 2.4 and 2.5, these changes correspond to a decrease in the inequality level
ω∗, accompanied by a simultaneous a structural change from the financial service to
the goods sector.
c) Financial product innovation (a rise of µ) or rising attractiveness of risky investments
(a decline of ρ) lead to structural change from Z1 to Z2, even if e¯1 = 0.
Proof. Using (2.27), (2.40), and Lemma 2.1, we have
Φ

sd− , sf+ ,
e¯1
r
−
, η¯
+

 ω∗
+/−

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?
, k
?
,
AxbLL¯
N
+/−
, e¯0
−
,
e¯1
r
+

 , Ax
+
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+
, k
+
,
bLL¯
N
+
, e¯0
−
,
e¯1
r
−



 ,
where the signs below the parameters show the sign of the respective partial derivative
of the functions Φ{·}, η¯[·] and ω∗(·). The plus below ω∗ applies for ω∗ > ω, the minus
for ω∗ < ω. The plus below AxbLL¯
N
applies for the case that e¯0 dominates e¯1; the minus
applies if e¯1 dominates e¯0. For the impacts of µ and ρ note that sf is rising and sd is
declining in µ and rising in ρ.
It is worth noting that for e¯1 = 0 there is no income effect on the portfolio structure
so that the channel between skill premium and financial structure is shut down. Since in
the benchmark considered here relative price effects within the financial sector were shut
down too, for e¯1 = 0 only financial innovation (a rise in µ) and rising relative returns
on risky investment (a decline of ρ) remain as sources of structural change within the
financial sector. This changes in the model variant with different technologies for Z1 and
Z2 considered in Appendix B.3.
The punchline of the general equilibrium analysis in the baseline model is: When
the skill premium has reached a certain level, a rise in average income leads to rising
inequality and to twofold structural change towards and within the financial sector si-
multaneously. The rise in income can be triggered by a general rise of productivity or
by an increased selection of the population into higher education (accompanied by labor
augmenting progress that makes low-skilled labor abundant relative to skilled labor). The
income effects generated by technical progress or education are robust drivers of the devel-
opments outlined at the beginning of this paper. They can explain a rising skill premium
and the twofold structural change towards and within finance by a single source, holding
everything else constant. Yet, of course, in reality the effects triggered by this source are
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overlaid by many other things that happen at the same time. The model points to a series
of other exogenous fundamentals that affect skill premium and economic structure. Thus,
the specific combination of determinants that actually determine the observed patterns
of inequality and structural change can only be identified by empirical analysis. The
quantitative analysis in Section 2.8 illustrates possible combinations of exogenous factors
which are consistent with the development observed from 1980 onwards.
2.7.5 Distortions
The main arguments why financial markets are distorted by imperfections are: First, the
complexity of new financial products confuses people. Second, the expertise required to
deal with the complex products gives to the agents within the financial sector an advantage
that can be exploited for extracting rents from their clients. Third, not all households
will be able to participate in the security markets. How would such imperfections change
the equilibrium outcome qualitatively?
If confusion leads to wrong beliefs about the opportunities provided by securities,
the consequences are straightforward. For instance, if investors are euphoric about the
measure µ of risky states covered by state-contingent financial products, then, according
to (2.18), the propensity sf for new financial services rises while the propensity to save
in deposits declines. As a consequence, the new finance sector gains weight compared
to traditional financial services, as shown by (2.27). This structural change within the
financial sector does not affect total demand ZD (see (2.31)) so that equilibrium skill
premium and financial sector share do not change compared to the benchmark analysis.
Misperception of the relative returns on risky investments ρ would affect the equilibrium
outcome in a similar way. In sum, euphoric beliefs about measure or performance of
state-contingent financial products enhance structural change within the financial sector.
The effect of rents in the financial sector are in general more complex. If they are
extracted by charging to clients a mark up on the costs cz of providing financial services,
relative prices are distorted so that all equilibrium values are affected (see supplementary
Section B.2 for more details). Such distortive allocative effects are excluded if rents are
earned by charging to clients a lump sum fee τ for providing financial services on top of
the price pz for covering costs cz of providing the services. In this case, an unambiguous
redistributive effect raises the finance share in total income. The effect on the structure
within the financial sector depends on the way in which the rents are distributed on the
financial agents.
Fixed fees have more far-reaching consequences if they exclude low-income earners
from participating in a financial market. In the presented model, low-skilled agents would
be excluded from using new financial services if a lump sum fee τ is charged to clients
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of the Z2-sector which is higher than the supernumerary income y
L − y¯. Under such
a participation constraint, low-skilled workers invest all their savings in deposits. In
contrast, high-skilled workers can pay fee τ for participating in the Z2-market. If the lump
sum fee τ corresponds to a real fixed cost arising in the provision of financial services, then
τ has similar effects like subsistence expenditure e¯0. If however τ is charged to generate
rents for the high-skilled workers in the financial sector, we have redistribution of income
among high-skilled workers. Since for Stone-Geary preferences such redistribution does
not change aggregate savings, equilibrium wage premium ω and finance ratio Ψ remain
unchanged compared to the benchmark analysis. Yet, due to the participation constraint
the ratio of new finance compared to traditional finance changes to
Φ˜ =
sfβH
1− sfβH +
1+δ
δ
1+pz
w¯−y¯
e¯1
r
(2.41)
where βH ≡
yH−y¯
w¯−y¯
H¯
N
< 1 is the income share of high-skilled agents.20 Comparing (2.41)
with (2.27), we see two things: First, since only part of the population participates in the
Z2-market the new finance share is lower than under full participation. Second and more
interesting, the distribution of income becomes an important determinant of the structure
within the financial sector. If the income share (βH) of high-skilled agent rises then the
new finance share rises, too.
2.8 Empirical evidence and numerical exercises
In this section we first provide empirical evidence on the twofold structural change and
on wage inequality and then we carry out numerical exercises to show how our model can
replicate the observed changes.
2.8.1 Empirics
2.8.1.1 Data
We use data from the Current Population Survey (March CPS) for the survey years 1980-
2013 from IPUMS-CPS by King et al. (2010).21 This data set allows us to split the sam-
pled population (weighted with the sampling weight) into our three sectors and two skill
levels: TheX-sector consists of all sectors of the U.S. economy except finance. The finance
20See Appendix B.2 for details.
21Survey years 1980-2013 represent years 1979-2012 because households are surveyed about last year’s
job. This means whenever we talk about a year the data considered represent the situation a year before.
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sector is finance and insurance without real estate.22 “Traditional finance” Z1 includes
banking, credit agencies and insurance. “New finance” Z2 is security and commodity bro-
kerage and investment companies. We define a worker (who worked positive weeks last
year) to be high-skilled if she/he holds a college degree (four-year college) or more. Then,
H¯j is the number of high-skilled workers in sector j ∈ {x, z1, z2} and L¯j is the number of
low-skilled workers in sector j ∈ {x, z1, z2}. For each skill level, we calculate for the three
sectors the average yearly hours worked last year (i.e., hlj, j ∈ {x, z1, z2}, l ∈ {H,L}) and
the respective average hourly real wages (i.e., wlj, j ∈ {x, z1, z2}, l ∈ {H,L}).
23
In our data analysis we use “actual” and “normalized” numbers for employment and
wage levels. The “actual” numbers use the observed sector- and skill-specific average
yearly hours worked and the respective average hourly wage. The “normalized” numbers
are calculated all with the same basis of hours worked and hourly wage (i.e., the ones
from the X-sector).24 The normalization allows us to separate the effects we can identify
in the theoretical, frictionless model from two frictions observed in reality: (i) Low- and
high-skilled Z-workers work more hours per year than low- and high-skilled X-workers.
More precisely, for the U.S. over the last decades on average a Z-worker has worked about
9% more than a X-worker. (ii) There is the finance premium on hourly wages for low-
and high-skilled Z-workers.25 CPS data show that the finance premium increased over
time and differs for the two subsectors: In Z1 workers earn about 15% more than in the
X-sector, in Z2 it is even 50%.
The sectoral structure-figures below show black and gray lines: The gray lines corre-
22This corresponds to the standard classification as in Philippon and Reshef (2007, 2012).
23We use worker’s total pre-tax wage and salary income to calculate average hourly real wages (nominal
values are adjusted by using the CPI-U adjustment factor to 1999 dollars (i.e., for the base survey year
2000)). There are two issues related to this: First, the CPS top-codes high wage incomes for reasons
of confidentiality. This leads to an underestimation of wages in general and especially in the finance
sector: Over all our survey years around 0.8% of workers in the X-sector are top-coded whereas in the
Z1-sector it affects around 1.6% of the workers and in the Z2-sector even 7.6%. To dampen the bias in
high wages we multiply top-coded incomes for survey years 1980-1995 by 1.5; a standard factor used in
literature (as is described in Philippon and Reshef (2007, 2012)). From year 1996 on, top-coded wages
are categorized into groups with different mean incomes by the CPS and thus the aggregate and the
average wage income are uninfluenced by the top-coding. Note that the results are not very sensitive
with respect to the multiplication factor (e.g., compared to ω = 1.62, Ψ = 5.08% and Φ = 13.99% in
Table 2.2 resulting from factor 1.5, using a factor of 1.75 as in Philippon and Reshef (2007, 2012) would
results in ω = 1.63, Ψ = 5.09% and Φ = 14.02). Second, a worker’s total wage income consists of both
wage income from longest job last year and wage income from other work. We cannot allocate these
two incomes to different industries. Thus, we allocate the total wage income to one industry. If one
assumes that the switch of job occurs equally likely between the three sectors, it does not bias the results.
Furthermore, only about one fifth of all workers (in all three sectors) is affected by this; and of those who
are affected not even a fourth of total income is coming from other work.
24Since the skill premium is approximately identical in all three sectors in the U.S. the skill intensities
in the sectors need not be “normalized”. They already correspond to the frictionless numbers.
25See Célérier and Vallée (2016) or Philippon and Reshef (2007, 2012) for a detailed empirical discus-
sion of the finance premium.
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spond to the “actual” numbers. The black lines correspond to the “normalized” ones.
2.8.1.2 Empirical trends
As is described in the introduction and picked up in the model, financialization has several
aspects: On the one hand, the weight of the financial sector relative to non-financial
business has increased; this is structural change towards finance. On the other hand,
the type of financial products and services has changed; this is structural change within
finance. The next two figures show the twofold structural change.
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Figure 2.5: Employment ratio and wage sum ratio of the financial sector
Notes: ΨE measures the employment ratio (in terms of total hours worked) of finance (including insur-
ance) compared to the rest of the U.S. economy. Ψ measures the ratio of the total wage sum in finance
vs. the rest of the U.S. economy. “Actual” uses the observed sector-specific hours worked and hourly
wages (for low-and high-skilled), whereas “normalized” uses the X-sector hours worked and hourly wages
(for low-and high-skilled). Survey years from 1980-2013. Source: Own calculations based on CPS.
Figure 2.5 shows the ratio of the total finance sector (Z-sectors) compared to the non-
finance economy (X-sector) for the U.S. based on the CPS data. On the one hand, the fig-
ure shows that finance has attracted new employment. The employment ratio (in terms of
total hours worked) of the financial sector, defined by ΨEactual ≡
hHz1H¯z1+h
H
z2
H¯z2+h
L
z1
L¯z1+h
L
z2
L¯z2
hHx H¯x+h
L
x L¯x
,
increased from 4.54% in 1980 to 5.63% in 2013. The respective “normalized” ratio
ΨEnormalized ≡
hHx H¯z1+h
H
x H¯z2+h
L
x L¯z1+h
L
x L¯z2
hHx H¯x+h
L
x L¯x
rose from 4.21% in 1980 to 5.18% in 2013. On
the other hand, the figure illustrates the structural change towards the financial sec-
tor in terms of a growing wage sum ratio of finance. The wage sum ratio of the fi-
nancial sector, defined as Ψactual ≡
wHz1h
H
z1
H¯z1+w
H
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hHz2H¯z2+w
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, increased by
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50% from about 5.17% in 1980 to 7.83% in 2013. The respective “normalized” ratio
Ψnormalized ≡
wHx h
H
x H¯z1+w
H
x h
H
x H¯z2+w
L
x h
L
x L¯z1+w
L
x h
L
x L¯z2
wHx h
H
x H¯x+w
L
x h
L
x L¯x
rose by 34% from 4.36% in 1980 to 5.94%
in 2013. The difference between the employment (E) ratio and the wage sum ratio is the
result of different skill-intensities in the different sectors. By comparing the “normalized”
black with the “actual” gray lines one sees a large difference between the two ratios of the
wage sum: More than half of the increase in the ratio of the wage sum is the result of the
frictions (i) and (ii). Yet, as the black line shows, there is still structural change towards
finance if one controls for the two frictions. Comparison of the two black lines shows that
the difference between the employment ratio and the wage sum ratio increased over time.
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Figure 2.6: Employment ratio and wage sum ratio within the financial sector
Notes: ΦE measures the employment ratio (in terms of total hours worked) of “new finance” compared
to “traditional finance”. Φ measures the ratio of the total wage sum in “new finance” vs. “traditional
finance”. “Actual” uses the sector-specific hours worked and hourly wages (for low-and high-skilled),
whereas “normalized” uses theX-sector hours worked and hourly wages (for low-and high-skilled). Survey
years from 1980-2013. Source: Own calculations based on CPS.
We observe a similar pattern for the within finance sectoral structure by splitting total
finance up into subsectors Z1 and Z2. Figure 2.6 shows the employment ratio and the
wage sum ratio of finance subsector Z2 compared to the subsector Z1 for the U.S. since the
1980s based on the CPS data set. “New finance” (subsector Z2) grew strongly independent
of the measure we use: The within employment ratio (in terms of total hours worked)
of finance subsector Z2, Φ
E
actual ≡
hHz2H¯z2+h
L
z2
L¯z2
hHz1H¯z1+h
L
z1
L¯z1
, more than doubled from about 8.63% in
1980 to 20.79% in 2013. The respective “normalized” ratio ΦEnormalized ≡
hHx H¯z2+h
L
x L¯z2
hHx H¯z1+h
L
x L¯z1
is
very similar with a rise from 8.26% in 1980 to 19.77% in 2013. The within finance wage
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sum ratio, defined by Φactual ≡
wHz2h
H
z2
H¯z2+w
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, increased dramatically from 11.75% in
1980 to 29.02% in 2013 peaking in survey 2009 at 40.18%. The respective “normalized”
ratio Φnormalized ≡
wHx h
H
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x h
L
x L¯z2
wHx h
H
x H¯z1+w
L
x h
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rose from 9.17% in 1980 to 22.83% in 2013 with a
peak in survey year 2009 of 29.91%. Hence, about two-thirds of the actual rise in the
wage ratio of “new finance” cannot be assigned to frictions: They are also observed in the
“normalized” data. The rest of the rise comes from friction (ii) (finance premium), which
is particularly strong in the finance subsector Z2.
As argued in the introduction financialization (with the twofold structural change)
and inequality are two closely related topics. Figure 2.7 shows the development of the
“normalized” skill premium calculated by ω = w
H
x
wLx
for the U.S. since 1980, based on
the CPS data. It increased from 1.55 in 1980 to 1.91 in 2013.26 The time trend in ω
illustrates that wage inequality increased over time. Nowadays high-skilled workers earn
nearly double as much as low-skilled workers per hour. If one accounts in addition for the
fact that high-skilled workers work more hours, the income inequality is even larger (e.g.,
2.19 in 2013).
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Figure 2.7: Skill premium
Notes: ω measures the “normalized” skill premium (i.e., hourly wage of high-skilled labor in X-sector
divided by hourly-wage of low-skilled labor in X-sector). Survey years from 1980-2013. Source: Own
calculations based on CPS.
26Interestingly, the skill premium in the U.S. is about the same in the three sectors because both low-
and high-skilled workers in the financial industry earn a similar relative finance premium.
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2.8.2 Numerics
In this section we implement our theoretical model quantitatively and use it for several
numerical exercises. These illustrate possible drivers of the empirical developments pre-
sented in Figures 2.5-2.7. For the quantitative implementation of our model and the
comparative-static equilibrium results we exclude the post-crisis years and compare av-
erage values for the period 1980-1994 with the respective average values for 1995-2009.
More specifically: First, we calibrate our model for the average value of the early sur-
vey years 1980-1994. This calibrated model is then used for comparative static analysis.
We introduce (i) ceteris paribus shocks and (ii) simultaneous shocks to illustrate how the
channels analyzed in our model can generate the situation observed in later years (average
values of later survey years 1995-2009).
2.8.2.1 Calibration
Table 2.1: Parameters survey years 1980-1994
Parameter Data Source Description
L¯ 99.2m CPS # Low-skilled employees
H¯ 26.5m CPS # High-skilled employees
hL 1639.4 CPS Yearly hours of low-skilled
hH 1982.6 CPS Yearly hours of high-skilled
αx 0.34 CPS Output ela. of high-skilled in X
αz1 0.42 CPS Output ela. of high-skilled in Z1
αz2 0.68 CPS Output ela. of high-skilled in Z2
Ax 26.53 CPS Technology level in X
PT65 $ 11,204 U.S. Bureau of the Census Real poverty threshold <65
PT 65 $ 10,076 U.S. Bureau of the Census Real poverty threshold >65
LEratio 4.66 LE from World Bank Old-age ratio
rf 0.0368 Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis Real effective federal funds rate
Az1 116 Model calibration Technology level in Z1
Az2 165 Model calibration Technology level in Z2
δ 0.385 Model calibration Discount rate
µ 0.740 Model calibration Certainty measure
Notes: The table shows the averaged values for the time range of survey years t ∈ {1980, . . . , 1994}.
Averages of αj,t =
κj,tωj,t
1+κj,tωj,t
with κj,t =
hHj,tH¯j,t
hL
j,t
L¯j,t
and ωj,t =
wHj,t
wL
j,t
, j ∈ {x, z1, z2}, hHt = h
H
x,t and
hLt = h
L
x,t. Ax,t =
wLx,t
Γx,tω
−αx,t
x,t
with Γx,t = αx,t
αx,t(1 − αx,t)1−αx,t . PT is the average, real poverty
threshold of a two-people household (nominal values are adjusted by using the CPI-U adjustment
factor to 1999 dollars (i.e., for the base survey year 2000) from CPS with PT65 denoting the relevant
value for households younger than 65 and PT 65 denoting the value relevant for older ones. LEratio
is the average ratio of working-time to retirement: (65 − 20)/(LEt − 65), where LEt denotes life
expectancy in year t; 65 is the retirement age and 20 is the assumed start of the working-life. rf
is the average, real effective federal funds rate (effective federal funds rate adjusted with the CPI-U
adjustment factor from CPS). See bibliography for details on data sources.
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We calibrate our model such that it fits the data for the average of the survey years 1980-
1994 (i.e., years 1979-1993). Exogenous values from data are used for labor endowments
L¯, H¯, hL, hH , output elasticities αj, technology in the X-sector Ax, interest rate r
f and
poverty thresholds (PT65 for young and PT
65 for old households) as summarized in Table
2.1. For the subsistence levels we assume that each worker must cover over the life
cycle half of a two-people household’s poverty threshold. Further, we account for the
fact that during the 1980-1994 time period the ratio of working-time to retirement was
LEratio = 4.66 (i.e., we divide the poverty threshold of old households by 4.66). Hence,
e¯0 = PT65/2 and e¯1 = PT
65/2/4.66. The real safe return is r = 1 + rf with rf being
the real effective federal funds rate and the risky return is such that the risk premium is
four percentage points (i.e., R = (r + 0.04)/µ). We measure the efficiency units from the
model by bl = h
l, l ∈ {H,L}, where hl are hours worked.
The other parameters (productivities in the finance sectors Az1 and Az2 , discount factor
δ and completeness measure µ) are calibrated internally by targeting wage inequality ω,
“normalized” ratios for the sectoral structure Ψ and Φ of the U.S. economy and the gross
saving rate in the U.S. for the average of the survey years 1980-1994. The targeted values
are shown in Table 2.2. More specifically, we solve the model numerically for possible
parameter combinations of Az1 , Az2 , δ and µ and grid-search for the combination (see
Table 2.1 for calibrated values) which minimizes the sum of the squared relative distances
of the four model values from the corresponding data targets.27 The comparison of the
four model values generated by our calibrated model with the data outcomes is given in
Table 2.2:
Table 2.2: Targets
Variables Model Data Source Description
ω∗ 1.63 1.62 CPS Skill premium
Ψ 5.08% 5.08% CPS Between sectoral structure
Φ 13.99% 13.99% CPS Within sectoral structure
saving rate 20.32% 20.30% World Bank Aggregate savings
Notes: ω∗ is the equilibrium skill premium (per hour worked). Ψ corresponds to
pz1D+pz2F
X
in the model and to
Ψnormalized in the data. Φ corresponds to
pz1D
pz2F
in the model and to Φnormalized in the data. The saving rate is
(D + F )/W in the model and the share of aggregate savings in gross national income in the data, where aggregate
savings (gross savings) is gross national income less total consumption, plus net transfers. See bibliography for details
on data sources.
The calibrated model fits the targets fairly well. Further, the other equilibrium values
27For solving the model numerically, we use the demand functions in the goods and financial services
markets to obtain the equilibrium values of X-, Z1- and Z2 as functions of ω (and exogenous parameters).
Substituting these functions for X-, Z1- and Z2 in one of the labor market clearing conditions, we can
solve for the equilibrium skill premium ω∗. (Then, at ω∗, the other labor market is also cleared.) From
ω∗ follow factor prices and prices of financial services, output levels and employment in the three sectors
and the sectoral structure of the economy in a straightforward way.
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following from the model are also very similar to the values observed in the CPS data
(given in brackets). Hourly wages in our model are wH = $ 19.3 ($ 19.3), wL = $ 11.8 ($
11.9) and the resulting prices are pz1 = 0.25, pz2 = 0.19.
28 Labor employments in total
hours are Hx = 49215m (49215m), Lx = 156043m (156287m), Hz1 = 2710m (2794m),
Lz1 = 6113m (6022m), Hz2 = 614m (635m), Lz2 = 472m (468m). For the skill intensities
we get κx = 0.32 < κz1 = 0.44 < κz2 = 1.30 (κx = 0.31 < κz1 = 0.43 < κz2 = 1.30),
which shows that the two finance subsectors are more skill intensive than the rest of the
economy. These numbers suggest that the calibrated model matches the U.S. economy in
the survey period 1980-1994 fairly well.
2.8.2.2 Numerical exercises
We show now how our calibrated model can predict the twofold structural change and
the rising wage inequality between survey period 1980-1994 and survey period 1995-2009
as seen in Figures 2.5-2.7. To do so, we look at the predictions of our calibrated model
if shocked by exogenous changes. Thereby, we apply the changes in the exogenous pa-
rameters of our model as observed in data. In other words, we use as shocks the average
values of L¯, H¯, hL, hH , αx, αz1 , αz1 , Ax, PT65, PT
65, LEratio and rf for the time span
of the survey years 1995-2009 instead of the ones for the time span of the survey years
1980-1994.29 In addition, we also consider shocks on the internally calibrated parameter
Az1 , Az2 , δ and µ.
Table 2.3: Comparative statics
ω Ψ Φ
Uniform productivity progress Aj (income effect) 1.63 5.18% 14.92%
X-biased technical change Ax 1.64 6.15% 16.24%
Z1-biased technical change Az1 1.63 4.36% 10.02%
Z2-biased technical change Az2 1.63 4.91% 15.26%
Skill-biased technical change αx, αz1 , αz2 2.49 5.08% 13.68%
Higher subsistence requirement young e¯0 1.63 5.08% 13.99%
Higher subsistence requirement old e¯1 1.63 5.28% 13.17%
Increased skill supply k 1.21 4.96% 14.99%
Lower safe return r ( e¯1r -channel) 1.63 5.10% 13.91%
Lower relative return ρ 1.64 5.06% 15.32%
More completeness µ 1.64 4.99% 24.75%
Fall in δ 1.63 4.68% 13.61%
Notes: Ceteris paribus comparative-static effects.
28The magnitude of the financial services prices could be interpreted in the following way: A household
has to pay the unit costs of financial intermediation, estimated by Philippon (2015) to be 0.015-0.02,
during all his/hers “capital-accumulation” years (i.e., 15-times from 1980-1994 to 1995-2009).
29See Table 2.1 in Appendix B.4 for data of the average values for survey years 1995-2009 of L¯, H¯, hL,
hH , αx, αz1 , αz1 , Ax, PT65, PT
65, LEratio and rf . For R we use again a constant risk premium of four
percentage points.
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As a first exercise, we introduce ceteris paribus shocks. This means that we apply
each of the changes listed in Table 2.3 separately. For the exogenous parameters we
apply observed changes; for the internally calibrated parameters potential changes. The
quantitative effects of such ceteris paribus changes on the skill premium ω, on the between
sectoral structure Ψ and the within structure Φ are summarized in Table 2.3.
By comparing Table 2.3 with Table 2.2 we see the magnitude of different effects.
Uniform productivity progress Aj means that the productivities in all three sectors j ∈
{X,Z1, Z2} grow at the same rate (i.e., A
1
zi
= gxA
0
zi
, where gx = A
1
x/A
0
x is given by the
observed average values of A0x from survey years 1880-1994 and of A
1
x from survey years
1995-2009). Consistent with Proposition 2.4-2.6 such a uniform productivity progress
leads to the twofold structural change. Also (however, only visible at later digits) the
skill premium increases. This is due to the income effect arising through the subsis-
tence requirements e¯0 > 0 and e¯1 > 0. Sector-biased technical change means that only
the respective sector’s productivity grows, while the other two productivity levels are
kept constant (as growth rate we use always the observable rate gx). The comparative
static effects of such a ceteris paribus shock are a combination of income and substitu-
tion effects. (Sector-specific) skill-biased technical change αj, as observed in the data for
j ∈ {X,Z1, Z2}, induces clearly an increase of the skill premium. An increase in skill
supply k = H¯h
H
L¯hL
reduces the skill premium and leads to within structural change be-
cause there are more high-skilled people who demand more finance subsector Z2 services.
Furthermore, a lower relative return ρ (induced by an increase of the risk premium by
one percentage point) or more market completeness µ (by ten percentage points) raise
the skill premium and make new financial services relatively more attractive compared to
services for deposits. Finally, a fall in δ to 0.335, which leads to a lower saving rate close
to 18.83% as observed on average for the time span of survey years 1995-2009, leads to
smaller financial sectors.
As a second exercise, we shock our calibrated model with simultaneous shocks. This
means, we shock our economy by using all the shocks in the exogenous parameters together
(i.e., new average values of H¯, L¯, hH , hL, αx, αz1 , αz1 , Ax, PT65, PT
65, LEratio and rf for
time span of survey years 1995-2009). Further, we assume uniform technological progress.
This means, the productivities in the Z-sectors develop identical to the productivity in
the X-sector. Discount parameter δ and completeness measure µ are held fixed at the
calibrated values. With this procedure, we get a quantitative model prediction which can
then be compared with the empirical development (see Table 2.4). Under simultaneous
shocks our model predicts a rise in the skill premium ω from 1.63 to 1.86 and twofold
structural change towards and within finance with a rise of Ψ from 5.08% to 5.21% and
a rise of Φ from 13.99% to 15.02%.
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Table 2.4: Predictions
Variables Model Data Source Description
ω∗ 1.86 1.85 CPS Skill premium
Ψ 5.21% 5.54% CPS Between sectoral structure
Φ 15.02% 23.41% CPS Within sectoral structure
Notes: ω∗ is the equilibrium skill premium (per hour worked). Ψ corresponds to
pz1D+pz2F
X
in the model and to
Ψnormalized in the data. Φ corresponds to
pz1D
pz2F
in the model and to Φnormalized in the data.
Comparing the model values with data, we see that the simulated equilibrium values
underestimate the between structural change (only a little) and mainly the within struc-
tural change. This means, additional shocks are needed to come closer to data values.
According to our analysis, possible candidates for such additional shocks (unobserved in
our data) are, for example, more market completeness (µ-shock shown in Table 2.3) or
diminished fixed costs in the financial sector and distorted portfolio choices as discussed
in Appendix B.2. Overall, the simulated development in our calibrated model illustrates
the channels that lead to the observed rise in the skill premium and the twofold structural
change towards and within the financial sector fairly well; at least as far as these changes
are caused by economic fundamentals. As pointed out in the beginning of this section,
the normalized financial sector ratios considered here are amplified in reality by rents.
2.9 Conclusion
The presented 3x3 model of production and financial services helps to explain the twofold
structural change towards and within the financial sector. The analysis emphasized de-
mand side effects by using quasi-homothetic preferences of the Stone-Geary form and
accounted for supply side effects by considering for different skill-intensities in produc-
tion of goods and financial services. The theoretical analysis was based on established
building blocks for modeling a multi-sector economy with production and was at the same
time sufficiently tractable to allow analytical results. The comparative-static equilibrium
analysis showed the effects of productivity progress and technical change, skill supply,
present and future subsistence requirements and financial product innovation on the skill
premium and on the sectoral structure of an economy. Both the size of the financial sector
relative to the non-financial sector as well as the size of the new finance sector relative to
the traditional finance sector were considered. Moreover, in a supplementary appendix
several extensions the robustness of the results was discussed and the effects of rents or
distortions in the financial sector were addressed. The main insight of the results from
the theoretical analysis can be summarized as follows: If one looks for a single economic
source (apart from assuming rents or distortions) that could explain the twofold struc-
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tural change towards and within finance and the rising skill premium simultaneously, the
income effect is a robust candidate. Other channels, like relative price effects within the
financial sector lead to more ambiguous results.
The qualitative results derived in the theoretical analysis were illustrated quantita-
tively by calibrating the model to U.S. data from 1980-1994. Focusing on normalized
data, which exclude rents, the numerical implementation of the model shows that the
subsequent development observed in the period 1995-2009 can be explained fairly well.
While uniform productivity growth, working through the income effect, is confirmed as a
main source of structural change towards and within finance, skill biased technical change
is important too for matching the rise in the skill premium.
The paper leaves open two main questions which are important in the current debate
about real economic development and financialization. The first open problem is the
finance premium. While it is obvious that the rents revealed by the premium contribute
to inequality and blow up the structural change towards and withing finance considered
in this paper, the question where the premium comes from is less clear. In recent years,
several attempts have been made to explain the premium by asymmetric information
between shareholders and employees in the banking sector. Yet, this can only explain
the redistribution of earnings within the financial sector. Our hypothesis is that it is the
asymmetry between financial agents and their clients which allows to extract rents. After
all, the financial sector is an expert system to start with. Possible channels for modeling
the rent-generating information asymmetry would be intransparent cost structures or
confusion by financial innovation (distorted µ-beliefs).
The second open question left to future research is how structural change towards
and within the financial sector affects economic productivity. The literature on financial
development and growth has identified market completion by financial innovation as an
important source of growth. Does the recent evidence on a negative effect of financial
development on economic growth indicate that the huge flood of new financial products
since the 1990s has not really completed markets but rather generated obfuscation? In the
framework presented in this paper such obfuscation would induce euphoric beliefs about
the degree of market completeness (µ), which is one of the drivers of structural change
within finance and at the same time a possible lever for rent extraction. Another possible
channel for a growth dampening effect could be the absorption of high-skilled labor in
the finance sector, which leads to scarcity of talent outside the financial sector and may
slowdown productivity growth.
To take stocks: The empirical evidence shows that the expansion of the financial sector
and the changing structure within the financial sector towards new finance are partly
caused by the finance premium. This is a rent which remains unexplained in the presented
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paper. But there are also economic fundamentals which drive the twofold structural
change. These drivers are the focus of the paper. The main explanation for the observed
twofold structural change is a rise in average income generated by uniform productivity
growth across sectors and factors, which changes demand for financial services, combined
with skill-biased technical change that drives up the skill premium.
Could the structural change towards and within finance, accompanied by a rise in
the skill premium, come to a halt? According to our model, apart from a slowdown of
growth, the following factors exert downward pressure on finance shares and skill premium:
Finance-biased productivity progress, less attractive risky investments, a decline in the
saving rate or a stop in the proliferation of new financial products.
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3 Environmental policy and political stabil-
ity in China
3.1 Introduction
China has experienced substantial economic growth and serious environmental deterio-
ration in the past decades. China’s environmental pollution surpasses other countries in
their similar phase of economic development and industrial structure. More specifically,
the current environmental situation can be summarized as follows: (i) Environmental
pollution is severe. Newspapers and academic papers have documented, for example, the
immense CO2 emission, the smog and low air quality in major cities of China, etc. (ii) Lo-
cal governments have low incentives to improve environment, due to career concerns and
availability of fiscal budget (Wu et al., 2013). (iii) There are increasing cases of household
protest due to environmental issues (Wang, 2010).
This research project analyzes China’s environmental situation from a political econ-
omy perspective and raises two questions: First, what are potential determinants of en-
vironment policy in the Chinese political system? Second, how do these factors influence
China’s environmental quality and household welfare? For answering these questions, this
paper presents a model with a central government, and local officials and households from
N regions, which captures three important aspects of Chinese reality: The cadre system
of the central government, households’ protest against local officials, and the allocation
of local fiscal revenues. With this framework we can evaluate the factors that influence
environment and agents’ behavior at different levels.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework that allows
to analyze the behavior of the central government, local officials and households. We
evaluate the impact of their interaction on local environment and household welfare. The
model consists of the following key elements: First, a benevolent central government
chooses an environmental policy - a pollution abatement technology, and employs local
officials to implement the technology. The central government is unable to observe local
officials’ ability directly, and infers their ability by observing local outcome. Specifically,
we explicitly characterize the cadre system of the central government as a scheme of
rewards contingent on economic output and household protest. Second, local officials
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differ in their ability. They influence local production and implement environmental policy
by allocating local fiscal revenues to production- and environment-related infrastructure,
respectively. Third, households make protest decision according to their realized utility
(from consumption and environment). Household protest and the central government’s
cadre system indirectly determine the investment allocation of local officials in production
and in environment.
Within the theoretical framework we focus on the principle mechanisms. First, we
model households’ protest decision in the most simple way. Namely, households protest
when their utility falls below an exogenous threshold. Second, local officials allocate
fiscal revenues so that the induced outcome maximizes their own expected utility. Thus,
the central government’s reward scheme has a direct impact on the tradeoff of local
officials in determining investment allocation. Furthermore, local officials’ behavior is
influenced by their ability and the central government’s environmental policy. Lastly,
the central government aims to maximize aggregate household welfare when choosing the
environmental policy. However, it has to account for the local officials’ behavior and
possible household protests. Specifically, we assume in the model that local household
protest per se incurs no costs. Nevertheless, when the share of regions with households
who protest exceeds a certain threshold, the protest generates negative externalities on
the entire population. We regard this situation as political instability. Households do
not internalize the externalities when deciding protest. However, the central government
needs to consider the impact of political instability on household welfare when choosing
the optimal environmental policy.
We characterize the central government’s environmental policy and local officials’ in-
vestment allocation in the equilibrium emerging under the cadre system of the central
government and compare the outcome with a social optimum benchmark. In contrast
to the equilibrium with opportunistic local officials, in the considered social optimum
benchmark, local officials are benevolent and maximize the expected utility of households
from their region.1 Therefore, the local officials’ allocation of fiscal revenues in the social
optimum deviates from the one in equilibrium (with opportunistic local officials).
We quantitatively solve for the optimal environmental policy of the central govern-
ment, and the optimal investment allocation of local officials under the two cases - social
optimum and equilibrium, respectively. The findings are intuitive. Under social optimum,
local officials balance household benefits from investment in production and in environ-
ment. The central government chooses the optimal environmental policy to avoid political
instability. In equilibrium under the central cadre system, local officials overinvest in pro-
1The social optimum here is, however, not first best, because potential externalities from political
instability are not taken into account at the local level.
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duction to increase their probability of promotion. As a result, environment deteriorates.
This is not only the case in regions with low development and low ability officials. On
the contrary, the marginal impact of investment on promotion probability is higher for
high ability officials. Therefore, they have more incentive to produce at the cost of en-
vironment, so that the environmental quality in high ability regions is low. Household
protest constrains local officials’ investment in production-related infrastructure. This
is especially the case in medium-ability officials, where the probability of promotion is
low, and thus the income loss due to household protest and demotion dominates. As a
consequence, production is restricted and environment is good. Finally, under the cadre
system the central government chooses a policy less effective than the socially optimal
one, in order to avoid the negative externalities by household protest and overproduction
by local officials in pursuit of promotion.
Lastly, the quantitative results are used to evaluate the welfare effect of the central
government’s policy and local officials’ behavior, and their impact on environment. The
results are in line with the empirical observation of China’s “high output, high pollu-
tion” situation. First, due to the impact of the cadre system on local officials’ behavior,
households from all regions consume more than under thesocial optimum. But the envi-
ronmental quality is lower. This happens especially in regions with high-ability officials.
However, environment deterioration is not only the result of inadequate environment-
related investment at the local level. Also the pollution abatement technology chosen by
the central government is laxer than under the social optimum.
3.1.1 Related literature
This research project is related to several strands of research.
The main objective of the paper is to explain China’s “high output, high pollution”
mix from a political economy perspective.2 This is related to papers that analyze how
political institutions influence environmental policy and officials’ behavior, and determines
the environment of the economy.3 To the best of my knowledge, none of the previous
studies simultaneously considers the determination of environmental policy, local officials’
behavior, and household protest, as well as how these behavior influences environmental
quality and household welfare.
This paper explicitly characterizes the cadre system of the central government, and
2See Zheng and Kahn (2013) and Chang et al. (2015) for a description of the status quo of China’s
environment.
3Jia (2014) studies how connection with top officials in the central government influences local officials’
behavior and the regional environmental quality. Fredriksson and Wollscheid (2014) discuss the impact
of political institutions on stringency of environmental policy.
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analyzes its impact on local officials’ behavior.4 Thereby, the central government and local
officials are in a hierarchical relationship (Maskin et al., 2000), and is closer to a principle-
agent relation as in industrial organization: The central government sets evaluation stan-
dards, and local officials are motivated by career concerns. We model local officials’
production and promotion incentives as in Holmström (1999) and Alesina and Tabellini
(2007).
Furthermore, this paper embeds local officials’ allocation of fiscal revenues. Local
government in China in general has the authority to decide about the allocation of fiscal
revenues.5 Their decision on the allocation has crucial impact on the implementation of
the central government’s policy and on local development. Wu et al. (2013) show empir-
ically that local officials overinvest in GDP-related infrastructure. However, theoretical
modeling is so far still missing.
Finally, this paper is related to the broad research on government accountability.
List and Sturm (2006), Besley and Case (1995) and Besley and Burgess (2002) analyze
in a democratic economy determinants of government accountability. They emphasize
that reelection motives influence officials’ behavior and their policy, and point out that
voters supervise accountability of the government. In contrast, households are not directly
involved in election of government officials in China. Moreover, the central government
has relatively weak influence on local officials’ decision about environment-related in-
vestment (Saich, 2012). This paper considers the accountability of local officials in the
context of China from a new perspective: The impact of household protest on the decision
of governments, especially on the investment allocation of local officials.6 This channel
gains importance along with the popularization of internet and the emergence of envi-
ronmental NGOs; it becomes easier and less costly to coordinate among households in
protest. Therefore, one could imagine an increasing impact of household protest on the
accountability of local officials in China.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In section 3.2 the theoretical model is
described. Section 3.3 and 3.4 characterize household protest decision, central environ-
4See Edin (2003), Li (1998), Li and Zhou (2005), Su et al. (2012), Rochlitz et al. (2014), and Xu
(2011) for a detailed discussion of the Chinese cadre system.
5See Tsui and Wang (2004) and Jin et al. (2005) for a description of the decentralized fiscal system in
China. See Asian Development Bank (2014) for a discussion of China’s local fiscal management.
6The impact of household protest on government in China is documented in many papers. Saich (2012)
gives a comprehensive discussion of households’ protest and the influence on policy implementation. Using
survey data, the paper additionally demonstrates that household protest in China happens mainly at local
level and households in general believe that the central government is benevolent. This is reflected in
the data: In 2011, the share of households (respondents) who are satisfied with the central government
is 91.8%, whereas this share drops to 63.8% at local level. From this aspect, it makes sense to assume a
benevolent central government with career-concern local officials in the model to characterize the political
agents in China.
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mental policy and local investment allocation for the social optimum benchmark and the
equilibrium under the cadre system, respectively. The quantitative results are illustrated
and discussed in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The model
Consider a one-period economy with a central government and a mass N of isolated
regions. The central government chooses an environmental policy by deciding about
the pollution abatement technology to be implemented. At the same time, they take
charge of the assignment and evaluation of local officials. In each region there is one
local official and a mass 1 of households. Local officials supervise local production, collect
tax revenues and implement the environmental policy. Specifically, they allocate the
tax revenues to production- and to environment-related investments to enhance output
and probability of successful policy implementation, respectively. Production generates
pollution, whereas successful environmental policy implementation reduces the level of
pollution locally. Households from all regions are identical. They derive utility from
consumption and good environment. The regions only differentiate with respect to the
ability of their local official. With slight abuse of notation we use local officials’ ability,
a, as an indicator of the different regions in the economy.
3.2.1 The central government
The central government is benevolent. It maximizes the aggregate expected utility of all
households when choosing the environmental policy. In addition, it assigns and evaluates
local officials.
3.2.1.1 The central government’s environmental policy
Suppose a linear environmental quality determination: E = E¯ − ϕY , where E¯ is envi-
ronmental quality in all regions at the beginning of the period, Y is local output, and ϕ
is pollution per unit of output. We characterize an environmental policy as the decision
to implement in each region a pollution abatement technology to reduce pollution in the
production process. Suppose that there is a continuum set of technologies, θ ∈ [0, 1], that
differ in their strength. If there is no technology (θ = 0), or a technology is unsuccessfully
implemented, pollution per unit of output is ϕ = ϕ¯. Successful technology implemen-
tation reduces pollution per unit of output by ϕ(θ), and thus ϕ = ϕ¯ − ϕ(θ). Assume
that
ϕ(0) = 0,
∂ϕ(θ)
∂θ
> 0, and
∂2ϕ(θ)
∂θ2
< 0. (3.1)
98 Environmental policy
Larger θ implies more effective abatement technology, whereas the marginal reduction
in pollution decreases as the strength increases.
3.2.1.2 Cadre system for local officials
The central government employs local officials from a natural pool. The probability distri-
bution of local officials’ ability in the pool is Ψ(a), where ability, a, is a random variable,
a ∈ [amin, amax]. Assume that drawing people from the pool does not influence the abil-
ity distribution, Ψ(a). The central government intends to select local officials with high
abilities. However, local officials’ ability is private information; the central government
is unable to observe their ability directly nor indirectly through local environmental out-
comes. We assume that the central government may observe the output level of each
region Y , subject to some noise, ǫ ∼ N (0, σ2). Denote the observed output by Yˆ , with
Yˆ = Y + ǫ. In addition, they recognize it when households protest against their local
official. Accordingly, they evaluate local officials and reward them contingent on the
evaluation. The reward scheme comprises three parts: Promotion, stay in office, and
demotion.7 If the observed local output is above an exogenous threshold, Yˆ > Y ∗, the
local official will be promoted. However, if households from a region protest against their
local official, the official is demoted and the central government employs a new official
randomly from the pool. If neither of the two cases occur, the local official stays in office.
The local officials’ income in the three cases are
{
A¯,M,A
}
, respectively. A¯ > M > A.8
3.2.2 Local officials
3.2.2.1 Ability and policy implementation
Local output, Y = Y (a, I1), is determined by the local official’s ability, a, and local in-
vestment in production-related infrastructure, I1. Assume that
∂Y
∂a
> 0, ∂Y
∂I1
> 0, ∂
2Y
∂a2
< 0,
∂2Y
∂I21
< 0. In addition, local officials can spend I2 on environment-related investment.
Given the central government’s pollution abatement technology, θ, local officials success-
fully implement the technology and reduce pollution with probability π(a, I2; θ), and fail
with probability 1− π(a, I2; θ). We label the two states as high and low, {H,L}, respec-
tively. The probability distribution depends on local officials’ ability (e.g., the ability to
coordinate and organize the policy implementation), local investment in environmental-
related infrastructure, I2, and the complexity of the task, θ.
7See Edin (2003) and Xu (2011) for more detailed description of the Chinese cadre system.
8The reward scheme and the threshold of promotion are exogenous in the model. It is for future
research to investigate the question of optimal reward and promotion scheme.
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Assumption 3.1 (Probability of policy success).
∂π(a, I2; θ)
∂θ
< 0,
∂π(a, I2; θ)
∂a
> 0,
∂π(a, I2; θ)
∂I2
> 0, and
∂2π(a, I2; θ)
∂a∂I2
> 0.
The first three conditions are straightforward: More effective policies are less likely
to succeed for all officials. Both ability and investment in infrastructure increases the
probability of policy success. The last condition implies that ability and investment are
complementary: A higher investment increases the marginal impact of ability on the
probability of policy success, and vice versa.
3.2.2.2 Local environmental quality
The environmental quality in the two states are given respectively by
Es =


E¯ − (ϕ¯− ϕ(θ))Y, if s = H,
E¯ − ϕ¯Y, if s = L.
(3.2)
Notice that in a good state the environmental quality depends on local output level, Y ,
and the environmental policy, θ. Whereas in a bad state, it only depends on local output.
In other words, local officials’ investment in environment-related infrastructure influences
the local expected environmental quality, but not the quality in high and in low state per
se.9
Using (3.2), we can define the level of production sustainable by the environment in
high and in low states, Y ssus, s ∈ {H,L}.
Definition 3.1 (Sustainable production). A production level Y in state s ∈ {H,L} is
sustainable by the environment if the environmental quality is non-negative. Namely,
Es ≥ 0, where Es is defined in (3.2).
Therefore, the maximal sustainable production in high and in low states are given
respectively by
Y Hsus = E¯/(ϕ¯− ϕ(θ)) and Y
L
sus = E¯/ϕ¯. (3.3)
In particular, one should notice that Y Hsus > Y
L
sus. In other words, output level that is
sustainable in a high state may not be sustainable in a low state. This is crucial in
9This set-up is different from related paper (e.g. Jia (2014)) that assume officials choosing between
clean and dirty technologies to produce, which directly influence the environmental outcome. However,
since local officials’ investment in environment-related infrastructure influences the expected environmen-
tal quality, a reallocation of investments from production to environment leads to similar outcome as to
produce with clean technology. Assuming local officials influencing the probability of the states gives us
technical simplicity in calculating the share of household protest and the optimal environmental policy.
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formulating the central government’s environmental policy decision in the equilibrium
under the cadre system in Section 3.4.2.
3.2.2.3 Local investment and production
Local infrastructure investments, I1 and I2, are financed by local tax revenues. The tax
revenues, Π, come from a proportional tax on output,
Π = τY (a, I1), (3.4)
where the tax rate τ is exogenous. Given local officials’ budget (3.4), we can define the
maximal feasible investment.
Definition 3.2 (Maximal feasible investment). The maximal feasible investment is the
maximal amount of investment a local official with ability a can make.
Formally, the maximal feasible investment is determined as follows:
max
I1,I2
τY (a, I1)
s.t. I1 + I2 ≤ τY (a, I1)
This gives us directly the following property.
Property 1. The maximal feasible investment equals to the maximal tax revenues a lo-
cal official may collect. It is achieved when local officials invest all tax revenues into
production-related infrastructure. Namely,
Imax1 = τY (a, I
max
1 ) (3.5)
From now on, we use Imax1 (a) to denote the maximal feasible investment of local
officials with ability a. At Imax1 (a), local output also achieves its maximal, Y
max(a), and
investment in environment-related infrastructure is zero. Apparently, both Imax1 (a) and
Y max(a) increase in local officials’ ability a.
Local officials derive utility from the income rewarded by the central government con-
tingent on evaluation. Given the reward and evaluation scheme of the central government,
local officials decide the optimal allocation of investments, subject to local fiscal budget
constraint, to maximize their expected utility.
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3.2.3 Households
Households derive utility from consumption and good environment. The instantaneous
utility function is given by U(C,E). It satisfies Inada conditions on E ≥ 0, with U(0, E) =
U(C, 0) = 0.10 And on E < 0, in which case production is beyond the sustainable
threshold defined in Definition 3.1, household utility is negative infinity. We simplify
the mircofoundation of how households acquire income (e.g., through labor and capital
supply in local firms), and set their consumption to be the net output of the region,
(1− τ)Y (a, I1).
Households may protest against their local official if their realized utility falls below
a threshold, U . In case of protests, the central government will replace the local official
with a new one randomly drawn from the natural pool.11
Protest incurs zero cost per se. However, when the share of households who protest
in the economy exceeds a threshold, λ¯, protest behavior generates negative externalities
on the entire population.12 Households do not consider the externalities when making
protest decision, but the central government takes this into account when deciding about
the environmental policy. For simplicity, we assume household utility is zero when large
scale (i.e., above λ¯) protests occur.
3.2.3.1 Thresholds of household protest
Households’ utility is determined by local output and environmental quality. Environ-
mental quality in turn depends on local output. Furthermore, depending on whether the
environmental policy is successfully implemented, the realization of local environmental
quality can be high or low, defined in (3.2). Therefore, given local output and the state
of the environment, household utility is uniquely determined.
To simplify the further discussion, we redefine household utility in state s ∈ {H,L},
as a function of local output Y . Specifically,
U s(Y ; θ) ≡ U(C,Es) = U
(
(1− τ)Y, E¯ −
(
ϕ¯− 1{s=H}ϕ(θ)
)
Y
)
, (3.6)
10Namely, ∂U(C,E)∂C > 0,
∂U(C,E)
∂E > 0,
∂2U(C,E)
∂C2 < 0,
∂2U(C,E)
∂E2 < 0, limC→0
∂U(C,E)
∂C =∞, limC→∞
∂U(C,E)
∂C = 0,
lim
E→0
∂U(C,E)
∂E =∞, limE→∞
∂U(C,E)
∂E = 0.
11We fix the threshold of household protest as constant and exogenous in the model. Yet, it can
be easily extended to the case when protest threshold depends on the level of local production (e.g.,
U = U(Y ), ∂U∂Y > 0). In addition, we could simplify the behavior of local officials and solve for the
threshold of household protests endogenously. For example, households compare the expected utility
if sticking to the incumbent, which is calculated with households’ belief on the official’s ability, versus
protesting and getting a new official with average ability in the pool. In this case, an endogenous threshold
of households’ belief on local officials’ ability, below which households will protest, emerges.
12In reality, one could think that a large share of regions with household protest induces political
instability, both of which influence household welfare of the entire population negatively.
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where s ∈ {H,L}, and 1{s=H} is an indicator function that equals one when the high state
is realized, and pollution is reduced. Following the definition, the threshold of household
protest, U , can be mapped into thresholds of output levels. First, define the maximal
achievable household utility in state s ∈ {H,L}, U smax, as
U smax = max
Y
U s(Y ; θ). (3.7)
Apparently, UHmax > U
L
max. Now, if U > U
H
max, household utility is lower than the threshold
regardless of the realized state and their local official’s ability and investment allocation.
Therefore, households always protest. If ULmax < U ≤ U
H
max, households always protest in
a bad state by the same argument. In a good state they protest only if their utility falls
below the threshold. This is the case when local output is low or overly high. Intuitively,
both low consumption (due to low output), and bad environmental quality (due to overly
high production) result in low utility, which induces household protest. In the end, if
U ≤ ULmax, households may protest in both good and bad state for similar reason as
above. We summarize the result in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1 (Household protest).
i) If U > UHmax, households will protest regardless of the behavior of their local official.
ii) If ULmax ≤ U ≤ U
H
max, households always protest if a low state is realized. If a high
state is realized, there exists an interval [Y H , Y¯ H ], such that households protest if
and only if local output is outside the interval.
iii) If U < ULmax, for each state s ∈ {H,L}, there exist an interval, [Y
s, Y¯ s] such that
households protest if and only if local output is outside the interval [Y s, Y¯ s] when
state s is realized.
In particular,
{
Y s, Y¯ s
}
s∈{H,L}
are solutions to the equation U s(Y ; θ) = U , where U s is
defined in (3.6). Y H ≤ Y L < Y¯ L ≤ Y¯ H , where equalities are achieved when θ = 0.
Proof. See text and illustration below.
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of output thresholds
We illustrate the three cases and the thresholds of case iii) in Figure 3.1. Since
household utility satisfies Inada conditions, the curve displays an inverse U-shape as
output increases. In addition, at a given level of output, household utility is higher when
environmental quality is better. Therefore, household utility in high state, UH , is above
their utility in low state, UL. Clearly, if local output is outside the interval [Y H , Y¯ H ] in
high state, or outside the interval [Y L, Y¯ L] in low state, household utility falls below the
threshold, U , and they protest. In addition, the upper interception of household utility
in high and in low states with the horizontal Y -axis are the corresponding maximal
sustainable production Y ssus, s ∈ {H,L} defined in (3.3). Output beyond these levels
results in negative infinite household utility.
In the following discussion, we focus on case iii), which induces a more comprehensive
analysis of investment allocation in the equilibrium under the cadre system in Section 3.4.
Technically, case i) and case ii) are special cases of case iii).
Finally, to simplify further analysis, we make the following assumption on the lower
bound of local officials’ ability, amin.
Assumption 3.2 (Lower bound of local officials’ ability). amin > a
L, where aL is the
minimal ability level such that output Y L is achievable, Ymax(a
L) = Y L.
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Clearly, the assumption excludes local officials against whom households always protest,
regardless of their investment allocation. In addition, we will see in Section 3.3.1 and 3.4.1
that the assumption implies that the output in all regions - under social optimum and
in the equilibrium under the cadre system - is always above Y L. Namely, in the end
household only protest due to deteriorated environment (resulted from production above
Y¯ s, s ∈ {H,L}), rather than lack of consumption.
3.2.4 Model timing
We consider a one-period static model. At the beginning of the period, the central gov-
ernment chooses an environmental policy, θ. Then local officials decide the allocation of
tax revenues on production-related and environment-related infrastructure investments,
I1 and I2, and produce output, Y (a, I1). Production generates pollution, ϕ¯Y (a, I1). De-
pending on local officials’ ability, a, and their investment in environmental-related infras-
tructure, I2, the abatement technology will reduce the marginal pollution level by ϕ(θ)
with probability π(a, I2; θ). In the end, households make their protest decision according
to whether their realized utility falls below the threshold, U . Notice that local production,
Y (a, I1), takes place before the environment state is realized. This means, households’
consumption, C = (1− τ)Y (a, I1), are the same irrespective of the state realization. Util-
ity in high and low states differ only due to different environmental quality defined in
(3.2).
3.3 Socially optimal policy, investment allocation and
household welfare
Before characterizing the optimal choices of the central government, local officials and
households in the equilibrium under the cadre system, we first derive the optimal envi-
ronmental policy, investment allocation and the corresponding household utility for the
social optimum benchmark with benevolent (rather than opportunistic) local officials.13
Definition 3.3 (Social optimum). An environmental policy and investment allocation is
socially optimal, if local officials maximize the expected utility of households in their region,
and the central government maximizes the expected aggregate utility of all households in
13Notice that the social optimum here is not first-best, because local officials maximize expected utility
of households in their region, without taking into account the negative externalities of household protest
on the welfare of households from other regions. In other words, we simply analyze the case when local
officials are benevolent to their own households. It is technically complex in a N -region model to consider
coordination of local officials to eliminate externalities of household protest.
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the economy, given the ability distribution, Ψ(a), investment decision of local officials and
protest behavior of households.
3.3.1 Local officials’ optimal investment allocation
Households’ expected utility in region a is given by
EU(I1, I2; a, θ) = π(a, I2; θ)U
H(Y ; θ) + (1− π(a, I2; θ))U
L(Y ; θ), (3.8)
where Y = Y (a, I1) is local output, and U
s(Y ; θ), s ∈ {H,L}, is defined in (3.6). There-
fore, in the social optimum, a local official with ability a solves the following allocation
problem:
max
I1,I2
EU(I1, I2; a, θ) (3.9)
s.t. I1 + I2 ≤ τY (a, I1).
Local officials maximize household utility by equalizing the relative marginal return
(in terms of households expected utility) of investment in production- and in environment-
related infrastructure, I1 and I2, to the relative marginal cost of the two investments. We
derive the first order condition of the program and illustrate the determination of the
optimal solution in Appendix C.1.1.
The optimization problem (3.9) gives the optimal investment allocation,
{I∗1 (a, θ), I
∗
2 (a, θ)}, as a function of local officials’ ability, a, and central government’s en-
vironmental policy, θ. Correspondingly, household utility in high and low states, UH(a, θ)
and UL(a, θ), respectively, and the expected utility, EU(a, θ) are determined.14 We cal-
culate the optimal solution numerically in Section 3.5.
Apparently, it is never optimal for local officials to produce below Y L under Assump-
tion 3.2, since their ability always allows them to produce at higher levels that give
households higher utility (and this is consistent with the objective of benevolent local
officials).
3.3.2 Central government’s optimal environmental policy
Given the optimal investment allocation of local officials, the central government calculates
the share of household protest, λ, households’ expected utility, EU(a, θ), and chooses the
optimal environmental policy so that aggregate expected utility is maximal. In both the
14Notice that in a bad state the environmental policy, θ, does not influence household utility directly,
but indirectly through local officials’ investment allocation, I∗1 (a, θ).
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good and the bad state, households protest when their utility falls below the threshold,
U . Therefore, the share of households who protest is given by
λ(θ) =
∫ amax
amin
[
π(a, θ)1{UH(a,θ)<U} + (1− π(a, θ))1{UL(a,θ)<U}
]
dΨ(a), (3.10)
where π(a, θ) = π(a, I∗2 (a, θ); θ), and 1{Us(a,θ)<U}, s ∈ {H,L}, is an indicator function that
equals to one if household utility in state s is below U and thus they protest.
The central government’s maximization problem is
max
θ
1{λ(θ)≤λ¯}
∫
N
EU(a, θ)dΨ(a), (3.11)
where 1{λ(θ)≤λ¯} equals to one if the share of household protest is below the threshold,
λ¯. When the share is above the threshold, negative externalities from political instability
imply zero utility for all households. Apparently, this is undesirable as long as the economy
has the possibility of ending up in political stability (in which cases households have non-
negative utility). Therefore, we can rewrite the central government’s problem defined in
(3.11) as an aggregate utility optimization problem with a political stability constraint:
max
θ
∫
N
EU(a, θ)dΨ(a), (3.12)
s.t. λ(θ) ≤ λ¯.
3.4 Equilibrium under the cadre system
Compared with the social optimum benchmark, the one thing that changes in equilib-
rium under the cadre system is the local officials’ investment behavior. Local officials
are now incentivized by the cadre system of the central government, and decide about
the allocation of tax revenues on production- and environment-related investments in an
opportunistic way. That is, they maximize their own expected income rather than the
expected utility of the households living in their region. In this section, we discuss the
determination of local officials’ investment allocation and the conditions that defines the
central government’s environmental policy. The quantitative results are given in Section
3.5.
3.4.1 Local officials’ equilibrium investment allocation
In contrast to the socially optimal case, local officials maximize their own expected utility
in equilibrium. As a result, the central government’s cadre system and the corresponding
reward scheme, which determines local officials’ expected utility under different circum-
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stances, have a crucial impact on local officials’ behavior. Specifically, the cadre system
consists of three parts: Promotion, stay in office and demotion, with A¯ > M > A as
respective remuneration levels.
3.4.1.1 Demotion
Local officials are demoted if and only if households from their region protest against them.
And household protest occurs when local output is outside the interval [Y s, Y¯ s], s ∈ {H,L}
(see Lemma 3.1 case iii)). Therefore, the probability of demotion, πD, of local officials
with ability, a, is given by
πD ≡ π(a, I2; θ)prob(Y /∈ [Y
H , Y¯ H ]) + (1− π(a, I2; θ))prob(Y /∈ [Y
L, Y¯ L]). (3.13)
Notice that output is not a random variable; given local officials’ investment allocation,
output Y is determined. Thus, prob(Y /∈ [Y s, Y¯ s]), s ∈ {H,L} is either zero or one.
In addition, since [Y L, Y¯ L] ⊆ [Y H , Y¯ H ], if prob(Y /∈ [Y H , Y¯ H ]) = 1, then prob(Y /∈
[Y L, Y¯ L]) = 1. Intuitively, households are more likely to protest in a low state (due to
worse environmental quality) compared to a high state. Therefore, if households protest
in a high state, given the output level, they will also protest if a low state is realized.
3.4.1.2 Promotion and stay in office
If protest does not occur, local officials may either be promoted or stay in office with
the current income. Specifically, local officials are promoted if the observed production,
Yˆ = Y + ǫ, is above the promotion threshold, Y ∗, and stay in office otherwise. Therefore,
the conditional probability of promotion is given by
πP = prob(Yˆ > Y ∗) = prob(ǫ > Y ∗ − Y ) = 1− Φ(Y ∗ − Y ), (3.14)
where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of ǫ ∼ N (0, σ2). Correspondingly, the
conditional probability of stay in office is 1− πP .
Now we can define the expected utility of local officials (LO), which is the sum of the
expected reward in the three cases:
ULO(I1, I2, a, θ) = π
DA+ (1− πD)
[
πP A¯+ (1− πP )M
]
, (3.15)
where the probability of demotion, πD, and the conditional probability of promotion, πP ,
are defined in (3.13) and (3.14), respectively.
Local officials choose the allocation of tax revenues on I1 and I2 in such a way that
their expected utility under the cadre system defined in (3.15) is maximized. Moreover,
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their investments are physically constrained by the maximal feasible investment, Imax1 (a),
defined in (3.5). The following proposition characterizes local officials’ optimal investment
allocation:
Proposition 3.1 (Optimal investment allocation). There exists a threshold of ability, a,
defined by Y (a, Imax1 (a)) = Y¯
L, such that
i) For officials with ability a ∈ [amin, a), investment in production-related infrastructure
is equal to the maximal feasible investment, Imax1 (a); investment in environment is
zero.
ii) Officials with ability a ∈ [a, amax] produce output, Y ∈ [Y¯
L, Y¯ H ], where Y¯ s, s ∈
{H,L}, is given in Lemma 3.1. As a consequence, according to (3.13), the probability
of demotion πD = 1− π(a, I2; θ), and the optimal allocation is thus determined by
max
{I1,I2}
ULO(I1, I2, a, θ), (3.16)
s.t. I1 + I2 ≤ τY (a, I1),
ULO(I1, I2, a, θ) ≥ Γ(Y¯
L),
where ULO(I1, I2, a, θ) is defined in (3.15), with π
D = 1 − π(a, I2; θ). Γ(Y¯
L) ≡
(1−Φ(Y ∗− Y¯ L))A¯+Φ(Y ∗− Y¯ L)M is the local official’s reward when producing at
output level Y¯ L.
Proof. Appendix C.1.2.
Intuitively, the production scale of local officials’ ability with low ability is small and
never reaches Y¯ L. Thus, households will not protest due to overproduction (and bad
environment). For local officials, both avoiding household protest due to low consump-
tion and increasing the probability of being promoted require higher production level.
Therefore, local officials invest all their resources into production without caring about
environmental quality.
After output level reaches the threshold, Y¯ L, extra production will lead to household
protest in a bad state (see Lemma 3.1). According to the cadre system, the responsible
local official is demoted. This happens with probability, 1 − π(a, I2; θ) > 0. Therefore,
on the one hand, increasing production beyond the protest threshold, Y¯ L, will result in
a loss of ΣL ≡ [1− π(a, I2; θ)]
(
Γ(Y¯ L)− A
)
for sure, where Γ(Y¯ L)− A is the decrease in
income due to demotion. On the other hand, the benefit of increasing production above
Y¯ L is a higher probability of promotion and the corresponding income. Specifically, the
probability of promotion at output level Y is given by 1 − Φ(Y ∗ − Y ). Therefore, the
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increase in probability of promotion compared with producing at Y¯ L is ∆P = Φ(Y −Y¯ L).15
As Y increases from Y¯ L, ∆P starts to increase continuously from zero. Therefore, local
officials need a minimal level of increase in promotion probability to compensate for the
loss of being demoted, ΣL. This requires a minimal increase in production. However,
local officials’ investment in production is bounded from above by the maximal feasible
investment and also by the investment, I1(Y¯
H , a, θ) required to guarantee U and avoid
protest. This means that in general it is not guaranteed that there will be local officials
who produce above Y¯ L. However, if there is a local official with ability a who finds it
beneficial to produce above Y¯ L, all officials with ability above a would also produce at
higher level. In the sense, there exists a threshold of ability, a¯, such that officials with
ability higher than the threshold will choose a higher level of production than Y¯ L. This
is the case in the quantitative results illustrated in Figure 3.5.
3.4.2 The central government’s equilibrium environmental pol-
icy
Similar to the social optimum benchmark, the central government knows the ability dis-
tribution of local officials and anticipates their investment behavior. The only difference
is that the career-concerned officials may produce at Y > Y Lsus, which results in nega-
tive infinite household utility if a bad state realizes. Notice that this is never the case
under social optimum where local officials are benevolent and a negative infinite house-
hold utility is never optimal. Therefore, the central government’s maximization problem
defined in (3.12) can be reformulated as one with an additional constraint on the set
of environmental policy the central government may choose from. Specifically, and the
central government’ choice of environmental policy has a direct impact on local officials’
behavior. Specifically, to increase their probability of promotion, local officials may pro-
duce at the upper boundary for household protest, Y¯ H . However, the central government
needs to make sure that the output of local officials is never above Y Lsus. According to
Proposition 3.1, local officials never produce more than the upper threshold of production,
Y¯ H . Therefore, the central government only need to guarantee that Y¯ H(θ) ≤ Y Lsus. Since
Y¯ H(θ) increases in the policy, θ, whereas Y Lsus is independent of the policy, this defines an
upper bound θ¯: Y¯ H(θ¯) = Y Lsus.
Therefore, the central government’s maximization problem in the equilibrium under
15Specifically, the increase in probability of promotion is ∆P = 1 − Φ(Y ∗ − Y ) − 1 + Φ(Y ∗ − Y¯ L) =
Φ(Y − Y¯ L).
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the cadre system is given by:
max
θ
∫
N
EU(a, θ)dΨ(a), (3.17)
s.t. λ(θ) ≤ λ¯ and 0 ≤ θ ≤ θ¯. (3.18)
3.4.3 Equilibrium characterization
The equilibrium in the economy is defined as follows:
Definition 3.4. An equilibrium is characterized by the following optimal solution:
1) Households make their protest decision according to Lemma 3.1.
2) Local officials’ determine their optimal investment allocation according to Proposi-
tion 3.1.
3) The central government choose the optimal environmental policy according to (3.17).
3.5 Numerical Exercises
In this section, we calculate the optimal environmental policy of the central government,
the optimal investment allocation of local officials and household welfare numerically for
the social optimum benchmark discussed in Section 3.3 and in the equilibrium under the
cadre system as characterized in Section 3.4. We assume specific functional forms and
parameter values to calibrate the model. The calibration is not meant to be a quantitative
description of Chinese reality. It is indeed to be taken as an exercise for illustrating
important mechanisms of environmental policy outcomes in a model that qualitatively
captures the economic and institutional situation in China. By comparing the quantitative
results under the two cases, we address three key questions of the paper: First, how the
cadre system and local households’ protest behavior influence the optimal investment
allocation of local officials with different abilities. Second, how local officials’ investment
behavior and household protest influence the central government’s choice of environmental
policy. And lastly, how the environmental policy and local officials’ behavior determine
household welfare and environmental quality of different regions.
Households’ utility is assumed to take the Cobb-Douglas form on E ≥ 0, U(C,E) =
CαE1−α, and is equal to negative infinity if E < 0. The output function exhibits a similar
form, Y (a, I1) = Pa
βI1−β1 , where P is a scale parameter.
The pollution abatement technology is a linear transformation of an exponential func-
tion,
ϕ(θ) = ϕ¯(1− e−χθ), θ ∈ [0, 1].
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Parameter Description Value
α Household’s utility 0.5
β
Production parameters
0.2
P 5
E¯ Environmental quality 3
ϕ¯ Marginal pollution 0.5
χ Abatement technology 2
amin Minimal ability 0.6
amax Maximal ability 6
ρ Policy complexity coefficient 0.8
τ Tax rate 0.2
U Protest threshold 1.8
Y ∗ Promotion threshold 3.87
A¯ Promotion reward 25
M Incumbent reward 5
A Demotion income 3
Table 3.1: Parameter values
where χ > 1 is a scale parameter. e−χθ ∈ [0, 1] implies that pollution reduction is a share,
1 − e−χθ, of the marginal pollution without abatement, ϕ¯. The technology satisfies the
conditions in (3.1).
Lastly, the probability of successful policy implementation is given by
π(a, I2; θ) = a
(
1− ρθI2
)
/amax, θ ∈ [0, 1],
where ρ ∈ (0, 1), so that even extreme environmental policy (i.e., θ = 1) can be imple-
mented successfully with positive probability a(1− ρ)/amax.
16 The expression is divided
by amax to ensure π(a, I2; θ) ∈ [0, 1]. In addition, the functional form satisfies the condi-
tions in Assumption 3.1, particularly that ability and investment are complementary in
increasing the probability of policy success.
We specify the parameter values in Table 3.1. In particular, we choose the environ-
mental quality, E¯, and the marginal pollution, ϕ¯, such that the maximal output level
that allows for a sustainable environment (i.e., E = E¯ − ϕ¯Y ≥ 0 and thus Ymax =
E¯
ϕ¯
) is
roughly comparable in magnitude with the attainable output by local officials.17 A large
ratio E¯
ϕ¯
would imply that reducing production-caused pollution has little impact on the
environmental quality of the economy and thus bias local officials’ investment towards
16If a policy can never be successfully implemented (i.e., ∃θ˜, s.t. ∀a ∈ [amin, amax], π(a, I2; θ˜) = 0), it
makes no sense to choose such a policy anyhow.
17To see this more clearly: Using the Cobb-Douglas production function, the maximal achievable
production level is given by Y max(a) = P (τP )
1−β
β a. With the parameter values in Table 3.1, E¯ϕ¯ = 6, and
Y max(a) ∈ [3, 30] for a ∈ [0.6, 6].
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production.18 In contrast, a small E¯
ϕ¯
would restrict local output significantly. U is chosen
such that case iii) in Lemma 3.1 is relevant. χ = 2 implies that by implementing an
extreme abatement technology (i.e., θ = 1), 86.47% of pollution per unit of output can
be reduced. The threshold of promotion, Y ∗, is of similar scale to the production level
that maximizes household utility in a good state.
The rest of the parameters were chosen such that numerical solutions do not run into
economically unmeaningful areas like negative values. Obviously, Table 3.1 does not claim
to be a calibration that matches reality in China in a quantitative sense. The purpose of
the calibration is rather to allow for a numerical illustration of the mechanisms at work
in the model.
3.5.1 Numerical solution in the social optimum benchmark
In this section, we characterize numerical solution of the socially optimal environmental
policy and investment allocation in the social optimum benchmark. First, we solve for
the optimal investment allocation of local officials, I1 and I2, for any given environmental
policy, θ (Section 3.5.1.1). From this, we get environmental quality and household welfare
for all θ ∈ (0, 1] (Section 3.5.1.2). And in the end, the central government calculates
for each possible θ the share of household protest (according to (3.10)) and chooses the
environmental policy, θ, such that there is no political instability and that aggregate
households’ expected utility is maximized (Section 3.5.1.3).
3.5.1.1 Socially optimal allocation of investments
In this case the local officials’ behavior is characterized by the solution of (3.9). Fig-
ure 3.2 depicts for given environmental policy, θ, the optimal investment allocation,
{I∗1 (a, θ), I
∗
2 (a, θ)}, of local officials with different abilities, a.
19 As ability rises, local of-
ficials allocate a larger share of investments into environment-related infrastructure (i.e.,
I∗1 increases and I
∗
2 decreases). Intuitively, for given investment in production, I1, lo-
cal officials with higher ability can generate more output. This drives down households’
marginal utility of consumption. However, higher output deteriorates environment and
thus drives up the marginal utility of environment. By allocating more investment into
18In this case, a corner solution with allocation of all resources to production-related investment may be
optimal for local officials of all ability. One could consider a situation of low economic development, when
output is low and environment quality is high. It benefits both households and local officials to focus
on production. However, in this paper we want to characterize heterogeneous behavior of local officials,
in particular, overproduction of local officials with high abilities that induces environment deterioration.
Therefore, the corner solution is of less interest.
19For Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3, we set as an example θ = 0.1274 to be consistent with the illustration
in the equilibrium under the cadre system (see footnote 22 for more details). The shape of the graph
maintains for θ ∈ (0, 1].
Chapter 3 113
environment-related infrastructure and less in production, local officials with high abilities
can alleviate the negative impact of high output on environment, and increase the prob-
ability of successful policy implementation, and thus achieve maximal household utility.
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Figure 3.2: Socially optimal allocation of investments
3.5.1.2 Socially optimal environmental quality and household welfare
With the investment allocation calculated in Section 3.5.1.1, we compute household con-
sumption, C = (1 − τ)Y (a, I∗1 (a)), and environmental quality in high and low states,
Es = E¯ − (ϕ¯ − 1{s=H}ϕ(θ))Y (a, I
∗
1 (a)), s ∈ {H,L}. From this, we get household utility
in the two states, U s(C,E) = U(C,Es), s ∈ {H,L}.
The results are plotted in Figure 3.3. Even though local officials’ investment in
production-related infrastructure decreases as ability increases (see Section 3.5.1.1), the
resulting output and thus household consumption is higher in regions with more able
officials. This is due to a strong positive impact of high ability on local output. As
a result of the high output, the environmental quality in both states is worse in re-
gions with high-ability local officials. However, the expected environmental quality,
EE(a, θ) ≡ π(a, I2; θ)E
H +(1−π(a, I2; θ))E
L, is only slightly worse off, as is indicated by
the downward-sloping, but much flatter curve in subplot 2. The combination of higher
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Figure 3.3: Socially optimal environmental quality and household welfare
investment in environment, I∗2 (a, θ), and higher ability increase the probability of policy
success. Consequently, the gap between the expected environment quality, EE(a, θ), and
the environmental quality in high state, EH(C,E), shrinks when the local officials’ ability
is higher.
The last subplot illustrates household utility, U s(C,E), in high and low states, s ∈
{H,L}, and the households’ expected utility, EU(C,E), as a function of local officials’
ability, a (for a given environmental policy of the central government, θ). Not surprisingly,
the household utility in a high state increases with their local official’s ability, which
implies that the utility gain from higher consumption outweighs the utility loss from lower
environmental quality. In the low state, however, the situation is the opposite.20 Like
the expected environmental quality, the expected household utility approaches household
utility in high state, because as local officials’ ability increases, the probability of high
state rises.
3.5.1.3 Socially optimal environmental policy
So far we solved numerically the program ((3.9) in Section 3.3.1) for the optimal in-
vestment allocation, {I∗1 (a, θ), I
∗
2 (a, θ)}, at all combinations of local officials’ ability, a ∈
20Essentially, we discuss the partial derivative of household utility with respect
to their local official’s ability. Namely, ∂U
s(C,E)
∂a =
∂U(C,Es)
∂C
∂C
∂a +
∂U(C,Es)
∂E
∂Es
∂a =(
(1− τ)∂U(C,E
s)
∂C − (ϕ¯− 1{s=H}ϕ(θ))
∂U(C,Es)
∂E
)
∂Y
∂a , where Y is the output under the socially opti-
mal investment allocation. Since ∂C∂a = (1 − τ)
∂Y
∂a > 0 from subplot 1,
∂UH(C,E)
∂a > 0 implies that
(1−τ)∂U(C,E
H)
∂C > (ϕ¯−ϕ(θ))
∂U(C,EH)
∂E . In other words, the marginal utility gain from higher consumption
outweighs the utility loss from lower environmental quality. And ∂U
L(C,E)
∂a < 0 implies the opposite (i.e.,
(1−τ)∂U(C,E
L)
∂C < ϕ¯
∂U(C,EL)
∂E ). The change in the sign is not surprising, because as environmental quality
decreases (from EH to EL) the marginal utility from consumption (i.e., LHS) decreases, whereas the
marginal utility from environment (i.e., RHS) increases. And thus the inequality changes its direction.
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[amin, amax], and environmental policy values, θ ∈ [0, 1]. To decide about the environmen-
tal policy, the central government needs to know the expected share of household protest,
λ(θ), defined in (3.10) and the aggregate expected utility of households, defined in (3.11).
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Figure 3.4: Environmental policy in the social optimum
We illustrate the quantitative results in Figure 3.4. The first subplot depicts the ex-
pected share of household protest, λ(θ), as a function of the environmental policy, θ. The
share displays an inverse-U shape. Intuitively, when the central government chooses a
moderate environmental policy (i.e., θ small), pollution abatement is low regardless of
local officials’ ability. Local officials take this into account when choosing the optimal
investment allocation, and restrict their output level to preserve the environment. As a
result household protest is relatively low at low θ. When the strength of environmental
policy increases (θ rises), the abatement technology reduces pollution in a good state
more significantly. Furthermore, since the task is still relatively easy, the probability that
a region (especially the ones with high-ability local officials) ends up in a bad state is low.
Therefore, local officials (especially high ability ones) have an incentive to overinvest in
production-related infrastructure and increase household utility in high state. However,
this leads to low environmental quality and thus low household utility in a bad state,
which induces household protests. In the end, as the strength of environmental policy
increases further, pollution abatement is very strong in a good state. However, the prob-
ability of policy success is low. In other words, with high probability the regions will end
up in bad environment and thus low household utility. Anticipating this, local officials re-
strict their production (i.e., lower I∗1 ) and shift more investment into environment-related
infrastructure to increase the probability of policy success. Therefore, household utility
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is less likely to fall below the threshold, and the protest share decreases.
Overall, environmental policies at the two ends restrict local officials’ investment in
production-related infrastructure, and reduce the share of household protest. We set the
tolerable share of household protest to be λ¯ = 10%; environmental policies θ ∈ (0.21, 0.66)
induce a protest share higher than 10% and thus political instability.
Aggregate expected utility of households as a function of environmental policy, θ, is
plotted in the subplot 2. Due to the negative externalities of political instability, aggre-
gate expected utility in the interval (0.21, 0.66) is zero. The dashed line represents the
level of utility which would result without any negative externality of political instability.
The shape of the curve is determined by the tradeoff between a better environmental
quality versus a lower probability of policy success. In our calibrated model, the central
government’s optimal environmental policy is θ∗ = 0.66, at the boundary of household
protest. However, as can be seen directly from the figure, without political instability
consideration, the optimal environmental policy would be θ∗∗ = 0.42.21
3.5.2 Solution of equilibrium under cadre system
3.5.2.1 Equilibrium allocation of investments
Under the cadre system, local officials allocate their investment for a given environmental
policy, θ, according to Proposition 3.1. The solid black line in Figure 3.5 gives the
optimal investment allocation of opportunistic local officials, and the dashed lines define
the boundaries of the region in which the solution must lie.22 According to Proposition
3.1, these boundaries include the maximal feasible investment, Imax1 (a, θ), and the required
investment in production to produce, Y¯ L and Y¯ H , respectively.23
The local officials’ investment behavior follows three patterns according to their abil-
ity.24 For officials with low ability, a ∈ [amin, a), which corresponds to case (i) in Propo-
sition 3.1, all tax revenues are invested into production. The intuition is as discussed in
21Notice that our model specification results in a higher optimal environmental policy compared to the
case without political stability concern (i.e., θ∗ > θ∗∗). However, this should not be taken as a general
feature. If the functional forms of pollution abatement technology and probability of policy success
change, the opposite may emerge (i.e., θ∗ < θ∗∗).
22Again we use θ = 0.1274 in the plots. The shape holds for θ ∈ (0, 0.1274]. In particular, θ = 0.1274
is the upper bound of the strength of the environmental policy that the central government can choose
from in the cadre system equilibrium without generating infinitely negative household utility.
23With the Cobb-Douglas production function, we can solve for these boundaries analytically.
Specifically, Imax1 = (τP )
1
β a, which displays a linear relationship with ability, a, and I(Y¯ s, a) =(
Y¯ s
P
) 1
1−β
a−
β
1−β , s ∈ {H,L} . In addition, the threshold of ability, a, is given by a = Y¯
L
P (τP )
− 1−β
β .
24The two thresholds that partition the interval of [amin, amax] into three parts are a = 0.79 and
a¯ = 4.15 as illustrated in Figure 3.5. In addition, amin = 0.6 and amax = 6.
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Figure 3.5: Equilibrium allocation of investments by local officials. Note: The two vertical
dotted lines indicate the lower and upper threshold of local officials’ ability, a and a¯, respectively.
Section 3.4.1: The scale of production at low ability is not enough to drive household
utility below the threshold that induces protest due to bad environment. In this case,
local officials’ motive to increase promotion probability and to avoid household protest
coincide: Both encourage local officials to focus on production. Officials with medium
ability a ∈ [a, a¯) produce at Y¯ L. At this output level, households never protest regardless
of state realization (see Proposition 3.1). As the local officials’ ability increases within
the interval, the amount of investment, I1(Y¯
L, a, θ), required to generate output, Y¯ L,
decreases, and thus the curve is downward-sloping. Furthermore, since local fiscal bud-
get is unchanged in this interval (due to the constant production), local officials actually
allocate larger share of resources into environment-related infrastructure as their ability
increases. Finally, for officials with high ability, a ∈ [a¯, amax], it is optimal to produce at
the upper boundary of production, Y¯ H > Y¯ L. Therefore, we see a jump in the production
investment, I1. After the jump, the curve is again downward-sloping, since officials with
higher abilities can generate Y¯ H with less resources; so they can allocate more investment
into environment. Note that even though high-ability officials invest more in produc-
tion than medium-ability ones, their investment in environment is not necessarily lower.
Quantitative results indicate that the opposite is the case (see Figure 3.8 subplot 2 in
Section 3.5.3). The reason is that for high-ability officials, one unit of extra investment
118 Environmental policy
in production generates more than one unit of fiscal income. Therefore, local officials
can increase investment in both production- and environment-related infrastructure.25
The corresponding ratio of investment, I2/I1, by officials of the three ability categories is
illustrated in Appendix C.1.3 Figure C.3.
3.5.2.2 Equilibrium environmental quality and household welfare
Having calculated local officials’ investment allocation for given policies, θ, we can now
calculate household consumption, regions’ environmental quality in high and in low state,
and household utility.
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Figure 3.6: Equilibrium environmental quality and household welfare. The vertical dotted
lines in the subplots indicate the lower and upper threshold of local officials’ ability, a and a¯, respectively.
Figure 3.6 illustrates the quantitative results. In regions with low-ability officials,
households consume less and enjoy better environmental quality. Their utility in both
states is relatively high due to high environmental quality. Notice that the households’
expected utility in these regions is very close to the utility in a bad state. This mirrors
the fact that the probability of a bad state is very high, because local officials invest zero
budget in environment. In other words, environmental policy has very limited impact on
environmental quality in low-ability regions.
Medium-ability officials produce at Y¯ L, and thus household consumption and environ-
mental quality in high and low states are constant, regardless of the local officials’ ability
within the interval. Household utility in a bad state is at the boundary of protest, U . In
a good state, it is above the protest threshold due to better environmental quality. More-
over, local officials within the interval allocate a larger share of investment in environment
25To see this more clearly: I2 = τY (a, I1)− I1, and thus the partial derivative of I2 with respect to I1
is given by ∂I2∂I1 = τ
∂Y
∂I1
− 1. Since lim
I1→0+
∂Y
∂I1
= ∞ and lim
I1→∞
∂Y
∂I1
= 0, there exists a threshold of I¯1, s.t.
τ ∂Y∂I1 |I1=I¯1 = 1: For I1 < I¯1, an increase in I1 also increases investment I2 and vice versa for I1 > I¯1.
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as their ability increases. Therefore, regions with higher-ability officials experience good
environmental quality with higher probability. This explains why expected environmental
quality and expected household welfare rise with ability in subplot 2 and 3.
In regions with high-ability officials, households consume (1−τ)Y¯ H , which is the high-
est level of consumption among all regions. As a consequence, there is a strong negative
effect of production on environmental quality. In the chosen numerical calibration, this
strong negative effect is not compensated by sufficient investment in environment so that
the environmental quality is among the worst in the high-ability regions.26 Furthermore,
in these regions household utility in high state is U , and in low state, the utility is lower
due to bad environmental quality. This is a direct consequence of the reward scheme.
Since in the case of demotion, local officials’ punishment is independent of their behav-
ior (and of household welfare), they do not care what exactly happens in their region.27
Therefore, low utility, even environmental disaster (i.e., unsustainable environment due to
overproduction, Y > E¯
ϕ¯
as defined in Section 3.2.3.1) could occur. This is never the case
in the social optimum benchmark where local officials balance household utility in high
and low states. As a result, the central government has to account for an extra constraint
in the cadre system: The environmental policy must avoid to induce local production
beyond the level consistent with a sustainable environment. This constraint defines a
maximal environmental policy θ¯ that is feasible for the central government.
3.5.2.3 Equilibrium environmental policy
Similar to the social optimum case, we plot the share of household protest and aggregate
expected utility of households as a function of environmental policy, θ. Furthermore,
according to the three patterns of investment allocation of local officials, we decompose
households into three categories: Households from high-, medium- and low-ability regions,
respectively.
Notice that in equilibrium, a change in the policy not only influences the share of
protest and household utility directly, but also indirectly through the change in local
officials’ behavior. Numerical results indicate that as the strength of environmental policy
increases (i.e., θ increases), the share of local officials that produce at Y¯ H increases.28
26However, this is not necessarily the case in general. Even if environmental quality in high-ability
regions is worse in each of the two states, L and H, respectively, expected environmental quality is not
necessarily worse. This is due to higher investment in environment by high-ability officials and thus a
higher probability of ending up in a good state. But one thing is for sure: Both environmental quality
and household utility in a bad state are the lowest in regions with high ability officials.
27Note that in the high-ability regions local officials take the low risk to be demoted in a bad state in
exchange for a high chance to be promoted in a good state.
28The share of local officials that invest all resources into production (i.e., low-ability regions) is inde-
pendent of the environmental policy, and is thus unchanged.
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This is the result of two counteracting effects. On the one hand, a rise in θ increases
the probability of policy failure, in which case local officials that produce at high level
will be demoted. This increases the expected loss, and discourages local officials from
producing at high level. On the other hand, as environmental policy turns to more
effective technology, local officials can produce at larger scale without inducing household
protest (i.e., Y¯ H increases). The extra production increases local officials’ probability of
promotion which encourages local officials to produce at high level, and tends to decrease
the threshold of the ability (a¯) above which local officials produce at Y¯ H . Quantitatively,
the second effect dominates the first one, and thus more regions will produce at the higher
level of production, Y¯ H .29
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Figure 3.7: Equilibrium environmental policy. With slight abuse of notations, we use aLow if
a ∈ [amin, a), a
Med if a ∈ [a, a¯), and aHigh if a ∈ [a¯, amax].
Not surprisingly, the share of household protest increases if the central government
chooses a stronger environmental policy (i.e., θ increases). On the one hand, as θ rises the
probability of a bad state and thus policy failure increases. Therefore, ceteris paribus the
expected share of household protest increases. On the other hand, the share of regions
that produce at high level of production increases. Since in regions which produce at high
level, households protest in a bad state, a larger share of household protest.
Aggregate household utility displays an inverse-U shape similar to the social optimum
case. But the central government chooses from a much smaller set of environmental policy,
in order to restrict local officials’ incentive to produce at output levels unsustainable by
the environment in a bad state (i.e., Y > Y Lsus(θ)). Compared with the social optimum
29Notice that this result relies on the specification and parameter values of the model. For example,
if the probability of policy success is very sensitive to the strength of environmental policy (i.e., the
elasticity is large), an increase in θ drives down the probability significantly, local officials may actually
decrease their investment in production related investment, resulting a larger share of regions producing
at the lower level of output, Y¯ L.
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case, the hump shape comes not only from a tradeoff between more effective pollution
abatement in a good state and a lower probability of policy success, but also from a
composition effect: More effective policy increases the production threshold of protest
in a good state, and thus induces more local officials to overproduce. This drives down
household utility. The optimal environmental policy is θ = 0.04, which is much lower
than the socially optimal one (θ∗ = 0.66).
The composition effect is verified by the third subplot. We see clearly that as the
strength of environmental policy increases, the share of local officials, S(aHigh), that
produce at Y¯ H increases; the increase share comes from a decrease in officials that produce
at Y¯ L, S(aMed).
3.5.3 Comparison between social optimum benchmark and the
equilibrium solution under the cadre system
In this section, we compare investment allocation, optimal environmental policy and
household welfare under the cadre system with the social optimum.
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Figure 3.8: Comparison of investment allocation. The vertical dotted lines in the subplots
indicate the lower and upper threshold of local officials’ ability, a and a¯, respectively.
First, we compare the local officials’ investment in production and in environment for a
given environmental policy. Under the cadre system, investment in production (illustrated
by the solid line) is at all ability levels higher than in the social optimum (illustrated by
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the dotted line) due to career motives. The effect of the career motives is especially strong
with high ability officials, for whom the marginal increase in promotion probability by
investing in production is the highest.
Investment in environment-related infrastructure is not uniformly lower in equilibrium
under the cadre system (solid line): The investment by high ability officials is higher than
under the social optimum (dotted line). However, we see from subplot 2 in Figure 3.9 that
the expected environmental quality is much lower in high-ability regions. This reflects that
the extra investment in environment is not enough to compensate for the extra pollution
from higher production.
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Figure 3.9: Comparison of household welfare. The vertical dotted lines in the subplots indicate
the lower and upper threshold of local officials’ ability, a and a¯, respectively.
Subplot 1 in Figure 3.9 shows that households’ consumption is higher in equilibrium,
especially in high-ability regions as a result of local officials’ overproduction. Conse-
quently, environmental quality is lower (subplot 2). Also expected household utility is
lower, as shown in subplot 3. However, one should notice that the worse environmental
quality in high-ability regions is not always a result of lower investment in environment as
is discussed above in Figure 3.8 subplot 2. These findings are in line with China’s “high
production, high pollution” situation.
Finally, if one compares the illustration of the share of household protest in Figure 3.4
and in Figure 3.7, the share is significantly lower under the social optimum, because of the
benevolent behavior of local officials.30 In addition, the optimal environmental policy is
much less ambitious in equilibrium. This is mainly due to the central government’s incen-
tive to avoid overproduction of local officials. In the end, the weak environmental policy
30Notice that the maximal share of protest in social optimum is higher. Yet, that is under much higher
level of environmental policy. If we compare the share of protest at the same level of environmental policy
there is far less protest under social optimum.
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together with the local officials’ biased investment allocation results in a low aggregate
household utility (1.83 in equilibrium, compared with 2.04 under social optimum).
3.6 Conclusion
In the last decades, China’s environmental situation has attracted attention from all
over the world. In a model with a central government, local officials and households,
the paper analyzes the reason of China’s “high output, high pollution” from a political
economic perspective. The high pollution is due to distortions from two levels: Distorted
allocation of tax revenues on production-related and environment-related investments by
local officials, and biased environmental policy by the central government.
The model emphasizes the impact of the cadre system of the central government and
of household protests on local officials’ allocation of fiscal revenues on production and
on environment investment. The central government promotes local officials according to
local output. This induces local officials with career concerns to overproduce on the one
hand. On the other hand, the possibility of household protest to some extent restricts local
officials’ incentive to produce and pollute. This is especially the case for medium-ability
officials, for whom promotion is less likely compared with the high ability ones. However,
local officials’ motive to avoid household protest is inadequate to eliminate overproduction.
As a result, the environment deteriorates and household welfare decreases. In the end,
in order to avoid overproduction by local officials and negative externalities of household
protests, the central government chooses under the cadre system an environmental policy
which is less effective than the socially optimal one. This has a negative impact on
environmental quality and household welfare indirectly.
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A Appendix: Chapter 1
A.1 Timing
The timing of the activities within a period T is as follows (see Figure A.1). At first,
a mass of 1 − ∆ households is born. An endogenously determined share λ of them
decides to become an entrepreneur and the rest decides to be a worker. The newborn
entrepreneurs sign a lifetime binding financial contract with the banks. The banks give
loans b(V E), according to the amount entitled by the respective terms of the contract, to
all entrepreneurs in the economy. Entrepreneurs pay the costs of capital and labor inputs
with the loans (workers consume and save by buying annuities from the banks from their
labor income and capital returns) and production takes place under uncertainty. After
production, entrepreneurs observe the state of their productivity realization and make
a report about it to the bank. Then, entrepreneurs make state-contingent repayments
ms(V
E) to the banks according to their financial contract and consume the remaining net
production revenue. Further, the contract determines state-contingent promised values
V Es (V
E) as future state variable. Finally, a share 1−∆ of the workers and entrepreneurs
dies and the associated firms exit.
t
T
Banks give
loans b(V E)
Production under
uncertainty
1. Realization of states
2. Entrepreneurs report states
State-contingent repayments
ms(V E), promised values V Es
Figure A.1: Timing of terms of financial contract within one period
A.2 Derivations
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A.2.1 Derivations of financial contract properties
The proofs for Proposition 1.1 and 1.2 and Lemma 1.1 and 1.2 follow the proofs on the opti-
mal social insurance in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000) which are based on Thomas and Worrall
(1990).
A.2.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1.1
Proof. Using the definition in (1.12) and summing up Cs,s−1+Cs−1,s we conclude: Cs,s−1+
Cs−1,s ≥ 0, which is equivalent to
U(θsR(b)−ms, L
E)−U(θsR(b)−ms−1, L
E) ≥
U(θs−1R(b)−ms, L
E)− U(θs−1R(b)−ms−1, L
E) (A.1)
Since θs > θs−1 and given the strict concavity of the utility function in consumption,
(A.1) is satisfied only if ms ≥ ms−1. It then follows from Cs,s−1 ≥ 0 that V
E
s ≥ V
E
s−1.
A.2.1.2 Proof of Lemma 1.1
Proof. Without loss of generality, we prove from the local downward constraints Cs,s−1 ≥
0,∀s ∈ S, that for any i > j, i, j ∈ S, Ci,j ≥ 0. The case of i < j can be proved from the
local upward constraints Cs,s+1 ≥ 0,∀s ∈ S, using the same logic.
Proof with mathematical induction:
For n = 1, Cj+n,j ≥ 0 holds according to the local downward constraint. Suppose for
n ≥ 1, Cj+n,j ≥ 0,∀j ∈ S holds; we need to prove that Cj+n+1,j ≥ 0. For simplicity of
notation denote i = j + n.
First, Ci,j ≥ 0 and Ci+1,i ≥ 0 are equivalent to the following inequalities:
U(θiR(b)−mi, L
E) + β∆V Ei − U(θiR(b)−mj, L
E)− β∆V Ej ≥ 0,
U(θi+1R(b)−mi+1, L
E) + β∆V Ei+1 − U(θi+1R(b)−mi, L
E)− β∆V Ei ≥ 0.
Summing up the two inequalities we have:
U(θi+1R(b)−mi+1, L
E) + β∆V Ei+1 − β∆V
E
j +
U(θiR(b)−mi, L
E)− U(θiR(b)−mj, L
E)− U(θi+1R(b)−mi, L
E) ≥ 0. (A.2)
Using the strict concavity of the utility function, the fact θi+1 > θi, and mi ≥ mj from
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Proposition 1.1, we have additionally the following inequality:
U(θi+1R(b)−mi, L
E)−U(θi+1R(b)−mj, L
E) ≥
U(θiR(b)−mi, L
E)− U(θiR(b)−mj, L
E) (A.3)
Adding (A.3) to (A.2) we have
U(θi+1R(b)−mi+1, L
E) + β∆V Ei+1 − β∆V
E
j − U(θi+1R(b)−mj, L
E) ≥ 0.
Namely, Ci+1,j ≥ 0.
A.2.1.3 Proof of Lemma 1.2
Proof. First, we prove by contradiction that the local downward constraints must bind:
Suppose that there exists an optimal contract
{
b,ms, V
E
s
}
s∈S
such that for some i ∈ S
the downward constraint does not bind (i.e., Ci,i−1 > 0). Then, the general procedure
is as follows: We prove that there exists a mean-preserving contraction transforma-
tion on
{
V Ej
}
j=i,...,S
such that the new contract
{
b,ms, Vˆ
E
s
}
s∈S
, where Vˆ Ej = V
E
j , for
j = 1, 2, . . . , i − 1, fulfills all constraints. In particular, we make a transformation with∑
s∈S
πsVˆ
E
s =
∑
s∈S
πsV
E
s , and Vˆ
E
j − Vˆ
E
l ≤ V
E
j − V
E
l , ∀j, l ∈ S, with at least one pair of
{j, l} giving strict inequality. In this case, under the assumption that P (V E) is strictly
concave, the banks’ profit increases strictly with the new contract. This contradicts the
fact that
{
b,ms, V
E
s
}
s∈S
is an optimal contract.
Now we describe explicitly the procedure of performing a mean-preserving contraction
transformation on the contract:
Keeping
{
mi−1,mi, V
E
i−1
}
as before, we decrease V Ei until Ci,i−1 = 0. Since
changing V Ei will influence the local downward incentive constraints for s = i + 1 and
sequentially s = i + 2, . . . , S, we decrease for each s = i + 1, . . . , S, V Es such that
Cs,s−1 = 0. As a result we have a new sequence of future promised value
{
V Es
′
}
s∈S
={
V E1 , V
E
2 , . . . , V
E
i−1, V
E
i
′
, V Ei+1
′
, . . . , V ES
′
}
. Now we add a positive constant, v¯, to the se-
quence of future promised value, such that the promise keeping constraint is regained.
Let Vˆ Es = V
E
s
′
+ v¯. We have a new contract
{
b,ms, Vˆ
E
s
}
s∈S
.
First, note that the new contract fulfills the local upward constraints automatically
given the strict concavity of the utility function and the fact that Cs,s−1 = 0 ∀s ∈ S
(see argumentation in the last part of this proof). In addition, the promise keeping
constraint is still fulfilled due to the mean-preserving transformation, and the limited
liability constraints are uninfluenced since b and {ms}s∈S are unchanged. Finally, for any
j = i, . . . , S, V Ej+1 must decrease at least as much as V
E
j to guarantee that Cj+1,j = 0.
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Therefore, for any j = i, . . . , S, v¯ ≤ V Ej − V
E
j
′
, indicating that Vˆ Ej ≤ V
E
j and remember
that for j = 1, 2, . . . , i − 1 Vˆ Ej = V
E
j ,. Since
{
V Es
}
s∈S
fulfills the credibility constraints,
so does the new contract.
Further, notice from the procedure that the gap of the promised values between two
successive states, s and s − 1, is either unchanged or decreased, with a definite decrease
in Vˆ Ei − Vˆ
E
i−1. Following this we know ∀j, l ∈ S, V
E
j − V
E
l is non-increasing. Thus, the
new contract is a mean-preserving contraction. This contradicts that
{
b,ms, V
E
s
}
s∈S
is
an optimal contract: We know that the local downward constraints always bind.
Given that Cs,s−1 = 0,∀s ∈ S, rewriting the constraint we have
β∆(V Es − V
E
s−1) = U(θsR(b)−ms−1, L
E)− U(θsR(b)−ms, L
E)
Since θs−1 < θs,ms−1 ≤ ms and the utility function is strictly concave, we have
U(θs−1R(b)−ms−1, L
E)− U(θs−1R(b)−ms, L
E) ≥
U(θsR(b)−ms−1, L
E)− U(θsR(b)−ms, L
E) =β∆(V Es − V
E
s−1),
where strict inequality holds for ms−1 < ms. Therefore, we have directly from this that
the local upward constraint is never binding. Namely, Cs−1,s > 0,∀s ∈ S.
A.2.1.4 Proof of Proposition 1.2
Proof. The non-decreasing entrepreneurs’ utility is direct result of the binding local down-
ward constraints.
The non-decreasing profit of banks is proved by contradiction. Suppose for the optimal
contract,
{
b,ms, V
E
s
}
s∈S
, there exists i, j ∈ S, i > j, such that
−b+mi +
∆
1 + r
P (V Ei ) < −b+mj +
∆
1 + r
P (V Ej ).
Substituting (mi, V
E
i ) with (mj, V
E
j ) increases banks’ profit in state i. Since the downward
constraint binds, Ci,j = 0, the terms of contract, (mj, V
E
j ), entitle the entrepreneurs the
same promised value as (mi, V
E
i ). This means that we find an improvement that increases
the profit of the banks without violating any constraints. This contradicts the optimality
of the original contract. Therefore, in the optimal contract the banks’ profits cannot
decline with a higher productivity realization.
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A.2.1.5 Proof of Proposition 1.3
We use the Lagrangian. For simplification, we derive the Lagrangian and the F.O.C. for
the case of two states (i.e., S = {l, h} with πh = π, πl = 1− π). The Lagrangian is given
by:
L = max
{b,ms,V Es }s∈S
−b+
∑
s={l,h}
πs
[
ms +
∆
1 + r
P (V Es )
]
+ λ1

 ∑
s={l,h}
πs[U(css, L
E) + β∆V Es ]− V
E


+ λ2
{
U(chh, L
E) + β∆V Eh − U(chl, L
E)− β∆V El
}
+ λ3
{
U(cll, L
E) + β∆V El − U(clh, L
E)− β∆V Eh
}
+ λ4chh + λ5cll
+ λ6(V
E
max − V
E
l ) + λ7(V
E
l − V
E
min)
+ λ8(V
E
max − V
E
h ) + λ9(V
E
h − V
E
min)
where cij = θiR(b) − mj. λi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , 9 are the Lagrangian multiplier for (PK),
(IC), (LL) and (CC), respectively. The F.O.C.s are
∂L
∂mh
= π − (λ1π + λ2)U
′(chh) + λ3U
′(clh)− λ4 = 0; (A.4)
∂L
∂ml
= (1− π)− (λ1(1− π) + λ3)U
′(cll) + λ2U
′(chl)− λ5 = 0; (A.5)
∂L
∂V Eh
=
π
1 + r
P ′(V Eh ) + (λ1π + λ2 − λ3)β − λ8 + λ9 = 0; (A.6)
∂L
∂V El
=
1− π
1 + r
P ′(V El ) + (λ1(1− π)− λ2 + λ3)β − λ6 + λ7 = 0; (A.7)
∂L
∂b
= −1 + {(λ1π + λ2)U
′(chh)− λ2U
′(chl) + λ4}θhR
′(b)
+ {(λ1(1− π) + λ3)U
′(cll)− λ3U
′(clh) + λ5}θlR
′(b) = 0. (A.8)
These together with the complementary conditions and λi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , 9 character-
ize the conditions an optimal contract needs to fulfill. For the following result, we consider
only non-binding credibility constraints (CC) so that we have λi = 0, i = 6, . . . , 9. Fur-
thermore, we use that the downward constraint always binds (λ2 ≥ 0) whereas the upward
constraint for ms > ms−1 never does (λ3 = 0).
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Proof of Proposition 1.3. From (A.4), (A.5) and (A.8) follows
E(θ)R′(b) + [λ3U
′(clh)− λ2U
′(chl)](θh − θl)R
′(b) = 1
Since λ3 = 0 we have
E(θ)R′(b)− λ2U
′(chl)(θh − θl)R
′(b) = 1. (A.9)
Since λ2 ≥ 0 and U
′(c) ≥ 0, we have that E(θ)R′(b) ≥ 1 and thus b ≤ b∗, where b∗ is
the efficient bank loan level defined in (1.15). In addition, as chl = θhR(b)−ml increases
(e.g., if ml decreases), b approaches the efficient level, b
∗.
A.2.2 Derivation of the good market clearing condition
The goods market is cleared if aggregate output equals the sum of consumption of all
households and aggregates investment (i.e., replacement of depreciated capital in station-
ary case). Remember from (1.29) that the formal condition is λY = λCE + (1− λ)CW +
λδKD. To prove that the goods market clearing condition can be derived from the other
equations, we need only to prove that the RHS of (1.29) can be simplified to λY .
We aggregate the consumption of entrepreneurs CE and workers CW . Plugging in
entrepreneur’s consumption c(.) from (1.7) into (1.24) (using R(b) = R(b(V W )) and ms =
m(V E, θs)) we obtain for aggregate consumption of entrepreneurs:
CE =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τ
∑
s∈S
πs
∫ [
θsR(b(V
E))−m(V E, θs)
]
dΨτ (V
E) = Y −M, (A.10)
where the second equality follows from (1.23) and (1.22).
A cohort τ worker’s consumption is cτ = wlτ +Aτ − p
AAτ+1 (follows from the budget
constraint (1.3)). Aggregation gives
CW =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τ (wlτ + Aτ − p
AAτ+1)
= wLS −D +
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τAτ
= wLS −D +∆
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τ−1Aτ
= wLS −D +∆
1
pA
D
= wLS + rD, (A.11)
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where the second and forth equality follow from (1.18) and (1.17) and the annuity price
pA = ∆
1+r
from (1.1) is used.
Entrepreneurs have the bank loans to finance the production costs. All money is used
for production costs. Thus, the constraint in entrepreneurs’ decision problem in (1.5) is
binding so that we have b(V E) = wl∗(V E) + (r + δ)k∗(V E). In the aggregate, this means
B = wLD + (r + δ)KD. (A.12)
Plugging (A.10) and (A.11) into the RHS of (1.29) gives:
RHS = λ(Y −M) + (1− λ)(wLS + rD) + λδKD
= λY − λM + (1− λ)wLS + (1− λ)rD + λrE − λrE + λδKD
= λY + λwLD + λ(r + δ)KD − λ(M + rE)
= λY + λB − λB
= λY = LHS,
where the equilibrium conditions (1.27) and (1.28) were used in the third equality and
(1.25) and (A.12) were used in the third. This closes the proof that the goods market
clearing condition can be derived from clearing in the capital and labor markets.
A.3 Numerical procedure
In this section we describe the dynamic programming algorithm for solving the partial
equilibrium (i.e., workers’ decision problem in Section A.3.1 and banks’ optimal contract
in Section A.3.2), the procedure to simulate the entrepreneurs’ life path and calculate the
aggregate variables (Section A.3.3), and the algorithm to calculate the unique stationary
general equilibrium (Section A.3.4). All computations are done with Matlab.
A.3.1 Workers
1. Use constant r and w.
2. Set a grid for the state variable A. Agrid denotes the grid points of A. We set
A = [0, 10] and generate nA = 50 Chebyshev grid points on the interval.1 We
manually replace the lowest Chebyshev point with the lower bound of A = 0.
1See footnote 40 for an explanation of Chebyshev points.
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3. Give an initial guess for the functional form of the value function, V W (A; r, w)0, of
the policy functions l(A)0 andA′(A)0 and of c(A)0.2 We use V W (Ai)
0 = − exp(−Ai)−
0.1, c(Ai)
0 = 0.1, l(Ai)
0 = 0.6 and A′(Ai)
0 = 0 for each Ai ∈ Agrid, i ∈ {1, ..., nA}.
4. Solve on each grid point Ai ∈ Agrid, i ∈ {1, ..., nA}, the worker’s problem in
(1.2) subject to (1.3), c(Ai) ≥ 0, l(Ai) ∈ [0, 1] and A
′(Ai) ≥ 0. This gives us
the optimal solution of the system, {c(Ai)
1, l(Ai)
1, A′(Ai)
1} and the corresponding
updated value function V W (Ai; r, w)
1 at Ai ∈ Agrid, i ∈ {1, ..., nA}.
3 To calculate
the updated value function, we interpolate on V W (A; r, w)0 to get values for A′(A)
which lie between two Agrid-points.4
5. Compare the two successive iterations of value functions, V W (A; r, w)1 with
V W (A; r, w)0, by defining a distance measure dVW , such that dVW ≡
maxi∈{1,...,nA}
∣∣∣V W (Ai; r, w)1 − V W (Ai; r, w)0∣∣∣. If dVW ≤ ǫP , the optimal solution
from the current iteration solves the workers’ problem and go to Step 5.5 If dVW > ǫP
go to Step 3 by updating V W (A; r, w)0 = V W (A; r, w)1, c(A)0 = c(A)1, l(A)0 = l(A)1
and A′(A)0 = A′(A)1 as the new starting values.
6. Save the value function V W (Ai; r, w) = V
W (Ai; r, w)
1, the A′(Ai) = A
′(Ai)
1 and
l(Ai) = l(Ai)
1 and c(Ai) = c(Ai)
1 for each Ai ∈ Agrid, i ∈ {1, ..., nA}.
A.3.2 Financial contract
1. Use constant r and w.
2. Set a grid for the state variable V E on the interval
[
V Emin, V
E
max
]
. V Egrid denotes
the nV E = 50 Chebyshev grid points of V E on the interval.6 We manually replace
the lowest Chebyshev point with the lower bound V Emin.
3. Make an initial guess of the functional form of the value function, P (V E; r, w)0, and
of the policy functions,
{
b(V E)0,ms(V
E)0, V Es (V
E)
0
}
s∈{h,l}
. We use P (V Ei ; r, w)
0 =
log(−V Ei ), b(V
E
i )
0 = 1, mh(V
E
i )
0 = 3, ml(V
E
i )
0 = 1, V Eh (V
E
i )
0
= V El (V
E
i )
0
= V Ei
for each V Ei ∈ V
Egrid, i ∈ {1, ..., nV E}.
2Even though the functions (e.g., value functions, VW (A) and P (V E)) are continuous per se, they
can only be evaluated on the discrete grid points in the numerical exercise. Namely, it is a mapping of
each grid point into a number. This applies in all algorithms.
3 We apply the fmincon-command, which finds the minimum of a constrained nonlinear multivariable
function using the interior point algorithm.
4 We use spline interpolation, which is a cubic interpolation of the values of neighbor-points.
5We set the tolerated distance for ending the iterations, ǫP = 0.0001.
6See footnote 40 for an explanation of Chebyshev points.
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4. Solve for each V Ei ∈ V
Egrid, i ∈ {1, ..., nV E} the optimal contract in (1.11) subject
to (PK), (IC), (LL) and (CC).7 This gives the optimal contract at each V Ei ∈
V Egrid, i ∈ {1, ..., nV E},
{
b(V E)1,ms(V
E)1, V Es (V
E)1
}
s∈{h,l}
, and thus the updated
value function, P (V E; r, w)1.8
5. Compare the two successive iterations of value functions, P (V Ei ; r, w)
1 with
P (V Ei ; r, w)
0, by defining a distance measure dP , such that dP ≡
maxi∈{1,...,nV E}
∣∣∣P (V Ei ; r, w)1 − P (V Ei ; r, w)0∣∣∣. If dP ≤ ǫP , then take the current
iteration of value function and policy functions as the solution and go to Step
6. If dP > ǫP , start over with Step 3 by updating P (V
E; r, w)0 = P (V E; r, w)1
and b(V E)0 = b(V E)1, mh(V
E)0 = mh(V
E)1,ml(V
E)0 = ml(V
E)1, V Eh (V
E)
0
=
V Eh (V
E)
1
and V El (V
E)
0
= V El (V
E)
1
as the new starting value for the next iteration.
6. Save the value function P (V E; r, w) = P (V E; r, w)1 and the optimal contract b(V E) =
b(V E)1, mh(V
E) = mh(V
E)1,ml(V
E) = ml(V
E)1, V Eh (V
E) = V Eh (V
E)
1
and
V El (V
E) = V El (V
E)
1
.
A.3.3 Life path simulation and equilibrium variables
In this appendix, we simulate entrepreneurs’ life paths and calculate the aggregate vari-
ables related to entrepreneurs by combining the optimal solution from Section A.3.2
and the entrepreneurs’ decision.9 Moreover, we calculate workers’ aggregate deposits
D and the labor supply LS according to the straightforward analytical expressions (1.17)
and (1.18).10 Using the aggregate variables, we calculate equilibrium values for the en-
trepreneurial share.
1. Simulate for NE = 10, 000, 000 entrepreneurs’ age and life paths with history of
productivity realizations. We use two random numbers, uit and o
i
t, to denote en-
7For, (IC) we put in the constraint only the binding local downward constraint, since by the result of
Lemma 1.2 the local upward constraint is never binding for the optimal contract.
8As in the algorithm for solving the workers’ problem, we apply the fmincon-command to solve for
the optimal contract at each grid point and use spline interpolation to calculate the value function for
the next iteration.
9The numerical procedure described in this section is performed for given interest rate and wage rate,
{r, w}.
10Calculating the aggregate deposits and the aggregate labor supply according to analytical expressions
instead of applying life path simulation is simply to save computational time. Notice that to guarantee
that the equilibrium factor prices approximate the true values under acceptable computational error, ǫGE ,
we only need to make sure that the computed aggregate values approximate the true values at higher
precision, irrespective of the way they are calculated. And this is guaranteed in Step 4 for the aggregate
deposits and the aggregate labor supply (i.e., ǫL = 0.0001 < ǫGE). For the aggregate capital and labor
demand, on the other hand, we have checked that by increasing NE to ten times of the current number,
the changes of these two aggregate values are below ǫL = 0.0001 as well.
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trepreneur i’s productivity realization and death / survival at time t, respectively.
The procedure is as follows:
(a) Start from entrepreneur i = 1, period t = 1.
(b) Use a random number generator to generate two numbers oi1 and u
i
1, which are
uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1].
(c) If ui1 < πl, save the entrepreneur’s productivity realization in this period as
low, θit = θl, and otherwise as high θ
i
t = θh.
11
(d) If oit < ∆, the entrepreneur survives to the next period, increase t by one and
go back to Step 1b. If oit > ∆, the life path stops. Save her year of life, A
i = t,
go to Step 1b and simulate for the next entrepreneur i+ 1.
(e) Save all entrepreneurs’ years of life, {Ai}
NE
i=1, and the sequence of productivity
realizations, {θit}
Ai
t=1 , i = 1, . . . , N
E.
2. Using the simulation of the life paths from Step 1 and the policy function from
Section A.3.2, we determine the corresponding promised value V i, bank loans b(V i)
and the repayments m(V i, θiAi) for each entrepreneur i in their last period in life
t = Ai. Notice that the promised utility relevant for calculating the bank loans and
repayments is the value at the beginning of the last period. This means that the
productivity realization in t = Ai, θiAi , is only used for calculating the repayments
(see Step 2d). Specifically, the procedure is as follows:
(a) Set V i0 = V
W (0; r, w) using the workers’ value function from Section A.3.1.
(b) Start from entrepreneur i, period t = 1.
(c) If t ≤ Ai − 1, the promised utility of entrepreneur i at the beginning of period
t is V it = V
E
s (V
i
t−1), where V
E
s (V ) is entrepreneurs’ transition function solved
in Section A.3.2. Repeat the step until the condition is no longer satisfied.
(d) Calculate the optimal banks loans and repayments, {bi,mi}
NE
i=1, using the policy
functions solved in Section A.3.2, the productivity realization in the last period
of life, {θiAi}
NE
i=1 from Step 1, and the promised utility from Step 2c, {V
i
Ai−1}
NE
i=1.
Specifically, bi = b(V iAi−1) and m
i = (V iAi−1, θ
i
Ai).
3. Calculate the aggregate bank loans B and repaymentsM . Specifically, we aggregate
banks loans bi and repayments mi over all entrepreneurs i = 1, . . . , NE and divide
the two sums by NE to normalize the mass of the population to 1. Further, we cal-
culate the aggregate capital demand KD and aggregate labor demand LD according
to (1.33).
11We set πl=1/2 and ∆ = 0.92.
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4. Calculate workers’ aggregate deposits D and the labor supply LS according to equa-
tion (1.17), (1.18) and the optimal decisions solved in A.3.1. Specifically, start from
the deposits and labor supply of workers of age t = 1, SumA = pAA
′(At−1) and
SumL = l(At−1), weighted by their population size, (1 − ∆)∆
t−1. Constantly add
to SumA and SumL the weighted deposits and labor supply of the older genera-
tion, until the differences between the sums in two successive iterations is below
ǫL = 0.0001, respectively.
12
5. Determine the share of entrepreneurs from the labor market condition, λ = L
D
LD+LS
,
the zero-profit condition, P (V w(0; r, w); r, w), and the excess capital demand,
X(r, w) ≡ λKD − (1 − λ)D − λB−M
r
. Notice that all endogenous variables,{
λ,KD, D,B,M
}
are functions of the factor prices, (r, w).
A.3.4 Numerical procedure for general equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the procedure for solving the general equilibrium (i.e., the
factor prices (r, w)). The theoretical ground and intuition of the algorithm are given in
section A.4. We will mention banks’ profit at V E = V W (0; r, w), P (V W (0; r, w); r, w),
repeatedly in this section. To save notation we write Π(r, w) (or Π when the specific
values of (r, w) are irrelevant) instead of the full expression.
1. Start with (r0, w0) as an initial guess for the equilibrium factor prices. Calculate
the partial derivatives of the banks’ profit, Π, and of the excess capital demand, X,
at (r0, w0). Denote the values of the partial derivatives as S
Π
r , S
Π
w , S
X
r , and S
X
w ,
respectively.13 Set wL = wU = NaN , where NaN represents undefined numerical
results in Matlab.
2. Set rL = rU = NaN .
3. Set (r′, w′) = (r0, w0). Calculate V
W (0; r′, w′) according to Algorithm A.3.1, and
P (V E; r′, w′) according to Algorithm A.3.2.
12We set ǫL << ǫGE so that the equilibrium is not susceptible to calculation error in the workers’
aggregate variables.
13To approximate the partial derivatives, we calculate the value of Π(r, w) and X(r, w) at (r0, w0),
(r0 + ε, w0) and (r0, w0 + ε), respectively. Applying the definition of partial derivatives, we have S
Π
r ≈
Π(r0+ε,w0)−Π(r0,w0)
ε , S
Π
w ≈
Π(r0,w0+ε)−Π(r0,w0)
ε , S
X
r ≈
X(r0,w0+ε)−X(r0,w0)
ε , and S
X
w ≈
X(r0,w0+ε)−X(r0,w0)
ε .
Notice that this procedure is time consuming, because we need to calculate through the entire model
at each combination of (r, w). Since the searching region for the general equilibrium is relatively small
(within interval of magnitude 0.01), the change in partial derivatives is small. Therefore, we use these
values as an approximation of the partial derivatives in all iterations to save computational time.
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4. If |Π(r′, w′)| < ǫGE, the banks’ profit is close enough to zero and go to Step 6.
14
Otherwise, if Π(r′, w′) > 0, save rL = r
′ and ΠL = Π(r
′, w′). If Π(r′, w′) < 0, save
rU = r
′ and ΠU = Π(r
′, w′).15
5. If neither rL nor rU is NaN , let r0 ≡
rUΠL−rLΠU
ΠL−ΠU
. Otherwise, r0 ≡ r
′−Π(r′, w′)/SPr .
Go to Step 3.
6. Calculate the excess capital demand X(r′, w′) and share of entrepreneurs λ(r′, w′)
according to Section A.3.3.
7. If |X(r′, w′) − Π(r′, w′)| < ǫGE, then the (r
′, w′) and the corresponding λ(r′, w′) in
the current iteration are the equilibrium.16 Otherwise, ifX(r′, w′) < 0, save wL = w
′
and XL = X(r
′, w′). If X(r′, w′) > 0, save wU = w
′ and XU = X(r
′, w′). 17
8. If neither wL nor wU is NaN , let w0 ≡ (wL + wU)/2, and r0 ≡ r
′−(
Π(r′, w′) + SPw (w0 − w
′)
)
/SPr . Otherwise, we set

r0
w0

 ≡

r′
w′

− A−1b, (A.13)
where A =

SPr SPw
SXr S
X
w

, and b =

Π(r′, w′)
X(r′, w′)

.18 Go to Step 2.
A.4 Theoretical ground and intuition of Algorithm
A.3.4
The theoretical ground of the stationary general equilibrium searching in Algorithm A.3.4
is based on the continuity of the aggregate variables and the values functions with respect
14We set ǫGE = 0.001.
15An intuitive description of this step is given in Section A.4.
16Notice that by setting the criterion as |X(r, w) − Π(r, w)| < ǫGE instead of |X(r, w)| < ǫGE , we
decreases the computational error of the equilibrium factor prices. Essentially, we want to avoid the case
when both X(r, w) and Π(r, w) are marginally below ǫGE but of the opposite sign. By analysis similar
as illustrated in Figure A.2, this deviates the numerical solution from the true values much more than if
both X(r, w) and Π(r, w) are marginally below ǫGE but of the same sign.
17An intuitive explanation of this step is given in footnote 22 and the corresponding part in the main
text.
18We apply Tayor’s expansion on Π(r, w) and X(r, w). Namely, Π(r0, w0) ≈ Π(r
′, w′) + ∂Π∂r (r0 − r
′) +
∂Π
∂w (w0 − w
′), and X(r0, w0) ≈ X(r
′, w′) + ∂X∂r (r0 − r
′) + ∂X∂w (w0 − w
′). Setting Π(r0, w0), Π(r
′, w′), and
X(r0, w0) to be zero we get equation (A.13).
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to (r, w), and numerical properties of the zero-profit condition, Π ≡ P (V W (0; r, w); r, w),
and the excess capital demand,X ≡ λ(r, w)KD(r, w)−(1−λ(r, w))D(r, w)−λ(r, w)E(r, w).19
Property 2. The zero-profit condition and the excess capital demand are both decreasing
in r and w (at least locally around the equilibrium values).
This means that the partial derivatives of Π(r, w) and X(r, w) with respect to r and
w are negative:
Πr < 0, Πw < 0, Xr < 0 and Xw < 0. (A.14)
In a (w, r)-diagram, the slope of the iso-profit curve and of the iso-excess demand curve
are given respectively by
SΠ = −
Πw
Πr
and SX = −
Xw
Xr
. (A.15)
Therefore, equation (A.14) implies that both loci are downward sloping (i.e., SΠ < 0 and
SX < 0). In addition, a northeast shift of the locus (i.e., an increase in r and w) decreases
the corresponding value of the respective iso-curve.
Furthermore, the relative position of the two loci is determined by the following prop-
erty.
Property 3. The gap between the two equilibrium conditions, G ≡ X − Π, is decreasing
in r and increasing in w.
Property 3 implies that the iso-profit curve is steeper than the iso-excess demand curve
at all combination of (r, w) locally. To see this, note that the slopes of the iso-profit and
iso-excess demand curves are given by equation (A.15). Since Property 3 indicates that
the partial derivatives satisfy Gr < 0 and Gw > 0, we have
Πr > Xr and Xw > Πw. (A.16)
Therefore, the slopes of the two loci satisfy |SX | < |SΠ|. A direct implication is the
single-crossing property of the two loci: If the two curves ever cross they cross only
once.20 This establishes the uniqueness of the stationary equilibrium. Furthermore, the
properties of the iso-curves indicate the direction for approaching the equilibrium from
any off-equilibrium point.
19We thank Josef Falkinger for pointing out to us the basis of this section.
20The fact that the two curves cross (i.e., the existence of the equilibrium) is guaranteed in the numerical
practice: In the region we search for the equilibrium, there always exist combinations of (r,w) on the zero-
profit locus, s.t. X(r, w) > 0, and combinations, s.t. X(r, w) < 0. Since the zero-excess-capital-demand
locus must lie between the loci that pass through the above mentioned two types of combinations, the
zero-profit locus and the zero-excess-capital-demand locus cross.
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w
r
Π = 0
X = 0
b Eq.
b C, X(r
∗
0, w0) < 0r∗0
b A, Π(r0, w0) > 0r0
w0
Figure A.2: Iso-profit and iso-excess demand curves
Notes: Note that we do not know the curvature of the two curves. Below the two solid lines profit and
excess demand are positive and above they are negative.
Figure A.2 illustrates of iso-profit and iso-excess demand curves and gives an intuition
of the algorithm to find the equilibrium, Eq.. Suppose that at an initial guess (r0, w0)
(e.g., point A) the value of the iso-profit is Π(r0, w0) > 0 . First, we approach the Π = 0
locus by changing r to r∗0, s.t.(r
∗
0, w0) is on the locus (Step 4 and 5 in Algorithm A.3.4).
21
Then at (r∗0, w0) the excess capital demand X(r
∗
0, w0) can be positive, negative or 0. In
the last case we have found the equilibrium Eq. directly. Now suppose X(r∗0, w0) < 0
(e.g., point C). Equation (A.14) and (A.16) suggest that the stationary equilibrium lies
south-east of C.22 Therefore, we shift (r, w) - r ↓, w ↑ - along the locus of the iso-profit
curve Π = 0 until the excess demand increases to 0 (C →Eq.).23
21Since zero is unachievable numerically, we use |Π(r∗0 , w0)| < ǫP as a criterion for approximation. This
applies for the the excess capital demand X(r, w) as well. In addition, due to the unknown functional
form of Π, it is impossible to calculate the exact increase in r0 ex ante (i.e., r
∗
0 − r0). This means that
there may be back and forth in the adjustment of r. To guarantee that the target r∗0 is found in finite
iterations, we record the upper and the lower bound of region where r∗0 lies in each iteration, and use
binary search as is described in Step 5 and 8 in Algorithm A.3.4.
22This also means that w0 < wEq. Therefore, w0 is one lower bound of the equilibrium wage. We will
update the lower bound if a new w′, s.t. w0 < w
′ < wEq is found. The arguments apply for the upper
bound as well.
23Similar to the situation described in footnote 21 it is not possible to find the correct adjustment in
(r, w) in one step. Several iterations may be needed and we apply similar technique (i.e., recording upper
and lower bounds and updating w in each iteration with binary search) to guarantee that the equilibrium
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A.5 Intuition for convergence to stationary equity
level
From the characteristics of the optimal contract (Figure 1.4), we notice that at low levels of
promised values V E expected repayments, πlml(V
E)+(1−πl)mh(V
E), from entrepreneurs
to banks exceed the level of bank loans b(V E) and that the opposite holds at high levels
of promised values (see Figure A.3). Intuitively, this means that banks receive a positive
net cash flow from entrepreneurs with low promised values.
This positive net flow accrues to banks’ equity. This is supplied as capital on the
capital market and generates returns, which lead to a further accumulation of equity. In
contrast, banks expect a negative net cash flow from firms with high promised values,
which detracts banks’ equity.
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Bank loans
Expected repayments
V E
Figure A.3: Bank loans, b(V E), and expected repayments, πlml(V
E) + (1− πl)mh(V
E)
With this in mind, we can now intuitively describe the process of development of banks’
equity level from the very beginning of time with no population to the stationary equity
level E:24 Suppose the banks are endowed with E0 at the beginning of time when there
is no population in the economy, yet. As population starts, there is a new-born cohort of
entrepreneurs (and workers) with promised values V W (0; r, w) = V E0 . Entrepreneurs sign
contracts with banks, which entitle them to banks loans and which ask for repayments. At
the beginning of their lives, when entrepreneurs are at low levels of promised values they
must give positive net cash flows to banks. Hence, banks start accumulating equity. With
age, the average promised value of entrepreneurs increases (see firm dynamics in Figure
1.7 and 1.8) and reaches eventually levels where banks loans are larger than expected
repayments. This reduces banks’ equity. In addition, as the economy evolves, there are
is found in finite iterations. In addition, as we change (r, w) in each iteration, we need to make sure that
the change is along the locus of the iso-profit curve Π = 0. Otherwise, we need to apply the first step
again.
24Assume for simplicity that during the process of development interest rate and wage are fixed at
some level (e.g., the equilibrium level (r, w)).
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more overlapping cohorts – with younger cohort making positive and older cohorts making
negative net cash flows to banks. In aggregation there is an accumulation of total bank’s
equity. Finally, in the stationary equilibrium the accumulation of banks’ equity come to a
halt so that the equity level stays constant. This means, in equilibrium negative aggregate
net payments from entrepreneurs are exactly covered by the interest generated on banks’
equity.
A.6 Figures
A.6.1 Illustration of productivity shock
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Figure A.4: Life path I
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Figure A.5: Life path II
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Figure A.6: Life path III
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A.6.2 Development of entrepreneurs’ bank loans and repayment
-20 -10 0 10 20 30
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 ×10
5
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4 ×10
5
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5 ×10
5
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12 ×10
4
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4 ×10
4
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
-20 -10 0 10 20 30
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
N
r.
o
f
e
n
tr
e
p
re
n
e
u
rs
N
r.
o
f
e
n
tr
e
p
re
n
e
u
rs
bbbb
bbbb
τ=1 τ=2 τ=4 τ=8
τ=16 τ=32 τ=64 τ=209
Figure A.7: Development of entrepreneurs’ bank loans
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Figure A.8: Development of entrepreneurs’ repayments to banks
Notes: Most of the subplots exhibit two distinct levels of repayments. This reflects the fact that within
one cohorts firms may have high or low productivity realizations.
A.6.3 Production volatility
The quantitative results are summarized in Figure A.9.25
Subplot 1 shows the development of bank loans over lifetime under different levels
of volatility, σ ∈ {0.15, 0.25, 0.375, 0.5}. As is discussed in Section 1.5.1.1, there exist
simultaneously a volatility effect and an equilibrium price effect that changes the optimal
25We use again 5-year moving average after the same argument as in footnote 23.
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Figure A.9: Comparative statics of σ on firm dynamics
contract, and a distribution effect that changes the distribution of firms’ promised values
in the economy. Volatility effect decreases availability of credit in the economy, the firm
sizes are smaller on average as production volatility increases (i.e., the curve tends to
shift downwards). Similarly, distribution effect also has a negative impact on firms credit.
However, the larger the volatility, the stronger the equilibrium price effect, which leads to
an expansion of credit for all firms (i.e., the curve tends to shift upwards). Therefore, as
volatility goes beyond the threshold (approximately σ¯ = 0.0375), the average bank loan
increases (as can be seen by the fact that the curve with σ = 0.5 lies above the one with
σ = 0.375). In addition, the volatility effect influences the credit availability of young
firms more severely, which can be seen from the steeper slope as σ increases.
Subplots 2 and 3 show the average growth rate of firms and the variance of growth,
respectively. At all ages the two values increase as production becomes more volatile.
There are two effective channels: First, the efficient firm size defined in equation (1.35)
is larger as σ increases. Since the optimal bank loan starts from b = 0 at V E = Vmin
and approaches the efficient level as V E grows, the range of the bank loans is larger in
more volatile economy. Second, the distribution of promised values is more dispersed as
volatility increases, so is the distribution of bank loans. Therefore, the combination of two
mutually amplifying channels leads to an increase of the growth rate and of the variance
of growth.
A.6.4 Reserve ratio
Subplot 1 shows the development of bank loans over lifetime under different reserve ratios,
µ. The equilibrium price effect and a lower initial promised values under high reserve ratios
decrease the credit availability of young firms in the economy. However, average promised
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Figure A.10: Comparative statics of σ on firm dynamics
values increase as firms get older in an economy with higher reserve ratio. As a result,
the size of old firms increases. The combination of the two gives the counter-clockwise
shift of the average firm size as the reserve ratios increase.
Subplots 2 and 3 show that the average growth rate of firms and the variance of
growth, respectively. As reserve ratios increase, both values decrease. This is mainly
because the range of bank loans is smaller under a large reserve ratio: For a given change
in the promised values, the change in the level of bank loans is lower. Therefore, the
growth rate and variance of growth are smaller.
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B.1 Proofs
B.1.1 Portfolio Choice
Agent index l is skipped in the appendix. If financial intermediaries take ex-ante a fee in
the form T = pz1d+ pz2(s− d), the expected utility maximization problem is given by:
max
s,{fθ}θ∈Θ,d
EU = log(e0 − e¯0) + δ

µ∑
θ∈Θ
πθ log(eθ − e¯1) + (1− µ) log(eΘ¯ − e¯1)


s.t.
e0 + (1 + pz2)s+ (pz1 − pz2)d = y, (B.1)
eθ =


Rθfθ + rd, if θ ∈ Θ
rd, otherwise
(B.2)
s =
∑
θ∈Θ
fθ + d. (B.3)
Denoting by λ the Lagrange multiplier for constraint (B.3) the first-order conditions
of the households’ expected utility maximization problem give:
∂L
∂s
= −
1 + pz2
e0 − e¯0
+ λ = 0, (B.4)
∂L
∂fθ
= δµπθ
Rθ
eθ − e¯1
− λ = 0, (B.5)
∂L
∂d
= −
pz1 − pz2
e0 − e¯0
+ δ

µ∑
θ∈Θ
πθ
r
eθ − e¯1
+ (1− µ)
r
rd− e¯1

− λ = 0, (B.6)
∂L
∂λ
= s−
∑
θ∈Θ
fθ − d = 0. (B.7)
Using (B.4), (B.5) and (B.6), we have
d =
δ(1− µ)
λ
(
1+pz1
1+pz2
− r/R
) + e¯1
r
. (B.8)
147
148 Appendix: Chapter 2
where R = πθRθ. From (B.2), (B.5) and (B.7), we have
s =
δµ
λ
+ (1− r/R)d+
1
R
e¯1. (B.9)
In the end we have
d =
δ(1− µ)
(1 + δ)P
(y − e¯0) +
(1 + µδ)(1 + pz1)− (1 + δ)(1 + pz2)r/R
r(1 + δ)P
e¯1
=
1− µ
1− pρ
δ
1 + δ
y − y¯
1 + pz1
+
e¯1
r
, (B.10)
where P ≡ (1 + pz1)(1− pρ), p ≡
1+pz2
1+pz1
, ρ ≡ r
R
and y¯ ≡ e¯0 +
e¯1(1+pz1 )
r
.
Combining (B.10) with (B.8) and solving for λ, we obtain
1
λ
=
y − y¯
(1 + δ)(1 + pz2)
(*)
Using this and (B.10) in (B.9), we have
s =
δ
(1 + δ)
y − y¯
1 + pz2
[
µ+ (1− ρ)
p(1− µ)
1− pρ
]
+ (1− ρ)
e¯1
r
+
e¯1
R
=
δ
1 + δ
y − y¯
1 + pz2
µ− pρ+ p(1− µ)
1− pρ
+
e¯1
r
,
which can be rewritten in the form
s =
δ
1 + δ
y − y¯
1 + pz2
[
1 +
(pz2 − pz1)(1− µ)
(1 + pz1)(1− pρ)
]
+
e¯1
r
, (B.11)
where p− 1 =
pz2−pz1
1+pz1
has been used.
Finally, (B.7), (B.10) and (B.11) give us
f ≡
∑
θ∈Θ
fθ =
µ− pρ
1− pρ
δ
1 + δ
y − y¯
1 + pz2
(B.12)
and from (B.1) we conclude
y − e0 = (1 + pz1)d+ (1 + pz2)f
=
δ
1 + δ
(y − y¯) +
(1 + pz1)e¯1
r
.
(B.13)
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For the allocation of f on fθ, θ ∈ Θ, we combine (B.2) with (B.5) to get
fθ = πθ
[
δµ
λ
+
e¯1 − rd
R
]
= πθ
δ
1 + δ
y − y¯
1 + pz2
[
µ− ρ
1− µ
1− pρ
p
]
= πθf,
where (B.10) and (*) have been used for the second equation.
B.1.2 Corner solutions for securities demand
To account for the non-negativity constraint fθ ≥ 0 we have to add
∑
θ∈Θ ψθfθ to the
Lagrange function for max EU – with ψθ ≥ 0 denoting the Lagrange multiplier for fθ ≥ 0.
Then, the first order condition for fθ changes to
δµπθ
Rθ
eθ − e¯1
− λ+ ψθ = 0 (B.14)
with ψθfθ ≤ 0.
Suppose that fθ = 0 for all θ. Then s = d and
e0 − e¯0 = y − e¯0 − (1 + pz1)d
eθ − e¯1 = rd− e¯1
(B.15)
and the first-order conditions
(s) λ =
1 + pz2
e0 − e¯0
(d) δ

µ∑
θ∈S
πθ
r
eθ − e¯1
+ (1− µ)
r
rd− e¯1

 = λ+ pz1 − pz2
e0 − e¯0
(B.16)
reduce to
δ
r
rd− e¯1
=
1 + pz1
e0 − e¯0
.
With (B.15) this solves to
d =
1
1 + δ
[
δ(y − e¯0)
1 + pz1
+
e¯1
r
]
. (B.17)
150 Appendix: Chapter 2
Substituting the solution into (B.15) gives us
e0 − e¯0 =
1
1 + δ
[
y − e¯0 −
(1 + pz1)e¯1
r
]
eθ − e¯1 =
δr
(1 + δ)
[
y − e¯0
1 + pz1
−
e¯1
r
]
.
(B.18)
Using this in (B.14) we obtain: ψθ ≥ 0 if and only if
µπθRθ ≤
1 + pz2
1 + pz1
r (B.19)
where λ =
1+pz2
e0−e¯0
has been used from (B.16).
Since πθRθ = R, (B.19) reduces to
1 + pz1
1 + pz2
µR ≤ r,
which is equivalent to Rµ(1 + pz1) ≤ (1 + pz2)r.
Hence non-negativity fθ > 0, θ ∈ Θ, requires
Rµ(1 + pz1) > (1 + pz2)r. (B.20)
B.1.3 Further proofs
Proof of Fact 2.2. With (2.11) and (2.12) the condition yL = bLwL > y¯ = e¯0 +
(1+pz)e¯1
r
takes the form
AxΓxω
−αx
[
bL −
e¯1
rAz1Γz1
ωαz1
]
> e¯0 +
e¯1
r
.
The left side of the equation declines in ω. Thus yL > y¯ requires
ω < ω+L

Ax
+
, Az1
+
, bL
+
, e¯0
−
,
e¯1
r
−

 ,
where ω+L is determined by the equation:
bL = (e¯0 +
e¯1
r
)
ωαx
AxΓx
+
e¯1
r
ωαz1
Az1Γz1
.
Proof of Lemma 2.1. a) Let B1 ≡ AxΓx
bLL¯
N
and B2 ≡
AxΓx
AzΓz
. Using (2.21) and (2.12), we
B Appendix 151
have
w¯ = B1ω
−αx(1 + ωk), pz = B2ω
αz−αx .
Then η¯ can be reformulated as
η¯ =
w¯ − y¯
1 + pz
=
B1ω
−αx(1 + ωk)− e¯0
1 +B2ωαz−αx
−
e¯1
r
,
where (2.14) is used to substitute y¯.
To get the shape of η¯, first notice that
sign
∂η¯(ω)
∂ω
= sign
∂G(ω)
∂ω
,
where G(ω) ≡ B1(1+ωk)−e¯0ω
αx
ωαx+B2ωαz
. Differentiating G(ω) we have
∂G(ω)
∂ω
=
L(ω)
(ωαx +B2ωαz)
2 ,
where
L(ω) =B1ω
αx
[
k(1− αx)−
αx
ω
]
+B1B2ω
αz
[
k(1− αz)−
αz
ω
]
+ e¯0B2(αz − αx)ω
αx+αz−1.
We have ∂G(ω)
∂ω
> 0 if and only if L(ω) > 0. For αx + αz > 1, L(ω) is an increasing
function in ω. Moreover,
lim
ω→0+
L = −∞, lim
ω→+∞
L = +∞.
Therefore, there exists a unique ω with L(ω) = 0 and: ∂η¯(ω)
∂ω
R 0 if and only if ω R ω. A
rise in k or e¯0 shifts L(ω) upward so that ω declines. The impacts of B1, B2 (and thus
of Ax, Az,
bLL¯
N
) on ω are ambiguous because κx < k < κz imply k(1− αx)−
αx
ω
> 0 and
k(1− αz)−
αz
ω
< 0.
b) We have
η¯ =
AxΓx
bLL¯
N
ω−αx(1 + ωk)− e¯0
1 + AxΓx
AzΓz
ωαz−αx
−
e¯1
r
.
By eye inspection we get:
η¯

ω
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ax+ , Az+ , k+,
bLL¯
N
+
, e¯0
−
,
e¯1
r
−


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Proof of Fact 2.5. According to (2.32), ZS = AzbLL¯
γαzz
γz−γx
ω−αz(kω − γx), where κj =
γj
ω
has been used from (2.9).
We have ∂ω
−αz (kω−γx)
∂ω
= ω−αz
[
(1− αz)k +
αzγx
ω
]
. This term is positive and decreasing
in ω.
B.2 Extensions
Five extensions are considered: Fixed costs in the financial sector, rents in the financial
sector, distorted portfolio choices of households, participation constraints in finance sub-
sector Z2 and set-up capital for firms. Like the equilibrium analysis in the benchmark,
the extended analysis is based on Assumption 2.2. Moreover, for avoiding too many case
distinctions, dominance of e¯0 over e¯1 is assumed in this section.
B.2.1 Fixed costs in the financial sector
Suppose that financial services are provided by banks. A bank b, serving Nb clients, needs
Kb = fBNb units of goods to set up the capacity to serve them. We assume that the fixed
cost Kb is financed by a lump-sum fee
τ = fB
imposed on the clients. That is, bank size and number of banks affect neither aggregate
fixed costs
KB = fBN
nor the households’ budget constraint. In the latter, yl reduces to yl − τ so that the
supernumerary budget becomes yl − y¯+, with y¯+ = y¯ + τ = e¯0 + fB + (1 + pz1)e¯1/r.
Hence, fixed cost fB has the same comparative-static effects on household choices as an
increase in subsistence expenditure e¯0. For the X-market this means, on the one hand, the
absorption of X by households’ consumption and investment is reduced by KB = fBN .
On the other hand, KB is spent by banks to set up the capacity to serve their clients. In
sum, we have
E0 − fBN +D + F +KB = X
for the goods market clearing, which reduces to the condition in the benchmark model:
E0 +D + F = X
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since fBN = KB. Hence, goods markets are cleared whenever the Z-markets are cleared.
In the markets for financial services, demand is reduced by the fact that w¯− y¯+ rather
than w¯−y¯ is now the relevant supernumerary income. The supply side remains unaffected.
In equilibrium, the implications of fixed costs can be derived by looking in the benchmark
model at the effect of a rise of e¯0 to e¯0 + fB.
Proposition B.1. A decline in fixed costs fB has the following effects:
a) The skill premium rises.
b) The between sectoral structure shifts from X to Z.
c) The within sectoral structure shifts from Z1 to Z2 at high levels of the skill premium
(ω∗ > ω). At low levels of the skill premium (ω∗ < ω) the effect is ambiguous.
Proof. Comparative-static results for e¯0 in Proposition 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6.
B.2.2 Rents in the financial sector
Suppose that a club of agents in the finance sector has the power to extract rents from
financial service provision.1 One may think of rentiers who have unearned property rights
or an elite subgroup of employees in the financial sector. We make two crucial assumptions:
First, whoever are the rent extracting agents, they spend the rent like other agents. Thus,
the redistribution of rents has no income effect on aggregate demand. (Total subsistence
requirements and aggregate supernumerary income remain unchanged). Second, nobody
can enter the club from outside so that the rent does not affect labor allocation.
In the presented model, two instruments can be used to extract rents. First, a fixed
fee τ˜ as in extension B.2.1, but:
τ˜ > fB.
Aggregate rents (τ˜ − fB)N are lump-sum redistributed. Everybody pays τ˜ and an elite
N0 receives the rent. Thus, average supernumerary income becomes
w¯ − y¯ − τ˜ +
N0
N
(τ˜ − fB)N
N0
= w¯ − y¯ − fB.
In this case, the rent has no effects on aggregate income, expenditure structure, labor
allocation, relative prices or the skill premium. Nevertheless, there is lump-sum redistri-
bution of income from the real to the financial sector and within the financial sector. This
1As pointed out in the introduction, there is robust evidence that indeed a substantial finance premium
exists. This paper deals with the consequences of rents, not with possible explanations why they exist.
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redistribution implies for the sectoral income shares:
pzZ + (τ˜ − fB)N
X
and
pzF + ν(τ˜ − fB)N
pzD + (1− ν)(τ˜ − fB)N
,
respectively, where ν is the share of the elite rent going to new finance. It is obvious that
a rising finance rent increases the total finance share in the economy. For a given rent
distribution ν, a rise in τ˜ raises the income share of new finance relative to traditional
finance as long as νD > (1−ν)F , that is as long as the new finance share is not too large.
A rise in ν trivially leads to a rise in the new finance share.
A second instrument of rent extraction would be to charge a markup on unit cost
prices in the financial sector so that households have to pay p˜zi = pzi(1 + oi) for financial
services.
Using (2.12), we have
p˜zi = (1 + oi)
Ax
Azi
Γx
Γzi
ωαzi−αx .
In the benchmark case with pz1 = pz2 a rent o1 = o2 = o decreases D1 in (2.36) to
AxΓx(1+ωk)
ωαx+
(1+o)AxΓx
AzΓz
ωαz
and decreases D0 in (2.37) to
1
1+δ
[
δe¯0
1+(1+o)AxΓx
AzΓz
ωαz−αx
− e¯1
r
]
. Hence, o has
an ambiguous impact on ZD − ZS and thus on ω
∗.
Proposition B.2. Rents in the financial sector have the following effects:
a) If rents are extracted by lump sum fees, they have no allocative equilibrium effects.
Yet, there is a redistributive effect that raises the finance share in total income. The
structure of the subsector shares within finance depends on how the earned rents are
distributed on traditional and new finance, respectively.
b) If rents are extracted by a markup on financial service prices, there is a redistributive
effect towards (and within) the financial sector. Yet, the mark ups affect all equilibrium
values in a generally ambiguous way.
Proof. Main text.
B.2.3 Distorted portfolio choice
Several empirical studies have pointed out that people get confused in dealing with com-
plex financial markets (see Célérier and Vallée (2014) and the literature discussed there).
In our model, the complex part that households have to solve is the choice of the portfolio
of the securities. The choice may be based on a wrong assessment of relative risks and
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returns of different securities. In this case, we have distortion within Z2 and consumption
levels planned for the future may be deceived by actual payoffs.2 As our study focuses
on structural change between X and Z as well as between Z1 and Z2, we do not consider
such distortions here. Rather we focus on distortions coming from misperception of the
opportunities to save by securities investment rather than in deposits.
In particular, people may have wrong beliefs µ˜ about the measure of future environ-
ments covered by state-contingent securities, relative to the non-covered part of possible
future events. They may also misjudge the relative payoff of deposits compared to the
payoffs of securities and base their decisions on a distorted ρ˜. Such distortions affect the
propensities to save in deposits and in securities. For instance, if agents are euphoric
about investments in securities and believe that µ˜ > µ or ρ˜ < ρ, then sf rises while sd
declines. The total propensity to save, however, does not change in the benchmark model
with pz1 = pz2 .
3 Therefore, the only consequence of µ˜ > µ or ρ˜ < ρ is sectoral change
within the financial sector. According to (2.27), Φ rises.
Proposition B.3. Euphoric beliefs about measure or performance of state-contingent
financial instruments lead to within sectoral change from Z1 to Z2. Equilibrium skill
premium and (X,Z)-structure are not affected in the benchmark model (with identical
technologies in Z1 and Z2).
Proof. Equation (2.27).
B.2.4 Participation constraints
Suppose that a fixed fee τ is charged only to agents who invest in securities. Moreover,
assume that there is a participation constraint:
yL > y¯ > yL − τ,
yH > yH − τ > y¯.
Then low-skilled agents do not participate in the securities market, while high-skilled
agents do. According to equation (B.17) in Appendix B.1.2, we have for l = L:
sL = dL =
δ
1 + δ
yL − y¯
1 + pz
+
e¯1
r
.
For l = H, saving behavior is given by (2.16) and (2.17) with y¯+ = y¯ + τ .
2Falkinger (2014) focuses on such distortions in a one sector economy.
3For pz1 6= pz2 , however, we would have sd +
sf
p for the marginal propensity to save. Thus, µ and ρ
impact also on ZD and therefore on ω and all other equilibrium outcomes. See Section B.3 for a more
detailed discussion.
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This gives us the following aggregate saving levels:
D =
δ
1 + δ
1
1 + pz
[
(yL − y¯)L¯+ sd(y
H − y¯+)H¯
]
+
e¯1
r
N
F = sf
δ
1 + δ
H¯
1 + pz
(yH − y¯+)
S =

 δ
1 + δ
w¯ − y¯ − τ H¯
N
1 + pz
+
e¯1
r

N.
Comparing S with ZD in (2.31), we see that fee τ , combined with the participation
constraint, impacts on ZD and thus on the skill premium and the (X,Z)-structure like
an increase of e¯0 to
e˜0 = e¯0 + τ
H¯
N
.
Moreover, F
D
=
sf H¯
(yL−y¯)L¯
yH−y¯+
+sdH¯+
1+δ
δ
(1+pz)e¯1
r
N
yH−y¯+
is declining in τ . Thus, the participation
constraint does not change the comparative static effects of fixed cost τ described in
Proposition B.1.
The above conclusion is only valid if τF is absorbed by real fixed cost requirements
as discussed in Section B.2.1. If τF is a rent which is redistributed back to high-skilled
agents, we have (yH − y¯ − τ)H¯ + τH¯ = yH − y¯ instead of yH − y¯+ so that
D =
δ
1 + δ
w¯ − y¯
1 + pz
N (1− sfβH) +
e¯1
r
N
F = sf
δ
1 + δ
H¯
1 + pz
(yH − y¯)
S =
(
δ
1 + δ
w¯ − y¯
1 + pz
+
e¯1
r
)
N
with βH ≡
yH−y¯
w¯−y¯
H¯
N
denoting the income share of high-skilled agents. For the high-skilled
nothing changes, but the low-skilled are only saving through D. This means that, com-
pared to the benchmark, we have an increase in D and a decrease in F . ZD = S coincides
with the expression in (2.31) so that equilibrium skill premium and (X,Z)-structure are
not changed compared to the baseline.4
For the within sectoral structure in the Z-sector, we have in the benchmark case with
4For pz1 6= pz2 , however, the change in Z
D
2 would also affect ω and all other equilibrium outcomes.
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pz1 = pz2 = pz:
F
D
=
sfβH
1− sfβH +
1+δ
δ
1+pz
w¯−y¯
e¯1
r
=
sfβH η¯
sdη¯ + sf (1− βH)η¯ +
1+δ
δ
e¯1
r
≡ Φ˜
Comparing this with (2.27), we conclude that Φ˜ < Φ because sf (1 − βH) > 0. Yet,
the proportion of total expenditure on new finance relative to expenditure on traditional
finance pzF+τH¯
pzD
= F
D
+ τH¯
pzD
is ambiguous. Rent τ increases the new finance share, but the
participation constraint induces a shift of the portfolio towards safe assets.
B.2.5 Set-up capital for firms
In the baseline model invested capital is transformed by linear technologies, using capital
as the only input, into future outcome. The extension in this section shows that the
baseline can be seen as kind of reduced form of a richer model, in which capital is needed
to set up firms. We assume now that firms in the X-sector use capital to set up technology
Gx, which then produces output by employing low-skilled and high-skilled labor. Each
established firm ν ∈ {1, ...,M} produces a variety xν = G
x(Lxν , Hxν ) under monopolistic
competition with free entry. Consumers spend the supernumerary income et−e¯t according
to a CES-utility function with substitution elasticity σ > 1 symmetrically over the variants
xν in the X-sector, which implies an instantaneous indirect utility function of the form
log(et − e¯t) (see Section B.2.5.1) like before. So saving decision and portfolio choice
remain the same as in the baseline model. Firms have positive operating profits which
are distributed as payoff to the investors (see Section B.2.5.2).
B.2.5.1 Consumer problem
Let the instantaneous utility of households be given by u =
[∑M
ν=1 x
σ−1
σ
ν
] σ
σ−1
, σ > 1. Then,
prices are determined by a constant markup on unit cost of production
pν =
σ
σ − 1
c(wH , wL), (B.21)
where c(wH , wL) are the unit costs (as in Section 2.3) and wH , wL are factor prices.
Moreover, demand for variety xν of a household that spends “supernumerary budget”
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e− e¯ is
xν = (e− e¯)
p−σν
P 1−σ
, P ≡
[
M∑
ν=1
p1−σν
] 1
1−σ
.
Since product variants use identical production technologies, their unit cost and prices
are identical, too. Thus, xν reduces to x =
e−e¯
pνM
. Using this in u, we obtain for the
instantaneous indirect utility u = e−e¯
P
. We set the price as numéraire (i.e., pν = 1) so
that the variety effect is P = M
1
1−σ . Due to the log specification, this variety effect,
though affecting the level of utility, does not matter for the intertemporal decision.5
Thus, maxElog(u) = maxElog(et − e¯t), which is identical to the intertemporal problem
in Section 2.3.2.
B.2.5.2 Firm entry and production in the X-sector
There are two types of set-up technologies, which induce capital demand of firms: A robust
set-up technology which requires c0 units of capital. Firms set up by the robust technology
will be producing tomorrow under any condition (i.e., in Θ and Θ¯). Furthermore, there
are risky set-up technologies with set-up input cθ, which are only effective if state θ ∈ Θ
occurs. Otherwise, their set-up fails. In an analogous way to (2.1), we assume
cθ = πθc1, where c1 < c0. (B.22)
The assumption states that set-up capital required for a robust technology is larger than
the capital required for risky technologies. Moreover, the smaller the measure πθ of
the state under which a set-up technology works, the lower the required set-up capital.6
Robust set-up technologies are financed by loans, whereas the risky set-up techniques are
financed by state-contingent securities.
LetK0 be the aggregate set-up capital for robust technologies and denote byKθ, θ ∈ Θ,
the aggregate set-up capital for specialized risky technologies. Then the number of firms
which can be set up is M0 =
K0
c0
and Mθ =
Kθ
cθ
, respectively. In a closed economy, capital
markets are cleared if
K0 = D, Kθ = Fθ = πθF.
5Note that log e−e¯P = log(e− e¯)− logP so that the P -levels add to EU a constant.
6See Falkinger (2014) for a more detailed discussion of the relationship between specialization and risk.
There, technologies are more productive the more narrowly they are targeted to a specific environment.
At the same time, they are more risky because the realization of the specific environment is less likely.
Here this idea is applied to set-up costs rather than productivity.
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Hence, we have for to total number of firms
M =


D
c0
+ F
c1
≡MΘ, if θ ∈ Θ,
D
c0
≡MΘ¯ otherwise.
After firms being set up, their operating profits earned under mark-up prices (B.21)
are
Π = (px − c)X =
X
σ
,
where px = 1, which implies c =
σ−1
σ
, has been used. Since firms are symmetric, aggre-
gated operating profits are distributed uniformly across firms so that operating profit per
firm is:
Πm
Mm
=
X
σMm
, m ∈ {Θ, Θ¯}.
The returns on one unit of set up capital are therefore
rm =
X
c0σMm
, m ∈ {Θ, Θ¯}
Rθ =
X
cθσMΘ
, R =
X
c1σMΘ
for safe and risky investments, respectively. (πθRθ reduces to R because of assumption
cθ = πθc1.) Since the number of firms is different in Θ and Θ¯, aggregate operating profits
have to be shared among more or less firms so that the return on robust investments
is m-dependent. The relative rate of return, rΘ
Rθ
, however, is uniquely determined by
the relative set-up requirements of specialized risky technologies compared to the robust
technology. We have ρ = c1
c0
.
For the portfolio choice derived in Section 2.5 almost only the relative rate ρ matters.
The exception is e¯1
rm
, since future subsistence can only be financed by deposits.7 This
means, we have to restrict the analysis of the paper to e¯1 = 0, or we reconcile the
fluctuation of the earnings of robust firms with a safe return on deposits by assuming
that firms hold buffers and distribute the expected profit per firm π¯ ≡ [ µ
MΘ
+ 1−µ
MΘ¯
]X
σ
to
the investors.
For the general equilibrium analysis, a further caveat is in order. Under the presented
extension, return r (even if smoothed by the buffer) is endogenous. It depends on M
7Formally the derivation of the portfolio choice presented in the appendix has to be adapted to account
for m-dependent pay-offs in the budget constraints. For e¯1 = 0, return rΘ¯ becomes irrelevant under the
logarithm specification and the analysis remains valid – with ρ = rΘRΘ .
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and X, which are determined by saving behavior and resource allocation, respectively.
Thus, in the general equilibrium, a further feedback loop is to be considered. We did not
account for such feedbacks in Section 2.7, since in the baseline return r is exogenously
given by the constant productivity of capital. For e¯1 = 0, however, the presented analysis
remains fully valid also with set-up capital of firms, since r matters only through the term
e¯1
r
. However, what one loses by setting e¯1 = 0 is the income effect on structural change
within the financial sector. For the income effect on the skill premium and the structural
change between goods and financial sector subsistence level e¯0 > 0 is relevant, which poses
no problem in the extension considered here.
B.3 Robustness
To account for relative price effects within the financial sector, we skip now Assumption
2.2 and impose the following restriction instead.
Assumption 1.2’. αx = αz1 < αz2.
Then, according to (2.12),
pz1 =
Ax
Az1
and thus: y¯ = e¯0 +
(1+ Ax
Az1
)e¯1
r
.
Moreover, the terms alxX + a
l
z1
Z1, l ∈ {H,L}, in system (2.13) reduce to
X+
1
Axκαxx
and X+
κ(1−αx)x
Ax
, X+ ≡ X +
Ax
Az1
Z1,
respectively. Using this when solving (2.13), we obtain
X+ =
bLL¯
aLx
κz2 − k
κz2 − κx
, Z2 =
bLL¯
aLz2
k − κx
κz2 − κx
(B.23)
and
pz2Z2
X+
=
pz2(ω)a
L
x (ω)
aLz2(ω)
k − κx(ω)
κz2(ω)− k
≡ Ψ˜(ω
+
, k
+
) (B.24)
where the signs for the partial derivatives of Ψ˜ follow from κz2 > k > κx, the Rybczynski
analysis and the fact that pz2 rises in ω.
Substituting Az2κ
αz2
z2 for
1
aLz2
in the second equation of (B.23) and using (2.9), we have
for the Z2-supply:
ZS2 = Az2bLL¯
γ
αz2
z2
γz2 − γx
g(ω
+
, k
+
), g(ω, k) ≡ ω−αz2 (kω − γx). (B.25)
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This coincides with (2.34) – with Z2 instead of Z – so that Fact 2.5 remains valid under
the alternative specification and applies to Z2-supply.
Z2-demand is given by
ZD2 = F = sf
δ
1 + δ
w¯ − y¯
1 + pz2
N =
µ− ρp
1− ρp
δ
1 + δ
η˜N (B.26)
with η˜ ≡ w¯−y¯
1+pz2
and p =
1+pz2
1+pz1
. In an analogous way to Lemma 2.1 and Fact 2.6, one
establishes that the income effect (i.e., η˜-part in ZD2 ) has an U-shaped form.
8 Further,
sf is decreasing in ω since
∂p
∂ω
> 0 (according to (2.12)). Because of the relative price
effect p, which now is at work within the finance sector, the demand for risky assets is
substituted by demand for safe assets if the relative price of services for securities rises.
For low values of the skill premium, we are on the downward sloping branch of the η˜-curve
so that income and substitution effect go in the same direction. In the upward sloping
part of η˜, the negative substitution effect is opposed by a positive income effect so that the
total effect of ω on ZD2 depends on the relative importance of the two effects. Numerical
simulation shows that the substitution effect is large if the price pz2 is high and the income
effect is stronger if subsistence expenditures are larger. For a high level of price pz2 (based
on (2.12) this means, for example, a low Az2) and low subsistence levels (such that y¯ is
close to zero) the substitution effect dominates. In this case
∂ZD2
∂ω
< 0. However, for low
levels of price pz2 and large subsistence levels the income effect dominates. For this case,
(B.25) and (B.26) give us the same picture as in Figure 2.4. Proposition 2.3 remains valid
in both cases.
For Proposition 2.4, we have to write the excess demand function ZD2 − Z
S
2 explicitly
in terms of parameters. Using W = bLL¯AxΓxω
−αx(1 + ωk) and pz2 =
AxΓx
Az2Γz2
ωαz2−αx in
(B.26), we can rewrite the equilibrium condition ZD2 − Z
S
2 = 0 in the form:
µ− ρ
1+ AxΓx
Az2Γz2
ωαz2−αx
1+pz1
1− ρ
1+ AxΓx
Az2Γz2
ωαz2−αx
1+pz1
δ
1 + δ
Γxω
−αx(1 + ωk)− N
bLL¯Ax
y¯
1 + AxΓx
Az2Γz2
ωαz2−αx
−
Az2
Ax
γ
αz2
z2
γz2 − γx
ω−αz2 (kω − γx)
≡ D

ω
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Az2
Ax
?
, k
?
,
AxbLL¯
N
+
, y¯
−
, µ
+
, ρ
−
, δ
+

 = 0.
Hence, an increase of AxbLL¯
N
always leads to a rise in the equilibrium skill premium.
Under Assumption 2.2, this was only the case if present subsistence expenditure dominates
8The only thing that changes is that now we have y¯1+pz2
with y¯ constant instead of y¯1+pz1
= e¯01+pz1
− e¯1r .
Thus, apart from subscript z2 instead of z(= z1 = z2) in the modified proof we have y¯ instead of e¯0 and
no negative term − e¯1r .
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futures subsistence requirements (Proposition 2.4). Moreover, a decline in subsistence
requirements y¯ has unambiguously a positive impact on the equilibrium skill premium -
regardless of whether the decline in y¯ is caused by a decline in e¯0 or e¯1.
In contrast to the benchmark analysis, the equilibrium skill premium is now also
affected by changes in µ and ρ. Finally, a rise in δ has now an unambiguously positive
effect on ω∗. (In the benchmark analysis the role of δ was ambiguous.) The following
proposition summarizes the comparative-static effects on the equilibrium skill premium
under Assumption 2’.
Proposition 1.5’. If Assumption 2.2 is replaced by Assumption 2’, then:
a) For y¯ > 0, a rise in AxbLL¯
N
(caused by uniform technical progress or education and
biased progress) raises the equilibrium skill premium. A decline of total subsistence
requirements y¯ (wherever they come from) have the same effect.
b) Financial innovations (a rise in µ) or increased attractiveness of risky investments (a
decline of ρ) raise the equilibrium skill premium. A lower discount on the future (a
rise of δ) has the same effect. These effects also hold if y¯ = 0.
Proof. Main text.
As a consequence of (B.24), Proposition 2.5 remains valid if applied to the structure
between new finance on the one side and production cum traditional finance on the other
side. We have
Proposition 1.6’. At given Az
Ax
, k, any change in other exogenous fundamentals which
raises the skill premium leads to structural change from production and traditional finance
(X+) towards new finance (Z2).
Proof. Equation (B.24).Finally, the ratio of value-added in financial subsector Z2 to value-added in subsector
Z1 is as in (2.27)
pz2F
pz1D
=
sf η¯
sdη¯ +
1+δ
δ
e¯1
r
pz2
1 + pz2
1 + pz1
pz1
. (B.27)
Since pz1 and y¯ are constant,
∂w¯
∂ω
> 0 immediately implies ∂η¯
∂ω
> 0. Hence, for e¯1 > 0,
the income effect unambiguously leads to structural change from Z1 to Z2 if the skill
premium rises. If e¯1 = 0, no such income effect is at work; yet the relative price effect
remains. For the relative price effect, we only have to consider pz2 because pz1 is constant.
Price pz2 affects the value added structure within finance through two channels: On the
one side, there is the direct effect shown explicitly in (B.27). Since
∂pz2
∂ω
> 0, this channel
tends to increase the share of new finance. On the other side, however, there is the negative
substitution effect in the demand for financial services (
∂sf
∂p
< 0 and ∂sd
∂p
> 0) which drives
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the sectoral structure within finance from Z2 towards Z1. Due to this ambiguous role
of the relative price effect under the alternative specification, within structural change
from Z1 to Z2 is more difficult to model than it was in the benchmark. For high levels
of price pz2 and low subsistence expenditures the substitution effect dominates. Then,
the presented model cannot predict a co-movement of ω and the within structural change
from Z1 to Z2. In the other case, however, Proposition (2.6) applies.
B.4 Data
Table B.1: Parameters survey years 1995-2009
Parameter Data Source Description
L¯ 109m CPS # Low-skilled employees
H¯ 41.1m CPS # High-skilled employees
hL 1755.6 CPS Yearly hours of low-skilled
hH 2025.3 CPS Yearly hours of high-skilled
αx 0.44 CPS Output ela. of high-skilled in X
αz1 0.54 CPS Output ela. of high-skilled in Z1
αz2 0.79 CPS Output ela. of high-skilled in Z2
Ax 32.46 CPS Technology level in X
PT65 $ 11,213 U.S. Bureau of the Census Real poverty threshold <65
PT 65 $ 10,080 U.S. Bureau of the Census Real poverty threshold >65
LEratio 3.83 LE from World Bank Old-age ratio
rf 0.0151 Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis Real federal funds rate
Az1 141.93 Model calibration·Ax-growth Technology level in Z1
Az2 201.88 Model calibration·Ax-growth Technology level in Z2
δ 0.385 Model calibration Discount rate
µ 0.740 Model calibration Certainty measure
Notes: The table shows the averaged values for the time range of survey years t ∈ {1995, . . . , 2009}.
Averages of αj,t =
κj,tωj,t
1+κj,tωj,t
with κj,t =
hHj,tH¯j,t
hL
j,t
L¯j,t
and ωj,t =
wHj,t
wL
j,t
, j ∈ {x, z1, z2}, hHt = h
H
x,t and
hLt = h
L
x,t. Ax,t =
wLx,t
Γx,tω
−αx,t
x,t
with Γx,t = αx,t
αx,t(1 − αx,t)
1−αx,t . PT is the average, real poverty
threshold of a two-people household (nominal values are adjusted by using the CPI-U adjustment
factor to 1999 dollars (i.e., for the base survey year 2000) from CPS with PT65 denoting the relevant
value for households younger than 65 and PT 65 denoting the value relevant for older ones. LEratio
is the average ratio of working-time to retirement: (65 − 20)/(LEt − 65), where LEt denotes life
expectancy in year t; 65 is the retirement age and 20 is the assumed start of the working-life. rf
is the average, real effective federal funds rate (effective federal funds rate adjusted with the CPI-U
adjustment factor from CPS). See bibliography for details on data sources.
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C Appendix: Chapter 3
C.1 Derivations and proofs
C.1.1 Derivation of the investment allocation of benevolent lo-
cal officials
Plugging the fiscal budget constraint into the objective function (3.9) and taking first
order condition, we get
[
π(a, I2; θ)
∂U
∂C
∣∣∣∣
E=EH
+ (1− π(a, I2; θ))
∂U
∂C
∣∣∣∣
E=EL
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡A
∂Y
∂I1
(1− τ)
−
[
π(a, I2; θ) (ϕ¯− ϕ(θ))
∂U
∂E
∣∣∣∣
E=EH
+ (1− π(a, I2; θ)) ϕ¯
∂U
∂E
∣∣∣∣
E=EL
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡B
∂Y
∂I1
+
∂π
∂I2
∂I2
∂I1
[
U(C,EH)− U(C,EL)
]
= 0 (C.1)
The three lines in equation (C.1) represent the tradeoff of local officials in choosing the
optimal investment I1 (and I2 correspondingly using the budget constraint): Marginal
utility from consumption (A), marginal utility from environment (B), and the change
in utility due to a marginal change in the probability of ending up in a good state,
respectively.
Since ∂I2
∂I1
= ∂Y
∂I1
τ − 1, we can divide (C.1) by ∂Y
∂I1
and have
(1− τ)A = B −
∂π
∂I2
(
τ − 1
/
∂Y
∂I1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡X
[
U(C,EH)− U(C,EL)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Z
, (C.2)
whereX represents the marginal impact of an increase in I1 on the probability of successful
policy implementation, and Z is the gap in utility between H and L state.
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I1
Marginal
returns
LHS:
Marginal consumption effect
RHS:
Marginal environmental effects
and marginal return through I2
I∗1 (a)
Figure C.1: Determination of socially optimal investment allocation
To see how the optimal investment is determined, we look at how the expressions on
the LHS and on the RHS of (C.2) react to a change in I1.
A decreases as I1 increases, because output Y increases and drives down marginal
utility from consumption. We illustrate this by a decreasing curve (i.e., LHS) in Figure
C.1.
B increases as I1 increases. As output Y increases with I1, consumption increases and
environmental quality decreases. This drives up the marginal utility from environment.
The last term is less straightforward analytically. To see this more clearly, we take the
partial derivative of the last term with respect to I1. Namely,
∂(XZ)
∂I1
=
∂X
∂I1
Z +
∂Z
∂I1
X. (C.3)
First, since utility is higher in a good state, Z > 0. taking derivative of X with respect
to I1, we have
∂X
∂I1
= 1
/(
∂Y
∂I1
)2 ∂2π
∂I22
(
τ
∂Y
∂I1
− 1
)2
∂Y
∂I1
+
∂π
∂I2
∂2Y
∂I21

 < 0, (C.4)
because ∂
2pi
∂I22
< 0 and ∂
2Y
∂I21
< 0. Therefore, ∂X
∂I1
Z < 0. However, the sign of the second term
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in (C.3) is unclear. Specifically,
∂Z
∂I1
=
(
∂U
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∣∣∣∣
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−
∂U
∂C
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EL
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
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(
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∂U
∂E
∣∣∣∣
EH
− ϕ¯
∂U
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EL
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Λ
∂Y
∂I1
(C.5)
The marginal utility from consumption is higher when environmental quality is better, and
thus ∆ > 0. However, the marginal utility from environment is higher when environmental
quality is lower (i.e., ∂U
∂E
∣∣∣∣
EH
< ∂U
∂E
∣∣∣∣
EL
). Thus, Λ < 0. Therefore, when the impact on
marginal utility from consumption is stronger, ∂Z
∂I1
is positive. Whereas if the impact on
marginal utility from environment is stronger, ∂Z
∂I1
is negative. Furthermore, X is positive
if an increase in I1 increases I2, which is the case if the increase in fiscal budget (i.e.,
τY (a, I1)) due to higher production-related infrastructure investment I1 is more than the
increase in the investment, and vice versa. Therefore, in the end the sign of the last term
in (C.3) depends on the relative magnitude of the marginal utility from consumption and
from environment, and whether an increase in I1 would increase I2.
Given the specification of the functional forms and parameter values, our numerical
results indicate that as I1 increases, XZ decreases (i.e., the negative sign of the first term
in (C.3) dominates). Together with the fact that the marginal utility from environment,
B, increases as I1 increases, we know that the RHS increases as I1 increases. This is
illustrated by the increasing curve in Figure C.1 (i.e., RHS). The investment allocation
under social optimum, I∗(a), is determined by the intersection of the two curves in Figure
C.1.
C.1.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Before proving the proposition, first notice that to achieve a given level of output, Y0,
there exists a minimal amount of investment in production-related infrastructure, I1, for
each level of ability, a ∈ [amin, amax]. Formally,
Y (a, I1) = Y0,
which gives I1 = I(a
−
, Y0
+
). The sign below the variables indicates the sign of the corre-
sponding partial derivatives. Therefore, the output thresholds,
{
Y H , Y L, Y¯ L, Y¯ H
}
, dis-
cussed in Lemma 3.1 case iii) define corresponding thresholds of investment,
{
IH , IL, I¯L, I¯H
}
.
We plot the four thresholds of investment and the maximal feasible investment in Figure
C.2. The region below Imax1 represents the levels of investment I1 that are feasible for
officials of the respective ability levels. Any level above Imax1 is infeasible. By definition,
each curve {Is1}s∈{H,L} indicates the minimal amount of investment required to achieve
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the corresponding production level.
a
I1
Imax1
I¯H1
I¯L1
IL1
IH1
amin a a¯ amax
Figure C.2: Illustration of investment thresholds and maximal feasible investment
The minimal ability amin is chosen such that the maximal feasible production is above
Y H for all officials. In other words, it is possible to choose an investment allocation so
that households do not protest at least in high state. Therefore, to assume a > amin is
equivalent to say that for all officials in the economy, they may stay in office or being
promoted with positive probability.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. For officials with ability a ∈ [amin, a), their maximal feasible
investment is below the I¯L1 curve. This means that these officials will never be protested
against due to overproduction, because the production thresholds Y¯ s, s ∈ {H,L} are not
achievable. Therefore, plugging the expression of Yˆ in (3.15), we have for the officials’
maximization problem
πDA+ (1− πD)
[
A¯− Φ(Y ∗ − Y )(A¯−M)
]
,
with
πD = π(a, I2; θ)1{Y≤Y H} + (1− π(a, I2; θ))1{Y≤Y L},
and Φ(·) be the distribution function of ǫ ∼ N(0, σ2).
Notice that Φ(Y ∗−Y ) increases in Y , the higher the output, the more likely the local
official is promoted. In addition, as output level increases, the probability of household
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protest due to low consumption is lower (i.e., πD decreases in Y ). Therefore, the optimal
choice of the local officials with ability in this interval is to invest all resources into
production to boost output level. This is illustrated by the line segment of Imax1 between
[amin, a).
Now we consider officials with ability a ∈ [a, amax].
We claim that investment levels above I¯H can never be an optimal solution. At this
investment level local output is above Y¯ H . Households protest due to bad environment in
both states. In other words, local officials will be demoted for sure. Officials who are able
to produce Y¯ H can always decrease the level of production and thus avoid households’
protest by invest more resources into environment-related infrastructure. Therefore, I¯1
H
-
curve gives the upper bound of the optimal investment allocation.
In addition, investment levels below I¯L are also not optimal. Since local officials
will not induce household protest at production below Y¯ L, they have an incentive to
produce at least Y¯ L, when it is achievable. In other words, for local officials with ability
a ∈ [a, amax], the optimal allocation problem is to determine whether to produce above
Y¯ L. Furthermore, if local officials produce above Y¯ L but below Y¯ H , household protest
for sure in a bad state, and not in a good state. Therefore, the probability of demotion
is equal to the probability of policy failure, πD = 1 − π(a, I2; θ). And the maximization
problem is given by
max
{I1,I2}
ULO(I1, I2, a, θ), (C.6)
s.t. ULO(I1, I2, a, θ) ≥ Γ(Y¯
L),
where ULO(I1, I2, a, θ) is defined in (3.15), and Γ(Y¯
L) is local officials’ reward when pro-
ducing at output level Y¯ L.
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C.1.3 Ratio of investment allocation
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Figure C.3: Investment ratio, I2/I1. The two vertical dotted lines indicate the lower and upper
threshold of local officials’ ability, a and a¯, respectively.
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